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1. INTRODUCTION 
Courts, commentators, and commercial actors have long touted 
arbitration as the best means of resolving international commercial 
disputes, largely because arbitration—with its many international 
and regional treaties on enforcement of awards1—is a much more 
efficient and reliable means of recovering against a foreign entity 
than litigation is.2  However, the international arbitral regime will 
soon face a new challenge as class arbitration—a United States-
initiated dispute resolution mechanism that has been in existence 
domestically since the early 1980s3—becomes increasingly 
international.4 
Indeed, several factors indicate that international class 
arbitration is on the rise.5  First, the United States Supreme Court’s 
 
1 See, e.g., Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New 
York Convention]; European Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration, Apr. 21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 364; Inter-American Convention on 
International Commercial Arbitration of 1975, Pub. L. No. 101-369, 104 Stat. 448 
(1990) [hereinafter Panama Convention]; Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States [hereinafter 
ICSID Convention], Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159; see generally 
ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION paras. 10-70 to 10-72 (4th ed. 2004) (comparing 
enforcement of arbitral awards under the New York Convention with 
enforcement under local laws and other agreements). 
2 See William W. Park & Alexander A. Yanos, Treaty Obligations and National 
Law: Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 251, 257 (2006) 
(arguing that implementation of the New York Convention should facilitate, 
rather than impede, award recognition). 
3 See Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209–10 (Cal. 1982), rev’d on 
other grounds sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (noting that 
the decision to order a class-wide arbitration is within the discretion of a trial 
court); Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, 
Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 39 (2000) (“Significantly, 
all of the supportive court decisions call upon the court to play an extremely 
active role in resolving the class action issues relevant to the class-wide 
arbitration.” (writing prior to Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) 
(plurality opinion)). 
4 See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 
384 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (interpreting a contract clause permitting arbitration “in the 
City of New York or in the City of London”), appeal docketed (2d Cir. June 2, 2008). 
5 “International class arbitrations” can be defined in either of two ways: (1) as 
class arbitrations giving rise to arbitral awards that are made “in the territory of a 
State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards 
are sought” or (2) as class arbitrations giving rise to arbitral awards “not 
considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and 
enforcement are sought.”  New York Convention, supra note 1, art. I(1).  The latter 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
4 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 30:1 
 
recognition of class arbitration as a viable method of dispute 
resolution in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle6 and the 
subsequent publication of two specialized arbitral rules dealing 
with class arbitration7 mean that class arbitration cannot be seen as 
an anomalous procedural mechanism limited to a few U.S. states.  
In fact, the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) has been 
asked to administer over 120 class arbitrations to date,8 and an 
unknown number of additional class arbitrations may be 
proceeding on an ad hoc basis or under the administration of other 
arbitral institutions that do not publish their class arbitration 
dockets.9  Second, class arbitration has been considered a 
potentially acceptable process outside of the U.S., which 
demonstrates that class arbitration is not limited to one country.10  
Third, a number of international class arbitrations seated in the 
United States already exist.  For example, Harvard College v. JSC 
Surgutneftegaz involves a defendant based in the Russian 
Federation; CBR Enterprises, LLC v. Blimpie International, Inc. 
involves several U.S. defendants with significant international 
holdings that could be subject to international enforcement orders; 
 
category of arbitrations typically includes disputes involving parties from 
different states or involving some important nexus with a foreign state.  See, e.g., 
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2007) (stating “a relationship which is 
entirely between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the 
[New York] Convention unless that relationship involves property located 
abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other 
reasonable relation with one or more foreign states”). 
6 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
7 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS 
ARBITRATIONS (2003), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936 (last visited Oct. 17, 
2008) [hereinafter AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES]; JUDICIAL ARBITRATION AND 
MEDIATION SERVICES CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES (2005), http://www.jamsadr.com 
/rules/class_action.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2008) [hereinafter JAMS CLASS 
ARBITRATION RULES].  The National Arbitration Forum has promulgated a set of 
class arbitration procedures as well, but they are somewhat less detailed and will 
not be discussed at length herein.  See National Arbitration Forum, Class 
Arbitration Procedures, http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources 
/Arbitration%20Class%20Procedures%202007.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2008). 
8 W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 69, 70 (2007). 
9 See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen SA, 435 F.Supp. 2d at 382 (concerning a potential ad 
hoc class arbitration); Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Nations Pers. of Tex., Inc., 343 
F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2003) (same). 
10 See infra notes 228–52 and accompanying text. 
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and Bagpeddler.com v. U.S. Bancorp could include non-U.S. plaintiffs 
as part of its class of up to 400,000 internet vendors.11 
This Article is the first known commentary to discuss the types 
of issues that are beginning to face the international arbitral 
community.  Furthermore, no known law review article or 
scholarly treatise acknowledges the possibility of class arbitrations 
taking place outside the United States.  However, this Article 
identifies several reported decisions from outside the United States 
that shed light on the extent to which international class arbitration 
will be considered a legitimate endeavor.12 
Although international class arbitration raises many issues,13 
this Article focuses on fundamental conceptual objections that can 
 
11 Harvard College v. JSC Surgutneftegaz, Case No. 11 168 T 01654 04 (Am. 
Arbitration Ass’n, Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=5032; 
CBR Enter., LLC v. Blimpie Int’l, Inc. (Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Apr. 19, 2006), 
available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=3929; Bagpeddler.com v. U.S. Bancorp, 
Case No. 11 181 0032204 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n, May 4, 2007),  available at 
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4667; see also Harvard College v. JSC 
Surgutneftegaz, No. 04-6069, 2007 WL 3019234 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2007) 
(confirming international class arbitration award); Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Inc., 343 
F.3d at 362 n.31 (concerning potential international class arbitration); President 
and Fellows of Harvard College Against JSC Surgutneftegaz, 770 PLI/LIT 127 
(2008) (reproducing partial final award on clause construction). 
12 See Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs (not indicated v. 
Can.), [2005] Q.C.C.A. 570, rev’d, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801, digest by Alvarez DIGEST for 
Institute for Transnational Arbitration (ITA), available at http://www 
.kluwerarbitration.com; Kanitz v. Rogers Cable Inc. (Can. v. Can.), [2002] 58 O.R. 
(3d) 299, 21 B.L.R. (3d) 104, digest by Alvarez DIGEST for Institute for Transnational 
Arbitration (ITA), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com; Valencia v. 
Bancolombia (Colom. v. Colom.), digest by Zuleta DIGEST for Institute for 
Transnational Arbitration (ITA) (Arb. Trib. from the Bogotá Chamber of Comm., 
2003), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com; see also infra notes 228–52 
and accompanying text.  It is possible that there are other domestic class 
arbitrations that are not reflected in the international arbitral reporting series. 
13 For example, objections to class arbitration might be based on arguments 
typically made when opposing consolidated proceedings.  See S.I. Strong, 
Consolidation and Class Arbitration in the International Realm: Analogous or 
Anomalous? (forthcoming).  However, objections based on analogies to 
consolidation focus heavily on efficiency rationales and concerns about party 
intent and consent.  See Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 
2d 382, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (discussing court’s interpretation of policy rationales 
concerning consolidation), appeal docketed (2d Cir. June 2, 2008); REDFERN & 
HUNTER, supra note 1, paras. 3-82 to 3-85 (describing the practical and legal 
problems associated with consolidation of arbitrations); Alan Scott Rau & Edward 
F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in International Arbitration Procedure, 30 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 89, 111–18 (1995) (discussing how contractual provisions affect the 
possibility of consolidation).  Other objections to class arbitration may be based on 
contract law, focusing on purported waivers of class treatment.  See Hans Smit, 
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and will likely be raised at the enforcement stage.  The two most 
compelling arguments against international enforcement of a 
foreign class award are likely to be based on due process and 
public policy.14  In many countries, both due process and public 
policy could be raised in a motion to set aside (i.e., vacate) a class 
award, particularly if the nation in question has modeled its 
arbitration laws on the 1985 United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration.15  However, detailed 
discussion of the distinctions between actions to enforce an arbitral 
award and actions to set aside or vacate an arbitral award is 
outside the scope of this Article, which focuses solely on 
enforcement issues. 
The two primary areas of concern—due process and public 
policy—indicate that the debate about the legitimacy of 
international class arbitration will take place at a fundamental 
level, possibly requiring a radical reconceptualization of both (1) 
acceptable procedure in international arbitration and (2) the nature 
of individual procedural rights in arbitration.  First, due process 
concerns reflect the manner in which class arbitration challenges 
 
Class Actions and Their Waiver in Arbitration, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 199, 201 (2004) 
(discussing ability of waiver clauses to withstand contract-based challenges); Jean 
R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class 
Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 75, 75–76 (2004) (discussing attempts by corporations to avoid class 
proceedings through contractual prohibitions); Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 85, 90, 
100 (discussing prohibition of class arbitrations).  Though these are interesting 
areas of inquiry, this Article focuses on two distinct and perhaps more 
fundamental concerns—due process and public policy. 
14 See New York Convention, supra note 1, arts. V(1)(b), V(2)(b) (outlining 
permissible grounds for objecting to the enforcement of an arbitral award).  In this 
Article, the term “due process” is not used in its strict U.S. constitutional sense 
(except in the context of the U.S. class action discussion in section 2.1), but is 
instead used in the broader, international sense, akin to procedural justice or the 
English concept of natural justice.  See John C.L. Dixon, The Res Judicata Effect in 
England of a U.S. Class Action Settlement, 46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 134, 136, 140 (1997) 
(discussing how concepts of natural justice affect English courts’ treatment of class 
action judgments and settlements). 
15 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 
arts. 34(2)(a)(ii), 34(2)(b)(ii), U.N. Doc. A/40/17/Annex I (June 21, 1985) 
[hereinafter UNCITRAL MAL], revised by REVISED ARTICLES OF THE UNCITRAL 
MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, arts. 34(2)(a)(ii), 
34(2)(b)(ii), U.N. Doc. A/61/17/Annex I (July 7, 2006); accord David J.A. Cairns, 
The Spanish Application of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, 22 ARB. INT’L 573, 592 (2006) (discussing the Spanish approach to 
procedural and public policy arguments). 
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established norms about the arbitral process itself.  International 
commercial arbitration developed primarily as a means of 
enforcing bilateral contracts, and the vast majority of its policies 
and procedures reflect that tradition.16  Even multiparty (non-class) 
arbitration is typically viewed through the lens of a two-party 
procedure.17  Class arbitrations challenge these norms due to both 
the size of the classes (which can include hundreds or even 
hundreds of thousands of parties) and their representative nature.  
Nevertheless, the similarities between class arbitrations and 
bilateral arbitrations—particularly at the policy level—outweigh 
the differences.18 
This Article demonstrates that concerns about due process and 
public policy are not sufficient to overcome the presumption in 
favor of enforcement inherent in multilateral treaties such as the 
United Nations’ 1958 Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York 
Convention”).19  Therefore, this Article argues that awards arising 
out of international class arbitrations should be treated at the 
enforcement stage the same way as awards resulting from bilateral 
arbitrations, with no special blanket objections being permitted as a 
result of the special nature of class arbitrations. 
Although further details of class procedure will be discussed 
below, at its core, class arbitration is a representative (class) action 
gone private.  Class actions (which currently exist in a number of 
different legal systems) have been defined as “a procedural joinder 
device that permits one or more persons to initiate a lawsuit as a 
representative of all those similarly situated.”20  By analogy, 
therefore, a class arbitration involves “an arbitrator [or arbitral 
 
16 See JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION para. 16-1 (2003) (“There is a general tendency to presume that 
arbitration involves only two parties.”). 
17 See id. paras. 16-1 to 16-3, 16-32 (outlining the procedural difficulties 
created by multiparty abtritrations). 
18 See infra notes 370–440 and accompanying text. 
19 New York Convention, supra note 1; see infra notes 370–440 and 
accompanying text. 
20 Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of 
Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1726 (2005–2006); see also 
RACHAEL MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS: A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 3 (2004) (providing similar definitions from other 
jurisdictions); Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil—A Model for Civil Law 
Countries, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 334 (2003) (discussing the elements of class action 
suits in Brazil). 
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tribunal] selected and paid by the parties, rather than an elected or 
appointed judge, [who] presides over a class action” and thus 
“decides whether to certify a class, determines the form and 
manner of notice to class members, resolves all issues of law and 
fact, and enters an award that might bind many hundreds or 
thousands of class members.”21  A class arbitration can result when 
a group of individuals (1) suffers the same or similar injury and (2) 
has the same or similar arbitration agreement with the 
defendant(s).22  Several named claimants then bring an action, on 
behalf of themselves and others who are similarly situated, for 
damages and/or for injunctive or declaratory relief.23 
Class arbitrations are an accepted procedure within the United 
States, with over 120 such actions administered by one arbitration 
provider—the AAA—as of early 2007.24  They have also been seen 
in other countries, both common and civil law.25  Although many 
class arbitrations will—like class actions—involve only domestic 
parties, the realities of the global economy mean that international 
class disputes are on the rise.26  Insurance companies, financial 
institutions and manufacturers are only some of the types of 
corporate defendants who will find themselves subject to demands 
for class arbitration.27  Furthermore, international arbitration is 
expected to increase in several areas of law, including the fields of 
consumer, employment and e-commerce law.28 
 
21 Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 70.  Many international arbitrations consist of 
a panel of three arbitrators.  However, for ease of discussion, this Article refers to 
the arbitrator in the singular. 
22 See infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
24 Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 70; see also BERNARD HANOTIAU, COMPLEX 
ARBITRATIONS: MULTIPARTY, MULTICONTRACT, MULTI-ISSUE AND CLASS ACTIONS 257–
79 (2005) (discussing generally the practice of class arbitrations in the United 
States). 
25 See infra notes 228–52 and accompanying text. 
26 See Samuel P. Baumgartner, Class Actions and Group Litigation in 
Switzerland, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 301, 301 (2007) [hereinafter Baumgartner 1] 
(discussing the rise of international class actions). 
27 See Carole J. Buckner, Toward a Pure Arbitral Paradigm of Classwide 
Arbitration: Arbitral Power and Federal Preemption, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 301, 301 
(2004) [hereinafter Buckner 1] (discussing areas of law where class actions and 
class arbitrations are common); Edward F. Sherman, Group Litigation Under 
Foreign Legal Systems: Variations and Alternatives to American Class Actions, 52 
DEPAUL L. REV. 401, 407 (2002) (same). 
28 See Christopher R. Drahozal, New Experiences of International Arbitration in 
the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 233, 250–55 (2006) [hereinafter Drahozal 1] 
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As class arbitrations develop internationally, questions will 
arise about how these proceedings should be structured.  Disputes 
about the arbitral procedure will be raised in international 
enforcement proceedings as due process objections.29  However, 
none of the anticipated objections appear to justify a blanket 
prohibition on international class arbitrations. 
The second major objection to enforcement—public policy—
reflects the tension between how different countries conceptualize 
individual procedural rights.  Unlike common law countries 
(which often permit representative actions, albeit to varying 
degrees), civil law jurisdictions tend to limit or prohibit such 
actions based on two related concerns.  First, plaintiffs have the 
right to choose the time and manner of bringing a cause of action.30  
Second, defendants have the right to mount a full, individualized 
defense of all legal and factual claims brought against them.31  
Representative actions—either in court or in arbitration—
jeopardize both these principles.  Under civil law jurisprudence, 
absent class members are not always considered to be effectively 
choosing to exercise their right to a cause of action, even if they are 
given the opportunity to opt out of the proceeding.32  Similarly, 
defendants are considered unable to defend themselves adequately 
against the generalized claims of absent class members.33 
Class arbitration is currently set up to reflect the common law 
vision of the benefits of representative proceedings.  As class 
arbitration becomes more international, state courts—particularly 
those in civil law countries—will have to consider whether and to 
what extent they should permit foreign conceptions of rights to be 
enforced in arbitration.  As they do so, they should also keep in 
mind the purpose and requirements of enforcement treaties such 
as the New York Convention.  While it is true that individual states 
 
(describing international elements of consumer, employment, and e-commerce 
law). 
29 See infra notes 253–305 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 361–68 and accompanying text. 
32 See, e.g., Richard H. Dreyfuss, Class Action Judgment Enforcement in Italy: 
Procedural “Due Process” Requirements, 10 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 5, 14 (2002) 
(discussing Italian courts’ close scrutiny of American class action judgments); 
Michele Taruffo, Some Remarks on Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective, 11 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 405, 415–17 (2001) (outlining grounds for European 
resistance to American-style class actions). 
33 Dreyfuss, supra note 32, at 26–27. 
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are entitled to structure their legal systems in any way they wish, 
even to the extent that they prohibit the use of representative 
actions in national courts, arbitration is inherently different than 
litigation, and the duties of a court asked to enforce an 
international award are fundamentally different than the duties of 
a court asked to adjudicate the merits of a dispute or even to 
enforce a judgment from a foreign court.34  As the law and policy 
of international arbitration currently stands, it is improper for 
courts to deny enforcement of international class awards based on 
a blanket assertion that the special nature of class arbitration 
violates the public policy of the enforcing state. 
All of these concepts are discussed in more detail below, and 
the Article proceeds as follows.  Section 2 discusses the nature of 
representative actions, identifying the rationales for such actions 
and describing how different conceptions of rights affect the form, 
shape, and availability of a nation’s representative actions.  This 
discussion identifies potential arguments for and against the 
enforcement of class arbitral awards based on public policy, since 
the public policies regarding representative actions in national 
courts may also be used to oppose or enforce international class 
awards. 
Section 3 discusses how class arbitrations typically proceed.  
The focus here is on the procedural rules recently published by two 
arbitration providers, the AAA and JAMS, since those rules will 
likely form the procedural foundation of class arbitration in the 
coming years.  This section also discusses the extent to which the 
arbitral rules mirror the class action provisions of the U.S. Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  These similarities are important because 
the Federal Rules are known to comply with U.S. notions of due 
process, and due process is a likely area of concern in international 
enforcement proceedings.  Therefore, this section introduces 
potential arguments for and against the enforcement of 
international class arbitral awards based on due process. 
Section 4 brings class arbitration into the international realm.  
The section begins with a discussion of class arbitrations in 
countries other than United States, which gives some guidance on 
 
34 See, e.g., Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation S.A. v. Hilmarton Ltd., 
[1992] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 146 (Eng.) (noting that the court was being asked to 
enforce an award, not the contract); Westacre Inv. Inc. v. Jugoimport-SPDR 
Holding Co., [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 65 (Eng. Civ. App.) (same); see also infra notes 
456–67 and accompanying text. 
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the acceptability of the procedure beyond U.S. borders.  The 
section then describes the standards which must be met to lodge a 
successful objection to international enforcement of an award 
based on due process and public policy concerns.  Because the 
New York Convention35 is the primary means by which 
international awards are enforced,36 this Article focuses on the due 
process and public policy provisions in the New York Convention 
as illustrative of the type of arguments that will likely arise in an 
enforcement proceeding.  While it is true that some nations do not 
consider employment or consumer contracts (the most common 
type of dispute to be subject to class arbitration) to be 
“commercial,” and therefore potentially outside the ambit of the 
New York Convention,37 these sorts of due process and public 
policy arguments are not limited to the New York Convention and 
can typically be raised under other international enforcement 
mechanisms and/or national arbitration laws. 
Section 5 weighs the competing legal principles and policy 
concerns to demonstrate that awards resulting from international 
class arbitrations should be treated no differently than awards 
resulting from bilateral or multilateral arbitrations.  This 
conclusion can be reached through reliance on (1) the general pro-
arbitration policy embodied in the New York Convention38 and 
prevalent in many—though not all—national systems39 as well as 
on (2) the policy rationales in favor of class treatment as a remedy 
for widespread injuries, particularly in cases where individual 
recovery would be minimal.40  Although international class 
arbitration challenges pre-existing notions of what constitutes 
 
35 New York Convention, supra note 1. 
36 One hundred and forty-two states have currently ratified, acceded, or 
succeeded to the New York Convention.  See  UNCITRAL, Status: 1958 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(2008), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration 
/NYConvention_status.html. 
37 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. I(3) (noting signatories may 
declare that the New York Convention will apply “only to differences . . . which 
are considered as commercial under the national law of the State making such 
declaration”). 
38 Park & Yanos, supra note 2, at 254, 259. 
39 See infra notes 387–90 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
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proper arbitral procedure41 and, in some cases, may require a state 
to reconsider the nature of individual procedural rights in dispute 
resolution proceedings,42 these objections are insufficient to 
withstand arguments in favor of a rule permitting the enforcement 
of class arbitration awards on the same basis as other arbitral 
awards. 
Section 6 concludes the Article with a discussion of the future 
of international class arbitrations as a matter of procedure and 
enforcement.  The section also summarizes the most important 
issues that courts will have to address when considering whether 
to enforce an international class award. 
2. REPRESENTATIVE AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS AROUND THE 
WORLD 
Although the United States class action is the perhaps the best 
known means of providing representative relief to large groups of 
plaintiffs, most countries have considered their own forms of 
representative or collective relief.43  For example, the European 
Directive on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers’ Interests 
(“European Directive”)44 required all Member States of the 
European Union to assign rights of action to “qualified entities,” 
defined either as organizations (including consumer associations) 
or independent public bodies, that would allow those entities to 
file a group litigation on behalf of a specifically defined group of 
people who had been injured by the defendant’s conduct.  
However, these actions are not entirely analogous to U.S.-style 
class actions, since the European Directive explicitly noted that 
“collective interests mean interests which do not include the 
cumulation of interests of individuals who have been harmed by 
an infringement.”45 
 
41 LEW ET AL., supra note 16, para. 16-1 (noting the presumption is that 
arbitrations involve only two parties, despite the increasing number of multiparty 
proceedings). 
42 See infra notes 90–121 and accompanying text. 
43 Sherman, supra note 27, at 401; see also Taruffo, supra note 32, at 412–13 
(noting European trend not to adopt U.S.-style procedures in representative 
actions). 
44 Council Directive 98/27, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51, 53 (EC). 
45 Id. at 51. 
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In fact, the issue of group rights and injuries is becoming 
increasingly urgent throughout the world.46  The common 
objectives of any class or representative action include principled 
predictability; proportionality of treatment (all class members 
receive some good, potentially smaller than if they had proceeded 
individually, in return for increased efficiency); access to justice; 
judicial economy; and balancing judicial activism and personal 
autonomy.47  Though individual compensation may be a goal, 
participants in group litigation may also seek to bring about social 
or legal change.48 
Though most comparative analyses of class, group, 
representative, or collective actions have been conducted to 
determine whether certain procedures are appropriate for 
“transplantation” into another legal system,49 the following 
discussion has a slightly different aim:  to consider whether and to 
what extent other legal systems would be amenable to enforcing a 
foreign arbitral award issued in a class arbitration and/or acting as 
a seat for class arbitrations.  The fact that representative actions are 
allowed in an increasing number of jurisdictions suggests that class 
arbitrations may be met with approval in some, if not all, states.  
Furthermore, the fact that there is a growing acceptance of these 
types of actions suggests the absence of the type of universal 
hostility to class arbitration that would permit a blanket objection 
based on concerns about due process and public policy under the 
New York Convention.50 
2.1. Class Actions in United States Federal Courts 
Of all the representative actions in the world, the U.S. class 
action is probably the best known in international legal and 
business circles.  However, even within the United States itself, 
 
46 See Baumgartner 1, supra note 26, at 301–03 (discussing the increasing 
global interest in group litigation); see also Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, 
Class Actions for Continental Europe?  A Preliminary Inquiry, 6 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. 
L.J. 217, 267 (1992) (noting the increase in the number of group injuries).  In the 
last thirty years, there have been four international conferences dedicated to 
comparative studies of class actions.  Gidi, supra note 20, at 324 n.22. 
47 MULHERON, supra note 20, at 47–63. 
48 Taruffo, supra note 32, at 407–09. 
49 See Baumgartner 1, supra note 26, at 301–03 (comparing U.S. and Swiss 
group litigation devices); Gidi, supra note 20, at 322 (comparing U.S. and Brazilian 
class action procedures). 
50 See infra notes 370–440 and accompanying text. 
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class actions are both praised and excoriated.51  Some consider such 
actions a lawyer-driven form of “legalized blackmail,” while others 
have characterized them as a “powerful and pervasive 
instrument[] of social change.”52  Although many individual U.S. 
states have their own form of class actions, the U.S. Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure53 have acted as the model for both the 
Supplementary Rules on Class Arbitration adopted by the AAA on 
October 8, 2003 (“AAA Supplementary Rules”)54 and the Class 
Action Procedures adopted by JAMS in February 2005 (“JAMS 
Class Arbitration Rules”),55 and thus will form the basis of the 
following discussion. 
Although Hans Smit has criticized the decision by the AAA 
and JAMS to mirror the U.S. Federal Rules as “an uninspired and 
superficial effort to introduce into arbitration a form of action that, 
on the whole, has not worked properly in litigation and . . . will 
exacerbate the problems it has encountered in court litigation,”56 
the choice was likely made because the U.S. Federal Rules are a 
known and respected commodity that would translate well to a 
new form of action.  As Carole Buckner has said, “[t]he scope of 
due process in class action litigation defines the possible scope of 
due process protection that arbitration providers should consider 
providing in class arbitration.”57 
U.S. class actions can arise in a variety of contexts, though most 
are damages class actions against corporate defendants, with 
approximately one-third of these cases arising in the context of the 
consumer, commercial, or employment fields.58  Banks, insurance 
companies, and manufacturers are typical defendants in class 
actions,59 and claimants can seek injunctive relief in addition to (or 
instead of) money damages.60  Although class actions began as a 
 
51 Anne Bloom, From Justice to Global Peace: A (Brief) Genealogy of the Class 
Action Crisis, 39 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 719, 719 (2006). 
52 Weston, supra note 20, at 1726 (citations omitted). 
53 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
54 AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 7. 
55 JAMS CLASS ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 7. 
56 Smit, supra note 13, at 211. 
57 Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 185, 195 
(2006) [hereinafter Buckner 2]. 
58 Buckner 1, supra note 27, at 301. 
59 Sternlight, supra note 3, at 5. 
60 Jack B. Weinstein, Compensating Large Numbers of People for Inflicted Harms, 
11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 165, 172 (2001). 
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domestic procedural device, they have become increasingly 
transnational.61  This Article assumes the reader’s general 
familiarity with class proceedings under the U.S. Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and thus will focus only on those aspects that 
affect the discussion of international class arbitration.62 
Judge Jack Weinstein, one of the foremost experts on U.S. class 
actions,63 believes class actions include a number of advantages, 
many of which also apply to class arbitration: 
1. They reduce duplication of discovery, motion practice, 
and pretrial procedures. 
2. They allow a single judge to familiarize himself or 
herself with the legal and factual issues. 
3. They provide consistency of results for all the injured 
and for the defendants. 
4. They enhance the possibility of a single action resolving 
the entire problem, hence preventing the need for 
repetitive litigation of similar issues.  Those who opt out 
of the class (as is often possible) will generally represent 
but a small percentage of possible claimants. 
5. They permit plaintiffs’ attorneys to generate enough 
capital to conduct the litigation on a playing field level 
for both sides. 
6. They enhance the possibility of a global settlement, 
which can provide reasonable relief for prospective 
claimants while limiting the costs for both parties and 
providing closure to the dispute for defendants. 
7. They provide the possibility of a single fair punitive 
damage amount instead of repetitive and overlapping 
punishment. . . . 
 
61 See Ilana T. Buschkin, Note, The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in a 
Globalized Economy–Permitting Foreign Claimants to Be Members of Class Action 
Lawsuits in the U.S. Federal Courts, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1563, 1567 (2005) (discussing 
issues involving  non-U.S. victims who pursue class actions  in U.S. courts); see 
also Weinstein, supra note 60, at 167 (describing how the increasingly global 
economy can lead to an increase in international class actions).  The international 
nature of the U.S. class action suggests how and why class arbitrations might 
become equally international. 
62 For a detailed summary of class actions in the United States, see OSCAR G. 
CHASE ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 395–405 (2007). 
63 See Bloom, supra note 51, at 735 (discussing Weinstein’s impact on class 
actions in the United States). 
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8. They give the court power to control legal fees, which 
may otherwise be much greater than warranted. 
9. They allow a single appellate panel to review the case. 
10. Perhaps most important, they permit recoveries for 
small claims by those who may not even know they 
were injured and almost certainly would not bother to 
sue even if they had known.  By, in theory, requiring a 
defendant to pay the entire social cost of its delicts they 
should avoid much of the reason for high punitive 
damages.64 
Julian Lew has identified similar benefits to multiparty 
arbitration (albeit outside the class context), suggesting multiparty 
arbitration should proceed when to do so would encourage 
procedural economy; avoid inconsistent awards; increase fairness 
by facilitating fact-finding and presenting legal and factual 
arguments; address any confidentiality concerns; and uphold the 
equal ability to choose arbitrators.65  Class actions (or arbitrations) 
also allow defendants to bring complex disputes to a close 
relatively quickly, thus allowing defendants to “get on with their 
affairs” and avoid large transactional costs.66 
However, there are also a number of disadvantages associated 
with class actions.  For example: 
1. The judge may lack familiarity with the law if more 
than one jurisdiction’s substantive law must be applied. 
2. They increase the complexity of the litigation. 
3. They place a significant burden on individual courts, 
since they are time consuming, containing more factual 
and legal issues than any individual case. 
4. They remove local issues from their normal venue.  
Forum shopping problems are compounded. 
5. They supersede the local jury’s role and replace it with 
a jury that may be unfamiliar with local conditions. 
6. They often require the application of many different 
substantive laws, some of which are still in a state of 
uncertainty. 
 
64 Weinstein, supra note 60, at 172–74; see also Sternlight, supra note 3, at 28 
(describing the nature and benefit of class actions); Weston, supra note 20, at 1727 
(same). 
65 LEW ET AL., supra note 16, para. 16–92. 
66 Weinstein, supra note 60, at 174–75. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss1/1
 
 
7. They attenuate the usual individual client-attorney 
relationship, creating new ethical pressures. 
8. They are often in significant tension with federalism 
assumptions.  One elected state county judge may bind 
the nation. 
9. They may force defendants to settle because of the 
threat of huge awards. 
10. Finally, there is the fundamental problem that the 
Supreme Court has been dealing with—protecting the 
rights of those class members with little knowledge of 
the suit, virtually no ability to monitor their attorneys, 
and potential conflicts with other members of the 
class.67 
Although most of the advantages of class actions apply equally 
to class arbitration, the disadvantages of judicial class actions do 
not track class arbitration quite as closely, due to the privatized 
nature of arbitration.  For example, the courts are not clogged by 
large cases, since arbitrators work independently, nor are there 
choice of forum or jury issues, since the parties have chosen 
arbitration precisely to avoid such concerns.68  The only real 
concerns involve ethical issues; pressure to settle; and, most 
importantly, due process issues.  Thus class arbitrations would 
seem at least as socially beneficial, and possibly more so, than class 
actions. 
However, class actions force judges to play a unique and 
difficult role.  The Federal Judicial Center notes that judges not 
only must “anticipate[e] the consequences of poorly equipped class 
representatives or attorneys, inadequate class settlement 
provisions, and overly generous fee stipulations” but also “cannot 
rely on adversaries to shape the issues that [the judge] must 
resolve in the class context.”69  In particular, judges need assistance 
from their peers “to determine when class representatives and 
counsel are ‘adequate’ and whether a settlement’s terms are ‘fair’ 
 
67 Id. at 173–74; see also Smit, supra note 13, at 210 (noting criticisms of class 
actions); Sternlight, supra note 3, at 34–37 (same). 
68 See LEW ET AL., supra note 16, paras. 1-7 to 1-30 (defining the features of 
arbitration and comparing these to the features of litigation in national courts). 
69 BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 
MANAGING CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 2 (2005).  Critics 
of class actions have also pointed to abuses associated with self-appointed class 
representatives and class counsel who drive litigation for their own personal 
gains.  Sherman, supra note 27, at 409–11. 
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to the class as a whole, ‘reasonable’ in relation to the class’s 
legitimate claims, and ‘adequate’ to redress class members’ actual 
losses.”70  Judges in class actions can also expect to “determine[] 
when and how to decide class certification motions” and “review[] 
notice plans and notices to the class to ensure the best notice 
practicable,” both of which are central to due process.71 
Indeed, the reason why the court plays this unusually active 
role in administering class actions is “to ensure fairness and to 
protect the due process rights of those class members not 
participating in the case.  The elaborate procedural steps in such 
representative litigation—fairness oversight, notice, adequacy of 
representation, and judicial involvement in class certification— 
reflect important constitutional due process protections.”72  In this 
context, due process “protection includes, at a minimum:  notice, a 
meaningful opportunity to participate, and adequate 
representation.  Rule 23 provisions reflect these constitutional 
requirements, and the court’s role is critical in safeguarding the 
due process rights of absent class members.”73  Of course, notice 
and the opportunity to participate have also received heightened 
protection in international arbitration.74 
As shall be seen below, the same due process concerns also 
exist in class arbitrations.  Indeed, these issues may be particularly 
problematic in international class arbitrations, since courts asked to 
enforce an international award may not be as familiar with the 
types of due process protections that are built into the U.S. system.  
However, as discussed further below, the New York Convention 
offers only limited grounds for non-enforcement, and international 
class awards should pass scrutiny under the international 
standards for enforcement, despite concerns about due process.75 
Responsible arbitrators—like responsible judges—want to 
adopt acknowledged “best practices.”  However, arbitrators in 
class arbitrations—including international class arbitrations—may 
find it difficult to implement some of the Federal Judicial Center’s 
“best practices,” since they do not have the same kind of peer 
 
70 ROTHSTEIN & WILLGING, supra note 69, at 2. 
71 Id. at 2–3. 
72 Weston, supra note 20, at 1714; see also Sternlight, supra note 3, at 32–33 
(describing due process concerns in class actions). 
73 Weston, supra note 20, at 1728. 
74 See infra notes 253–305 and accompanying text. 
75 See infra notes 253–305 and accompanying text. 
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network that judges do and may be restricted—due to 
confidentiality concerns76—from discussing the issues with other 
experienced arbitrators or from using objectors to provide 
additional information to the court, either through written 
submissions or through attendance at a class settlement fairness 
hearing.77  Furthermore, U.S. courts handling class actions often 
work in tandem with other government actors, either on the 
regulatory side or when coordinating class actions that are 
proceeding in different fora, something which may be difficult in 
arbitration.78  Finally, the Federal Judicial Center recognizes that 
some judges must deal with “’[t]ruly’ global settlements [that] will 
include class members whose language is not English and who 
may not be citizens of an English-speaking country.”79  In these 
situations, effective notice—both in judicial class actions and 
international class arbitrations—becomes even more difficult.80  
The problem is compounded by the fact that notice and adequacy 
 
76 LEW ET AL., supra note 16, para. 24-99.  Interestingly, several commentators 
have argued that there is, or should be, a public interest exception to arbitral 
confidentiality.  Loukas A. Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation: 
UPS v. Canada and Methanex Corporation v. United States, 21 ARB. INT’L 211, 211–
212 (2005) [hereinafter Mistelis 1]; Andrew Tweeddale, Confidentiality in 
Arbitration and the Public Interest Exception, 21 ARB. INT’L 59, 59–60 (2005).  
Certainly confidentiality is not the absolute barrier that it once was thought to be. 
See L. Yves Fortier, The Occasionally Unwarranted Assumption of Confidentiality, 15 
ARB. INT’L 131, 131, 139 (1999) (describing instances wherein principle of 
confidentiality may be breached); Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration: 
Beyond the Myth, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1255, 1273 (2006) [hereinafter Reuben 1] (noting 
state and federal law fails to respect confidentiality in arbitration, at least in 
instances involving discovery or admissibility of evidence at trial). 
77 Compare ROTHSTEIN & WILLGING, supra note 69, at 11, 21 with LEW ET AL., 
supra note 16, paras. 16-75, 24-99; see also FIONA MARSHALL & HOWARD MANN, INT’L 
INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW: EXPRESS 
RULES FOR INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATIONS REQUIRED 11 (2006), 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/investment_uncitral_rules_rrevision.pdf 
(describing amicus filings in investor arbitrations); Mistelis 1, supra note 76, at 218, 
221–22 (noting the practice of amicus filings has no counterpart in commercial 
arbitration); Sternlight, supra note 3, at 53 (discussing objectors in class 
arbitrations). 
78 See ROTHSTEIN & WILLGING, supra note 69, at 25–28 (describing the role of 
government actors in U.S. class action litigations). 
79 Id. at 19; see also Debra Lyn Bassett, U.S. Class Actions Go Global: 
Transnational Class Actions and Personal Jurisdiction, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 41, 65–69 
(2003) (highlighting problems relating to notices provided in English to non-
English speakers).  However, arbitrators do not have to comply with the technical 
rules of civil procedure, including those concerning notice, which can make class 
arbitration easier in ways than class actions.  Buschkin, supra note 61, at 1582. 
80 ROTHSTEIN & WILLGING, supra note 69, at 19. 
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of representation typically serve as proxy for due process, allowing 
the court to bind absent class members in a court-administered 
class action.81 
As it turns out, arbitrators dealing with class proceedings may 
stand in a better position than arbitrators handling bilateral 
proceedings.  As will be discussed further below, class arbitrations 
proceeding under the auspices of the AAA are listed on a publicly 
available website.  “[A]lthough arbitrators generally do not create 
precedent and are not bound by other arbitrators’ decisions, 
evidence from the AAA class arbitrations suggests that they may 
be strongly influenced by other arbitration awards in similar 
cases,” thus creating “something akin to informal precedent,” 
particularly in the area of class certification.82  Similarly, “collective 
arbitral wisdom” can arise in certain circumstances.83  In many 
ways, this standardization can be very useful to parties and 
arbitrators in a newly filed international class arbitration.  
Increased confidence about the competence of the arbitrator and 
the procedure is yet another factor in favor of giving international 
class awards the same presumptions in favor of enforcement as are 
given to bilateral awards. 
Throughout a class action, the judge plays a uniquely active 
role in overseeing the proceedings.84  The precise tasks that a judge 
may take on can vary widely, depending on the temperament of 
the judge, the type of case, and the approach taken by counsel.  For 
example, the court might “tak[e] initiative in shaping the suit, 
establish[] strict timelines for litigation, work[] with magistrates, 
devis[e] expert panels to facilitate discovery, direct[] pretrial 
scheduling, and engage[e] in fact-finding, while promoting 
settlement throughout the process.”85  The justification for such 
intensive court control and participation is, again, the protection of 
absent class members.86  The court’s oversight capacity includes 
 
81 Weston, supra note 20, at 1722. 
82 Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 71, 103–04. 
83 Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1085 (2000) 
[hereinafter Reuben 2]. 
84 See Buckner 2, supra note 57, at 201–02 (describing judge’s role in class 
actions, as compared to judge’s role in non-class litigation); Weston, supra note 20, 
at 1731 (same). 
85 Weston, supra note 20, at 1731. 
86 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(1)(B) (emphasizing protection of absent class 
members as an appropriate judicial concern); accord Weston, supra note 20, at 1731 
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not only the adversarial process, but the settlement process as well, 
since Rule 23 requires courts not only to approve any settlement 
between the parties, but also to hold a fairness hearing to ascertain 
whether the settlement is “‘fair’ to the class as a whole, ‘reasonable’ 
in relation to the class’s legitimate claims, and ‘adequate’ to redress 
class members’ actual losses.”87  Although this sort of activist 
approach may appear improper to civil law lawyers,88 international 
commercial arbitration contemplates the possibility of more active 
adjudication than occurs in litigation, so the need for a hands-on 
arbitrator in a class proceeding is not problematic as a matter of 
practice and theory.89 
2.2. Representative Actions Around the World 
A growing number of jurisdictions have implemented their 
own versions of collective and representative actions.90  However, 
these other models do not necessarily resemble that found in the 
U.S.  In fact, many states—particularly civil law systems—have 
deep-seated concerns about the U.S. model due to fundamental 
conceptual differences about how individual procedural rights 
operate.91  Indeed, some commentators have claimed that if “major 
 
(describing the role of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in directing 
court activity). 
87 ROTHSTEIN & WILLGING, supra note 69, at 2. 
88 See Baumgartner 1, supra note 26, at 310–11 (asserting that U.S.-style class 
actions are inconsistent with Swiss norms and jurisprudential traditions); Cappalli 
& Consolo, supra note 46, at 290–91 (describing European distrust of American 
judicial practices in class action proceedings); Gidi, supra note 20, at 371 
(discussing Brazilian view of U.S.-style representative actions). 
89 See Rau & Sherman, supra note 13, at 91–92, 97 (stating that international 
arbitrators play a more active role in directing the proceedings than common law 
judges). 
90 See generally CHASE ET AL., supra note 62, at 390–434 (describing collective 
and representative actions around the world); Baumgartner 1, supra note 26, at 
308–09 (discussing class or representative proceedings in a variety of common law 
systems); Gidi, supra note 20, at 312–13 (noting that although class or 
representative proceedings are generally disfavored in civil law nations, both 
Quebec and Brazil have adopted types of class action litigation). 
91 See Baumgartner 1, supra note 26, at 320–21 (basing the Swiss emphasis on 
individual causes of action on nineteenth century German Pandectism and 
Kantian concepts of free will); Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 46, at 264 (noting 
U.S. class actions are legally “inconceivable” in the civilian mindset); Gidi, supra 
note 20, at 344–45 (discussing the concept of “subjective right” that is prevalent in 
the civil law and identifying Hans Kelsen as one of the few writers in English who 
has discussed “subjective rights”). 
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legal innovation” is to occur in the area of representative actions, 
“civil law jurists must first arrive at a consensus to change the 
‘science’” upon which the civil law is built.92 
Although a detailed jurisprudential discussion is outside the 
scope of this Article, the differences in mindset are pronounced.  
First and foremost, civil law jurisdictions traditionally emphasize 
the individual nature of legal claims, a notion that would be 
violated by a representative mechanism that disposes of the rights 
of absent class members.93  This is because civil law nations 
interpret a class action—even with an opt-out provision—as an 
infringement of a non-representative plaintiff’s right to decide 
when and how to exercise his or her right to a cause of action.94  
Because the right to an individual cause of action is inviolate and 
cannot be overcome by arguments of social or judicial efficiency,95 
civil law nations resist a wide rule allowing representative actions. 
Furthermore, those civil law systems that have instituted group 
or collective actions have typically not done so by creating general 
procedural devices to be used in a wide variety of circumstances; 
instead, the new actions are usually subject-matter specific and 
address particularly egregious commercial practices.96  For 
example, in 1988 the European Union addressed consumer 
protection issues through the European Directive, leading to 
legislative reforms at the individual Member State level, following 
a similar European-wide action in 1985 concerning product 
liability.97  Individual nations have also taken action, with 
 
92 Gidi, supra note 20, at 346. 
93 See Baumgartner 1, supra note 26, at 310–11 (noting that the Swiss emphasis 
on the individual’s right to be heard “would need to be slighted in complex 
cases”); Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 46, at 233 (stating that civil law nations 
disfavor the American class action approach because they consider litigation a 
“matter for individual enterprise”); Gidi, supra note 20, at 385–86 (noting how the 
concept of res judicata in civil law systems creates problems for advocates of 
representative proceedings); Taruffo, supra note 32, at 416 (discussing the scope of 
res judicata in civil law systems). 
94 Gidi, supra note 20, at 344–45. 
95 See Weinstein, supra note 60, at 172–74 (listing advantages of class actions). 
96 See Taruffo, supra note 32, at 411; accord Gidi, supra note 20, at 313 n.2, 348 
(noting specific instances in which civil law nations have created limited recourse 
to representative actions through narrowly drafted legislation). 
97 Council Directive 98/27, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51 (EC); Council Directive 
85/374, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 (EC); CHASE ET AL., supra note 62, at 406.  For an 
analysis of consumer arbitration in Europe, see Christopher R. Drahozal & 
Raymond J. Friel, Consumer Arbitration in the European Union and the United States, 
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Germany passing domestic legislation in 2005 concerning injuries 
suffered by investors or shareholders in situations involving 
takeover offers.98  This approach not only maintains respect for 
individual procedural rights, it also reflects the civil law’s 
preference for having the legislature, rather than the judiciary, 
constitute the means of addressing mass injuries.99 
In addition to the jurisprudential concerns, there are pragmatic 
issues.  Lawyers in civil law countries are suspicious of any 
procedure that requires a great deal of judicial intervention, since 
judges typically do not wield that kind of power in civil law 
systems.100  Furthermore, many civil law lawyers are suspicious of 
American-style class actions because they believe (mistakenly) that 
certain litigation practices that they see as highly problematic—
including contingency fees, punitive damages, and massive 
discovery—are a necessary part of the class action mechanism.101 
Thus it is not surprising that representative actions are found 
primarily in common law jurisdictions, with countries such as 
Canada (including Quebec, the country’s only civil law province)102 
 
28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 357, 379–83 (2002) (comparing variations in  dispute 
resolution clauses based on jurisdiction). 
98 CHASE ET AL., supra note 62, at 413.  Other European states have addressed 
environmental protection, labor law, sex and race discrimination, abusive 
measures in contracts of adhesion, and other commercial practices considered to 
be harmful to certain segments of society.  Gidi, supra note 20, at 313 n.2. 
99 Baumgartner 1, supra note 26, at 310–11; Gidi, supra note 20, at 371. 
100 See Baumgartner 1, supra note 26, at 311 (describing civil law concerns 
about class actions); Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 46, at 290–91 (noting the 
passivity of the  civil law judge); Gidi, supra note 20, at 319 (noting “[a] common 
misconception” about civil law judges is that they exercise “great power over the 
conduct of the proceedings;” in fact, civil law judges’ discretion is primarily 
limited to the receipt of evidence).  However, international commercial arbitration 
permits a great deal of procedural flexibility, so an activist arbitrator in a class 
arbitration might be acceptable to a civil law lawyer.  See Rau & Sherman, supra 
note 13, at 91–92, 97 (describing the more active role adopted by arbitrators). 
101 See, e.g., Baumgartner 1, supra note 26, at 311 (discussing presumptions 
made regarding U.S.-style class actions); Gidi, supra note 20, at 322, 324 n.22, 371 
(discussing the evolution of the “traditional myth” regarding U.S. class actions 
amongst civil law scholars). 
102 Class Proceedings Act, 1992 S.O., ch. 6 (Ontario, Can.); Class Proceedings 
Act, 1996 R.S.B.C., ch. 50 (British Columbia, Can.); The Class Actions Act, 2001 
S.S., ch. C-12.01 (Saskatchewa, Can.); Manitoba Class Proceedings Act, 2002 S.M., 
ch. C140 (Can.); Class Actions Act, 2001 S. Nfld., ch. C-18.1 (Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Can.); Alberta Class Proceedings Act, 2003 S.A., ch. C-16.5 (Can.); Code 
of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., ch. C-25, at arts. 999–1051 (Quebec, Can.); Western 
Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton [2001] 201 D.L.R. 385, 534 (Can.); see Law 
Society Amendment Act (Class Proceedings Funding), 1992 S.O., 1002 ch. 7 
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and Australia103 recognizing a broad form of such actions, similar 
to that found in the United States.  This suggests that Canadian 
and Australian courts will not experience any conceptual 
difficulties in enforcing an award issued by a class arbitration 
seated in the United States.  The similarities between Canadian, 
Australian, and American class proceedings also suggest that 
Canadian and Australian courts would be amenable to having a 
class arbitration seated within their jurisdiction.104 
England, another common law jurisdiction, permits 
representative relief, but on a limited basis and to a much lesser 
degree than Canada or Australia.105  Nevertheless, England 
adopted new provisions for group litigation in May 2000 to 
provide “case management of claims which give rise to common or 
 
(providing funding for class proceedings); see also CHASE ET AL., supra note 62, 390–
434 (describing collective or representative actions around the world); MULHERON, 
supra note 20, at 8 (discussing the enactment of Ontario’s Class Proceedings Act of 
1992); S. Gordon McKee & Martha Cook, Class Actions in Canada: 2005 State of the 
Union, 73 DEF. COUNS. J. 31, 31, 42 (2006) (detailing recent developments in class 
actions in Canada); Sherman, supra note 27, at 429 (noting the growing number of 
jurisdictions that are adopting class proceedings); Janet Walker, Crossborder Class 
Actions: A View From Across the Border, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 755, 775–76, 796 
(evaluating the willingness of Canadian courts “to recognize the certification of a 
class action”).  Unlike some other countries that oppose the idea of a “private 
attorney general,” Canadian class proceedings “follow the American model by 
relying upon ‘lawyer-entrepreneurs to initiate and drive class actions, [and] 
allowing lawyers to risk non-payment for losing cases in the hopes of recovering 
substantial court-awarded contingency fees when the cases are successful.’”  
Sherman, supra note 27, at 430 (quoting Garry D. Watson, Class Actions: The 
Canadian Experience, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 269, 273 (2001)). 
103 Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, c. 33 (Austl.); MULHERON, supra note 
20, at 6–8; Sherman, supra note 27, at 424–29.  Class actions in Australia may be 
brought for any type of claim and regardless of the type of remedy sought.  
Sherman, supra note 27, at 426. 
104 Indeed, Canada appears to have already had some experience with 
domestic class arbitrations.  See infra notes 235–47 and accompanying text.  
However, because the judicial discovery process in Canada is much less onerous 
than it is in the United States, there may be less incentive to have class procedures 
in arbitration rather than the courts.  Furthermore, recent legislation in certain 
Canadian provinces limiting the enforceability of arbitration clauses in consumer 
contracts may further reduce the likelihood of class arbitration in those regions. 
105 See ENG. CIV. PRO. R. 19.6 (providing that the parties in a representative 
action must have the same interest in a claim); MULHERON, supra note 20, at 67–68 
(citing Markt & Co. Ltd. v. Knight Steamship Co. Ltd., [1910] 2 K.B. 1021 (CA)); 
Dixon, supra note 14, at 143, 146–47 (further discussing the “same interest” 
requirement); see generally J.J. Fawcett, Multi-Party Litigation in Private International 
Law, 44 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 744 passim (1995) (examining multi-party litigation 
under English law). 
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related issues of fact or law.”106  The new form of action was 
created in response to the European Directive,107 which required all 
Member States of the European Union to assign rights of action to 
“qualified entities,” defined either as organizations, including 
consumer associations, or independent public bodies, allowing 
those entities to file a group litigation on behalf of a specifically 
defined group of people who had been injured by the defendant’s 
conduct.108  However, these actions do not take the same form as 
class actions in the United States, since the European Directive 
explicitly noted that “collective interests mean interests which do 
not include the cumulation of interests of individuals who have 
been harmed by an infringement.”109  The English group action 
thus reflects the civil law view that individuals may not act as 
private attorneys general, as is permitted and encouraged in the 
United States.110  The English group action also suggests that future 
developments in English group and collective actions will follow 
the European model, addressing specific legal subjects (as the 
European Directive did) rather than undertaking wholesale 
procedural reforms that can be used in a variety of areas of law.111 
Although England has not adopted a broad form of 
representative class action for its own use, it has considered the 
enforcement of U.S. class action judgments and found that they do 
 
106 ENG. CIV. PRO. R. 19.10; see also Rachael Mulheron, From Representative Rule 
to Class Action: Steps Rather Than Leaps, 24 CIV. JUST. Q. 424, 448–49 (2005) (noting 
that English courts have sought to interpret the representative rule as requiring 
commonality, rather than identicality, of interest); Rachael Mulheron, Some 
Difficulties With Group Litigation Orders—And Why a Class Action is Superior, 24 CIV. 
JUST. Q. 40, 47–49 (2005) (examining difficulties with the new group litigation 
provisions). 
107 Council Directive 98/27, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51 (EC); Louis Degos & Geoffrey 
V. Morson, Class System: The Reforms of Class Action Laws in Europe are as Varied as 
the Nations Themselves, 29 L.A. LAW. 32, 34 (2006). 
108 Council Directive 98/27, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51 (EC); see also Sherman, supra 
note 27, at 418–19 (discussing the European Directive); Elena Torres, In Unity, Is 
There Strength? Representative Claims—Overview of Some European Developments, 12 
INT’L CO. & COM. L. REV. 178 (2001). 
109 Council Directive 98/27, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51 (EC). 
110 Sherman, supra note 27, at 418. 
111 See Degos & Morson, supra note 107, at 38–39 (noting that the European 
model of class proceedings focuses on specific areas of law and assigns rights to 
associations rather than individuals); Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 13, at 98 
(suggesting that, unlike the United States, European countries with large-scale 
bureaucracies charged with protecting consumer rights do not need to rely on 
class action). 
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not violate the principles of “natural justice,” which are similar to 
U.S. notions of due process.112  So long as notice, along with the 
opportunity to opt out or object to the class proceeding or 
settlement, is given to class members, the requirements of natural 
justice have been met.113  This bodes well for actions to enforce 
foreign class arbitral awards in England, since it suggests that—so 
long as due process exists—there is no per se policy rule against 
class proceedings.114  Furthermore, it also suggests that England 
might not be adverse to acting as the seat of a class arbitration, so 
long as the proper safeguards concerning natural justice and due 
process are in place.115 
Unlike common law jurisdictions, civil law jurisdictions 
typically exhibit vigorous objections to representative actions on 
both pragmatic and philosophic grounds, and resist attempts to 
transplant what is seen as a U.S. or common law mechanism into a 
civil law system.116  Few civil law nations permit representative 
relief, although Brazil117 and Colombia118  have apparently taken 
strides in that direction. Switzerland, an important jurisdiction due 
 
112 See Campos v. Kentucky & Ind. Terminal R.R. Co. [1962] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
459, 473 (noting, obiter, that a foreign class action judgment could give rise to a 
plea of res judicata in English courts if “the party alleged to be bound had been 
served with the process which led to the foreign judgment”); Dixon, supra note 14, 
at 136, 140 (arguing that a U.S. class action decision would not violate English 
principles of natural justice). 
113 Dixon, supra note 14, at 148 (citing Jacobson v. Frachon [1927] 138 L.T. 386, 
390, 392 (CA)).  This standard was adopted in Adams v. Cape Industries Plc., even 
though the procedures there did not rise to the necessary level.  [1990] 2 A.C. 433, 
556–67 (noting lack of objective assessment of individual damages violated 
principles of justice); see also Dixon, supra note 14, at 150  (arguing that the 
decision in Cape Industries does not suggest that a U.S. class action would violate 
natural justice). 
114 Dixon, supra note 14, at 150–51. 
115 England’s pro-arbitration policy would also suggest a pro-class arbitration 
stance.  See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Friendliness: Promises of Principle and Realities 
of Practice, 23 ARB. INT’L 477, 480 (2007) (discussing factors demonstrating 
England’s pro-arbitration stance). 
116 See supra notes 90–101 and accompanying text.  However, the passage of 
the European Directive has led to some forms of collective actions in continental 
Europe.  CHASE ET AL., supra note 62, at 395–405. 
117 Gidi, supra note 20, at 312–13 (discussing the Public Civil Action Act (1985) 
and Consumer Code). 
118  See Valencia v. Bancolombia (Colom. v. Colom.), digest by Zuleta DIGEST 
for Institute for Transnational Arbitration (ITA) (Arb. Trib. from the Bogotá 
Chamber of Comm., 2003), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com.  
(referencing legislation regarding class actions in Colombia). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss1/1
 
 
to its standing in the international arbitral community,119 permits 
an association action (similar to that mandated by the European 
Directive) at civil law, though the right to relief is expanded 
somewhat for administrative law matters, allowing some 
individuals to initiate a representative proceeding.120  However, 
Switzerland’s strongly pro-arbitration stance suggests that 
Switzerland would both enforce a class award and act as a seat of 
class arbitration, even though representative actions are not 
common or widely available in Swiss courts.121 
2.3. How the Availability of Representative Actions Affects 
International Class Arbitration 
Although international class arbitration is a new and 
developing dispute resolution mechanism, class or representative 
actions have been in existence for much longer, as the preceding 
discussion has demonstrated.  They are most developed and most 
prevalent in the United States, both in their arbitral and judicial 
forms.122  However, the fact that an increasing number of 
jurisdictions are embracing representative actions suggests that 
some of the hostility to representative actions is waning. 
As will be discussed in more detail below, the growing 
international acceptance of representative actions is important 
because it offsets any arguments that international class arbitration 
is presumptively improper as an unusual and jurisprudentially 
unsound mechanism that should not be given the benefit of the 
pre-enforcement policies inherent in the New York Convention.  
Any objections that can be raised to the nature of representative 
actions—be they judicial or arbitral—exist only at the domestic 
level, not the international level.  There is no international 
 
119 Paulsson, supra note 115, at 477 n.2. 
120 Baumgartner 1, supra note 26, at 332 (discussing the civil law Verbandsklage 
and the administrative law Verbandsbeschewerde).  Shareholder litigation is another 
area of group litigation in Switzerland.  Id. at 334. 
121 Paulsson, supra note 115, at 496. 
122 See Samuel P. Baumgartner, Debates Over Group Litigation in Comparative 
Perspective, 2 INT’L L. F. DU DROIT INTERNATIONALE 254, 255 (2000) [hereinafter 
Baumgartner 2] (noting that “the United States has had the most extensive 
experience with class actions”); Sherman, supra note 27, at 401–03 (discussing the 
prevalence of class actions in the United States as compared to other countries); 
see also American Arbitration Association Searchable Class Arbitration Docket, 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25562 (last visited Oct. 17, 2008) (exemplifying 
the large number of American class arbitration cases). 
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consensus that representative actions violate agreed notions of due 
process or public policy; instead, the trend seems to be going in the 
opposite direction, with states agreeing that representative actions 
are proper, if not on a wholesale basis, then at least in certain fields 
such as consumer protection, shareholder actions, and other 
economically-oriented areas of law. 
Although arbitration—as a more informal dispute resolution 
mechanism—is not meant to mimic litigation, certain lessons can 
be drawn from shifts in litigation policy.  First, whenever 
litigation—particularly on the global scale, as is the case with 
representative actions—becomes more informal and relaxed, 
arbitration can and should follow the lead of the courts.  It is 
inappropriate for states to take a more rigid view of the processes 
that are permitted in arbitration than they do of the processes that 
are permitted in litigation.  Certainly, parties may always choose to 
adopt stricter rules of procedure than are required in courts (so 
long as due process, such as the ability to present one’s case, 
remains intact), but states—particularly signatories to the New 
York Convention—ought not increase obstacles to arbitration 
when litigation is becoming more inclusive.123  Thus, the 
established acceptance of representative actions in some states and 
the increasing acceptance of such actions in other states suggest 
that international class arbitration should be accepted as well. 
Second, to the extent that there exists a split in the level of 
acceptance of representative actions in national courts, that split of 
opinion demonstrates a lack of international consensus regarding 
the legitimacy of representative actions.  As it stands, the 
jurisprudence on the New York Convention indicates that 
objections to enforcement based on due process and/or public 
policy must view such objections from an international, rather than 
purely domestic, perspective.124  Therefore, states may not allow 
purely domestic concerns to prohibit enforcement of international 
class awards. 
Finally, even those states that remain adamantly opposed to 
representative actions ought not take a restrictive stance towards 
the enforcement of class awards.  Arbitration is expected and 
allowed to adopt procedures that would not be permitted in 
national courtrooms, and the enforcement of an international 
 
123 See infra notes 374–434 and accompanying text. 
124 See infra notes 374–434 and accompanying text. 
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arbitral award does not require national courts to indicate their 
approval of a particular dispute resolution mechanism.125  Instead, 
a court may protect the integrity of its national legal system and 
national policies by recognizing that representative actions may be 
allowed in arbitration but not in litigation.126 
3. CLASS ARBITRATIONS 
3.1. Roots of Class Arbitration 
Class arbitration has existed in the United States for over 
twenty-five years127 and has been seen in other countries as well.128 
Those jurisdictions that permit class arbitration have determined 
that its procedures meet established due process standards.  
However, each state’s analysis has, thus far, been limited to 
domestic criteria, with each jurisdiction considering how well the 
process aligns with national due process standards.  This result 
makes sense when one considers that most domestic class 
arbitrations will likely reflect the values and procedures of 
domestic class (or representative) actions.  However, as class 
arbitration moves onto the international playing field, it is 
necessary to consider the extent to which the process lives up to 
internationally recognized standards of due process. 
As discussed further below, class arbitrations – even those that 
closely track certain national litigation procedures – appear to 
comply with international due process norms.129  So long as 
 
125 See infra notes 461–62 and accompanying text. 
126 See infra notes 461–62 and accompanying text. 
127 See, e.g., Keating v. Superior Ct., 645 P.2d 1192, 1209–10 (Cal. 1982), rev’d 
on other grounds sub nom., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) 
(constituting one of the first class arbitration cases in the United States); Sternlight, 
supra note 3, at 38–39 (noting that the Keating court was the first to consider the 
desirability and feasibility of class arbitration). 
128 Kanitz v. Rogers Cable Inc. (Can. v. Can.), [2002] 58 O.R. 3d 299, 21 B.L.R. 
(3d) 104, digest by Alvarez DIGEST for Institute for Transnational Arbitration (ITA), 
available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com; see also Dell Computer Corp. v. 
Union des consommateurs (not indicated v. Can.), [2005] Q.C.C.A. 570, rev’d, 
[2007] 2 S.C.R. 801, digest by Alvarez DIGEST for Institute for Transnational 
Arbitration (ITA), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com; Valencia v. 
Bancolombia (Colom. v. Colom.), digest by Zuleta DIGEST for Institute for 
Transnational Arbitration (ITA) (Arb. Trib. from the Bogotá Chamber of Comm. 
2003), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com.  It is possible that there are 
other domestic class arbitrations that are not reflected in the international arbitral 
reporting series. 
129 See infra notes 253–305 and accompanying text. 
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international standards are met, international class arbitrations are 
eligible for the pro-enforcement presumptions contained within 
the New York Convention.  However, critics of arbitration claim it 
is “an inferior system of justice, structured without due process, 
rules of evidence, accountability of judgment and rules of law.”130  
Any determinations made in an arbitration are “not intended to 
serve the public interest, but only that of the parties who have paid 
for the arbitration,”131 which could arguably conflict with the 
espoused public interest aspects of judicial class actions.132 
Although many of the issues concerning international 
arbitration have been refined over the years, international class 
arbitration creates a whole new set of concerns.133  For example, 
some opponents point to the view of arbitration as a contractual 
construct and argue that if the parties to the arbitration do not 
explicitly agree to class disposition, then it is improper to proceed 
as such.134  The argument, which is outside the scope of this Article, 
is similar to that made in cases involving consolidation of 
arbitration as well as cases involving third party intervention and 
joinder in arbitration.135 
 
130 Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 751 n.12 (8th Cir. 
1986); see Weston, supra note 20, at 1715 (quoting Stroh Container Co.); Weidemaier, 
supra note 8, at 71–81 (discussing various criticisms of arbitration); see also Buckner 
1, supra note 27, at 306–08 (discussing historical hostility toward arbitration); 
Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 
70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1947 (1996) (noting the historical “stigma of illegitimacy” that 
attached to arbitral awards due to perceived deviations from legal norms).  Many 
U.S. critics of arbitration focus on employment and consumer arbitration, 
although there are those who mount rigorous defenses of those particular types of 
arbitration, even in the realm of class arbitration.  Compare Sternlight & Jensen, 
supra note 13, at 75–76, 92 (discussing use of arbitration to avoid consumer class 
actions) with Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration 
Agreements–With Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. 
AM. ARB. 251, 274–76 (2006) (discussing prohibitions on class treatment in both 
litigation and arbitration). 
131 Carbonneau, supra note 130, at 1958. 
132 Weinstein, supra note 60, at 172–74. 
133 Sternlight, supra note 3, at 45–53. 
134 See, e.g., W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and 
Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 30 TEX. INT’L L. J. 1, 8 (1995) (stating 
“[d]esigned as a system of private justice, arbitration is a creation of contract”); 
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for 
Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REV. 473, 476 (1987) (noting “[a]rbitration is . . . a 
creature of contract”). 
135 See, e.g., REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, paras. 3–82 to 3–85; LEW ET AL., 
supra note 16, paras. 16–39 to 16–40 (noting that involuntary consolidation is 
considered contrary to arbitral notions of party autonomy); S.I. Strong, 
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Furthermore, arguments have been made that class arbitrations 
in the United States improperly infringe upon the due process 
rights of unnamed, non-participating class members.136  However, 
the issue is exacerbated in domestic arbitrations because arbitrators 
are not considered “state actors,” which means that parties in 
arbitration are not entitled to the full panoply of constitutional due 
process protections.137  By agreeing to participate in an arbitration, 
parties waive some of their due process rights.138  This is true not 
only in the United States but in other countries as well.139  
However, this does not appear to be a universal rule:  for example, 
the Spanish Constitutional Court has held that certain fundamental 
rights—particularly the procedural right of defense—that are 
guaranteed by the Spanish Constitution are inviolate, even in 
arbitration.140  Although the question of the extent to which due 
 
Intervention and Joinder as of Right in International Arbitration: An Infringement of 
Individual Contract Rights or a Proper Equitable Measure? 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
915 (1998) (exploring whether the “intervention or joinder of third parties as of 
right in an arbitral proceeding is wise, necessary, and legally possible”). 
136 Weston, supra note 20, at 1719–20. 
137 Buckner 2, supra note 57, at 203–14, 231–39, 250; Reuben 2, supra note 83, at 
990–1017; Weston, supra note 20, at 1722, 1745–67. 
138 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94–96 (1972); see also Buckner 2, supra note 
57, at 214–15 & n.207 (citing numerous federal court decisions); Stephen J. Ware, 
Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of 
Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 170 (2004) (discussing 
various waivers of procedural due process rights); Weston, supra note 20, at 1742 
(“Constitutional guarantees apply to litigants in state and federal courts and in 
situations where ‘state action’ is involved, but not to the activities of private 
actors.”).  But see Reuben 2, supra note 83, at 1019–53 (discussing waivers to due 
process rights under the Federal Arbitration Act and state arbitration statutes); 
Weston, supra note 20, at 1722–23 (“Presumably, an agreement to arbitrate is not 
necessarily consent to forgo due process rights—‘it merely provides an alternative 
forum for the adjudication of such rights.’”). 
139 See Aleksandar Jaksic, Procedural Guarantees of Human Rights in Arbitration 
Proceedings—A Still Unsettled Problem?  24 J. INT’L ARB. 159, 165 (2003) (arguing 
that claimants are unaware that bringing their claims in certain fora can mean the 
waiver of certain due process rights); Judith O’Hare, The Denial of Due Process and 
the Enforceability of CIETAC Awards Under the New York Convention: the Hong Kong 
Experience, 13 J. INT’L ARB. 179, 185 (1996) (discussing the waiver of due process 
rights in Hong Kong); Adam Samuel, Arbitration, Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Generally and the European Convention on Human Rights: An Anglo-Centric View, 21 J. 
INT’L ARB. 413, 416–19, 426–47 (2004) (stating that parties consenting to arbitration 
waive their rights under Article 6(1) of the European Convention); Tweeddale, 
supra note 76, at 67–68 (discussing how the European Court of Human Rights has 
stated that the right to a public hearing before a country’s national courts is 
subject to implied limitations). 
140 Cairns, supra note 15, at 593. 
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process rights can be waived is an issue in international arbitration, 
the “state actor” problem does not arise in international disputes, 
because article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention explicitly 
protects certain key rights by allowing objections to enforcement 
based on violations of due process.141  The question, therefore, is 
how the special due process concerns associated with class 
arbitration measure up to the due process requirements protected 
under the New York Convention.142  Due process-based objections 
to international class arbitrations will likely focus on the 
procedures adopted by the arbitrator.143 
3.2. Procedures in Class Arbitration 
3.2.1. Introduction 
Because of the large number of reported class arbitrations in 
the United States and the anticipated extent of U.S. influence on the 
development of international class arbitration,144 it makes sense to 
begin an analysis of the procedures used in class arbitration by 
looking at the U.S. model.  As it currently stands, “[n]o statute, 
state or federal, prescribes the rules or procedures for class 
arbitrations to ensure that the process is uniform, fair, or efficient.  
Moreover, whether any level of court involvement is required—or 
even permissible—is an open question.”145  The U.S. Supreme 
Court recently ruled that the arbitrator will determine whether 
class arbitration is appropriate, as well as the proper procedure for 
a class arbitration, suggesting that U.S. courts either will not, need 
not, or should not participate in the class arbitration proceedings, 
 
141 See, e.g., New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(b) (describing 
permissible objections to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards). 
142 Weston, supra note 20, at 1723. 
143 Id. at 1719–20.  Procedures for class arbitration are still developing, even in 
the United States, for although the U.S. Supreme Court legitimized class 
arbitration as a dispute resolution procedure in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 
the decision provided little guidance beyond the central holding that the 
arbitrator is to decide whether the arbitration agreement permits class arbitration.  
539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion); see also Smit, supra note 13, at 201 
(discussing Bazzle).  In particular, Bazzle gave no guidance as to the form of the 
class arbitration process itself and what roles the court and the arbitrators would 
play respectively.  Weston, supra note 20, at 1718, 1721, 1733–34. 
144 See infra note 225 and accompanying text. 
145 Weston, supra note 20, at 1723. 
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absent an invitation by the arbitrator.146  Furthermore, international 
arbitrators have long held the power (and indeed, the duty) to 
establish the necessary procedures and determine any procedural 
issues.147  Typically, arbitrators respect party autonomy to the 
greatest degree possible, not only because arbitration is considered 
a contractual construct but also because enforcement of an 
international arbitral award may be denied if the procedure was 
not in accordance with the agreement of the parties.148 
When considering due process in class arbitration, two areas of 
inquiry arise:  the extent to which the courts will be involved in (1) 
the substance and (2) the shape of the process.  Non-class 
arbitration considers the second question to some extent, since 
certain due process standards must be met even if the entire 
panoply of constitutional protections do not apply in bilateral 
arbitration.  However, the first question—which relates to the 
possibility that a court may need to adopt a special role during the 
substantive proceedings149 (to protect the rights of absent class 
members in class arbitrations)—is unique to class arbitrations.  It is 
particularly problematic in international class arbitrations, since 
the international arbitral community takes the view that judicial 
interference in the arbitral process is both unnecessary and 
improper, and thus to be eliminated or at least minimized.150 
In the twenty years of class arbitration prior to the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. 
Bazzle,151 at least two different models arose regarding the court’s 
role in a class arbitration.  First, some state courts—primarily 
California, Pennsylvania and, in at least one instance, South 
Carolina—promoted a hybrid method, wherein the court retained 
 
146 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 453–54 (2003) (plurality 
opinion).  The invitation would come in the form of an appealable partial final 
award.  See infra notes 181-92 and accompanying text. 
147 LEW ET AL., supra note 16, para. 21–3 (noting the scope of arbitrator 
discretion concerning procedure). 
148 Id. para. 21–5 (noting that procedure is based on party agreement). 
149 This is different than the rule that applies to the period before or after the 
merits of the dispute are addressed.  Courts are frequently involved in motions to 
compel arbitration prior to the time the merits are heard and motions to set aside 
or enforce awards after the merits are heard. 
150 National courts may be involved in the initiation of an arbitration and the 
enforcement of an arbitral award, but they typically avoid entanglements during 
the substantive proceedings.  REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, para. 5–47. 
151 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
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responsibility for certification, notice and fairness approvals of the 
final arbitral award, while the arbitrator retained responsibility for 
evaluating the merits of the case.152  As Carole Buckner has noted, 
in this model, “courts remain[ed] involved in the class action-
related aspects of the arbitration, to assure that due process 
protection of absent class members [was] provided.”153  However, 
there is some question about the continued legitimacy of this 
approach post-Bazzle, since courts in the hybrid model retained the 
discretion to determine whether a particular dispute was 
appropriate for class arbitration and Bazzle indicated that those 
questions were properly for the arbitrator.154  Nevertheless, some 
courts—particularly those in California—continue to intervene in 
class arbitrations, albeit in the context of addressing claims of 
unconscionability and waiver of certain forms of dispute 
resolution.155  Courts adopting the hybrid approach seem to take 
the view that class arbitration is qualitatively different than 
bilateral arbitration, at least with respect to due process, and that 
arbitrators are “ill-equipped to assure due process.”156 
 
152 See Blue Cross of Cal. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 785 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1998) (articulating the hybrid method used in California courts); Dickler v. 
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 876 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (describing 
the hybrid method used in Pennsylvania courts); Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 
569 S.E.2d 349, 360–61 (S.C. 2002) (promoting the use of a hybrid method in South 
Carolina courts), vacated, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion); see also Buckner 1, 
supra note 27, at 320–23 (further discussing the hybrid models used in various 
state courts). 
153 Buckner 2, supra note 57, at 226. 
154 Id. at 227. 
155 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1106, 1115–16 (Cal. 2005) 
(citing, with approval, the hybrid approach advocated by Keating v. Superior Court, 
645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982) and noting the court’s ability to decide issues of 
unconscionability and waiver even post-Bazzle); see also Gipson v. Cross Country 
Bank, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1286 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (noting that courts can decide 
whether class action waiver clauses are enforceable); Gentry v. Superior Court, 37 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 790, 792 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that courts can still consider 
whether an arbitration waiver is unconscionable).  Post-Bazzle cases that give 
questions of class treatment to the arbitrator include Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. 
Nations Personnel of Texas, Inc., 343 F.3d 355, 359–60 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that “it 
should not be necessary for a court to decide initially whether an arbitration 
agreement clearly forbids class arbitration”); In re Wood, 140 S.W.3d 367, 368 (Tex. 
2004) (directing the arbitrator to decide the class certification issue); Garcia v. 
DIRECTV, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 191 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that arbitrator 
was to determine whether arbitration agreement permitted class arbitration); see 
also Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 13, at 77–85 (describing situations wherein 
courts will determine unconscionability issues). 
156 Buckner 2, supra note 57, at 230. 
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However, “[t]he concept that the court is an effective watchdog 
overseeing due process under the hybrid model of class arbitration 
sounds nice; but it may be more a vestige of the historic mistrust of 
arbitration than practical reality.”157  Indeed, skeptics such as 
Carole Buckner have argued that “[a] system that requires 
continuous judicial intervention, even for the well-intentioned 
purpose of providing due process, runs afoul of the parties’ 
agreement and therefore violates” state arbitration statutes.158  
Hybrid models thus could lead to non-enforcement under the New 
York Convention to the extent they contravene the parties’ agreed 
procedure.159  Furthermore, the additional cost and delay 
associated with a back-and-forth system of split competence 
militates against the use of a hybrid model.160 
The second pre-Bazzle model of class arbitration was basically a 
“court-free” approach, wherein the arbitrator conducted all aspects 
of the proceedings, including certification, notice, and fairness 
approvals.161  Bazzle seems to contemplate future use of the “court-
free” method, although Maureen Weston has argued that 
“practical and policy concerns compel thought on the wisdom of 
entrusting arbitrators with protecting all class members, 
considering varying levels of arbitral expertise, a complicated 
procedural process, and the lack of judicial supervision or 
opportunity for meaningful appeal.”162 
Thus, even prior to Bazzle there was no consensus on the 
procedure that must be adopted in a class arbitration.  Since then, 
the issue of court involvement in class arbitration has shifted from 
a question to be decided by the courts to one to be decided by the 
parties as a result of the innovations of two U.S.-based arbitration 
providers:  the AAA and JAMS.163  Since Bazzle was handed down, 
both organizations have published class arbitration rules that 
address not only what procedures the arbitrators are to follow, but 
 
157 Id. at 238. 
158 Id. at 237. 
159 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(d). 
160 Buckner 2, supra note 57, at 237; see also REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, 
para. 5–47 (arguing against court intervention in non-class arbitrations). 
161 See Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 352–54 (S.C. 2002) 
(describing class arbitration wherein the arbitrator decided all procedural 
matters), vacated, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
162 Weston, supra note 20, at 1740. 
163 Buckner 2, supra note 57, at 239 (discussing how class arbitration 
procedure has changed post-Bazzle). 
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what involvement courts are to have in the process.  Given that the 
courts and legislatures have not provided any guidance regarding 
class arbitration procedures, it is likely that most future class 
arbitrations (in the United States, at least) will follow one or the 
other of these private rule sets, even though at least one 
commentator has argued that both sets of rules could permit an 
arbitrator to disregard due process.164  While it is true that some 
commentators advocate a “pure” arbitral model that not only does 
not embrace either of these two rule sets but also does not 
incorporate any court involvement (so long as that model is 
combined with a due process protocol),165 such a model—which is 
essentially ad hoc—is difficult to envision and is not suggested 
herein. 
3.2.2. Class Arbitration—Institutional Rules 
After the Supreme Court decision in Bazzle, both the AAA and 
JAMS established procedural rules for class arbitrations.  Both the 
AAA and JAMS based their class arbitration rules on Rule 23 of the 
U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leading at least one 
commentator to claim that the two rule sets “fail to engage with the 
possibilities of class arbitration” and take an “impoverished view” 
of the procedure by not taking advantage of the possibility of 
individually tailored procedures and remedies that are the 
hallmark of arbitration.166  However, because “[t]he scope of due 
process in class action litigation defines the possible scope of due 
process protection that arbitration providers should consider 
providing in class arbitration,” the AAA and JAMS were well 
advised to base their procedures on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, at least initially, to minimize any potential violations of 
critical due process protections.167  Both sets of rules create a semi-
hybrid approach to class arbitration, where “judicial involvement 
is subject to the discretion of. . . the parties.”168  Although neither 
the AAA nor JAMS claims to ensure that the constitutional or 
substantive rights of parties proceeding under their rules will be 
 
164 Id. at 249. 
165 See id. at 256 (noting the pure model of arbitration); see also Weidemaier, 
supra note 8, at 87–89 (same). 
166 Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 94–95. 
167 Buckner 2, supra note 57, at 195. 
168 Id. at 239, 247. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss1/1
 
 
upheld, the AAA’s policy statement on class arbitrations states 
that, “[i]n fidelity to [the AAA’s] Due Process Protocols, the 
Association will continue to require all proceedings brought to it 
for administration to meet the standards of fairness and due 
process set forth in those protocols.”169  The JAMS Class 
Arbitration Rules do not currently include a similar statement.  
Rather than address the two rule sets in toto,170 the following 
discussion focuses on those aspects of the rules that could result in 
objections to international enforcement based on due process or 
public policy concerns. 
3.2.2.1.  Certification of the Class, Class Counsel, and Class 
Representatives 
In judicial class actions, the court’s approval or denial of a class 
certification request under Rule 23(c)(1) is critical, since that 
decision often determines whether the litigation proceeds.171  Either 
way, the judge’s decision imparts serious pressure—if certification 
is denied, plaintiffs may abandon their numerous, but individually 
small, claims; conversely, if certification is approved, the 
defendant(s) will be inclined to settle, no matter what the merits of 
the case may be, in order to avoid the heavy transactional costs of 
defending a class action.172 
Furthermore, when deciding to certify a class, the court must 
consider the adequacy of both class counsel and the lead (named) 
plaintiff(s).173  Indeed, adequacy of representation has been 
 
169 American Arbitration Association Policy on Class Arbitrations (July 14, 
2005), http://www.adr.org/Classarbitrationpolicy; see also Margaret M. Harding, 
The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 369, 370 (2004) 
(stating that due process protocols involving arbitration are not always legally 
enforceable and depend largely on the mutual cooperation of arbitrators and 
arbitration services). Commentators differ on whether these protocols are 
sufficient to address the special needs of class arbitration.  See Buckner 2, supra 
note 57, at 246–47, 251, 259–63 (describing the lack of due process assurances in 
class arbitration proceedings as well as initiatives to remedy the problem); 
Harding, supra, at 454 (arguing that the standards for due process protocols must 
be made more rigorous than they currently are); Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 87–
88 (noting that if the arbitration agreement does not satisfy the minimum due 
process protocol requirements, the AAA reserves the right to refuse to hear a case 
until the requirements are met). 
170 The overall scope of the rule sets have been discussed elsewhere.  Weston, 
supra note 20, at 1737–41. 
171 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1); Weston, supra note 20, at 1728. 
172 Weston, supra note 20, at 1729. 
173 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1). 
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identified as “[t]he touchstone of due process in the class action 
setting.”174  It has been termed thusly because absent class 
members remain in the class (and thus will be bound to the terms 
of the judgment of settlement) unless they opt out, so the court’s 
determination about adequacy of representation (of both counsel 
and the lead plaintiff) “is a proxy for absent members’ due 
process.”175 
Because certification of a judicial class is one of the areas where 
due process concerns are at their highest, it should come as no 
surprise that certification is a complex process under the AAA 
Supplementary Rules.  AAA policy is to administer class 
arbitrations only when “the underlying agreement specifies that 
disputes arising out of the parties’ agreement shall be resolved by 
arbitration in accordance with any of the Association’s rules” or 
“the agreement is silent with respect to class claims, consolidation 
or joinder of claims.”176  Even so, there may be instances where one 
of the parties does not want to proceed with a class arbitration and 
would dispute certification of a class, regardless of the party’s 
views on how well the class boundaries were drawn.  The AAA 
Supplementary Rules address this issue by requiring arbitrators to 
determine “whether the applicable arbitration clause permits the 
arbitration to proceed on behalf of or against a class” and then 
issue a written “Clause Construction Award” which may be 
immediately brought to “a court of competent jurisdiction” to be 
confirmed or vacated.177  Proceedings are automatically stayed 30 
days to allow a court action to be brought, unless the parties advise 
the arbitrator that they do not intend to seek judicial review.178  If 
court proceedings are initiated, the arbitrator may stay some or all 
of the arbitration, pending the outcome of the judicial action.179  
This allows any arguments about contract construction to proceed 
 
174 Buckner 2, supra note 57, at 197–98; see Weston, supra note 20, at 1729 
(affirming that adequacy of representation is essential to class arbitrations, since 
judgments are binding on all members of a class who have not opted out). 
175 Weston, supra note 20, at 1729. 
176 American Arbitration Association Policy on Class Arbitrations (July 14, 
2005), http://www.adr.org/Classarbitrationpolicy.  The AAA will also 
administer a class arbitration upon court order, such as when a court has ruled a 
waiver provision invalid.  Id. 
177 AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 7, rule 3. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. rule 4. 
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before the parties and arbitrator have incurred the cost and effort 
involved in defining an appropriate class. 
Once that initial threshold has been passed, the arbitrator 
considers whether class arbitration is proper under the 
circumstances of the case.  Here, the drafters of the AAA 
Supplementary Rules copied the language of Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure almost verbatim, with the exception of 
AAA Supplementary Rule 4(a)(6), which requires the arbitrator to 
find that “each class member has entered into an agreement 
containing an arbitration clause which is substantially similar” to 
that signed by other class members, including the class 
representative.180 
Once the arbitrator decides whether the arbitration should 
proceed as a class, the arbitrator issues the “Class Determination 
Award” as a “reasoned, partial final award.”181  If class arbitration 
is to proceed, the Class Determination Award “shall define the 
class, identify the class representative(s) and counsel, and shall set 
forth the class claims, issues, or defenses.”182  The Class 
Determination Award also must include the proposed “Notice of 
Class Determination” and describe the mode of delivery to class 
members.183  Furthermore, the Class Determination Award 
describes “when and how members of the class may be 
excluded.”184 
Regardless of whether the class is confirmed or denied, the 
Class Determination Award may be immediately brought to “a 
court of competent jurisdiction” to be confirmed or vacated.185  
Proceedings are automatically stayed thirty days to allow the court 
to hear the claim, unless the parties advise the arbitrator that they 
 
180 Id. rule 4(a)(6); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); Weston, supra note 20, at 1738. 
181 AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 7, rule 5(a).  A partial final award 
on clause construction was issued in accordance with the AAA Supplementary 
Rules in JSC Surgutneftegaz v. Harvard College and filed with the Southern District 
of New York, yielding a Decision and Order that confirmed the ruling handed 
down by the arbitral tribunal.  No. 04-6069, 2007 WL 3019234 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 
2007); see also President and Fellows of Harvard College Against JSC 
Surgutneftegaz, 770 PLI/LIT 127 (2008) (reproducing partial final award on clause 
construction). 
182 AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 7, rule 5(b). 
183 Id. 
184 Id. rule 5(c). 
185 Id. rule 5(d). 
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do not intend to seek judicial review.186  Again, if proceedings are 
brought, the arbitrator may stay the arbitration pending the court’s 
decision.187  This approach echoes the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which explicitly provide for an interlocutory appeal of 
the class certification question, based on the recognition that 
(non)certification can sound the “death knell” of a cause of 
action.188  Thus, the possibility of a “second look” on the propriety 
of the process and the decision exists in both a judicial class action 
and a class arbitration. 
These procedures create a hybrid approach similar to that used 
prior to Bazzle, wherein the court retained responsibility for 
certification, notice and fairness approvals of the final award, while 
the arbitrator retained responsibility for evaluating the merits of 
the case.189 Although the AAA Supplementary Rules entitle the 
arbitrator to make the initial class determinations, allowing the 
parties to seek immediate judicial review of the partial final awards 
provides the court with some oversight capacity.  Such a procedure 
might overcome the type of “practical and policy concerns” that an 
entirely court-free system might raise concerning the wisdom of 
entrusting arbitrators with protecting the due process rights of 
absent class members.190  However, though the AAA approach 
may reflect some concern for absent members’ procedural rights, 
the process has not “acknowledged explicitly that judicial 
involvement in class arbitration is required or even permitted by a 
particular constitutional, statutory, or common law authority.”191  
Furthermore, foreign courts that are already suspicious of legal 
procedures that dispose of absent members’ rights may exhibit 
heightened concern when courts may only become involved upon 
the request of a party, since non-named class members will not 
usually be sophisticated enough to take that step on their own 
accord. 
Certification of a class is a multi-step process under the JAMS 
Class Arbitration Rules as well.  The procedure is virtually 
identical to that under the AAA Supplementary Rules, except that 
there is no requirement that any of the interim awards be issued, 
 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e); Weston, supra note 20, at 1728. 
189 See supra notes 151–62 and accompanying text. 
190 Weston, supra note 20, at 1740. 
191 Id. at 1741. 
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nor is there an explicit period for court review.192  Though parties 
can likely request written awards on which to base a court 
proceeding, the arbitrator holds a great deal of discretion 
concerning these partial final awards and could conceivably refuse 
the request.  Thus, the JAMS model is closer to the type of court-
free system that has raised both practical and policy concerns 
among commentators, who view such proceedings as a possible 
“means to avoid judicial scrutiny and accountability for providing 
procedural fairness in class arbitration altogether.”193 
 Because the AAA Supplementary Rules and JAMS Class 
Arbitration Rules track the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure so 
closely, they appear to uphold U.S. notions of due process.  
Certainly the absence of any court involvement does not appear 
problematic in the U.S. post-Bazzle.  Nevertheless, the AAA 
Supplementary Rules have created a useful quasi-hybrid model 
that accomplishes several things at once.  First, they create a useful 
record and procedural guideline should court involvement be 
requested.  Second, they minimize the opportunity for challenge 
after the hearing, not only because the parties are given the 
opportunity to object as an interlocutory matter, but because any 
failure to object at an interim stage could be construed by an 
enforcing court as a waiver of that particular objection under the 
New York Convention after the completion of the proceedings.194  
The AAA Supplementary Rules thus minimize expenditures of 
time, money, and effort, both for legitimate and illegitimate (i.e., as 
a means of delay or obstruction) objections to enforcement.195 
3.2.2.2.   Notice and Settlements 
Notice is a fundamental element of procedural due process in 
U.S. class actions, with courts scrutinizing not only the content of 
the notice, but also the manner of notice.196  In the United States, 
simple publication notice is seldom constitutionally adequate, 
 
192 JAMS CLASS ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 7, rules 2–4. 
193 Weston, supra note 20, at 1740. 
194 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, para. 10–43. 
195 Buckner 2, supra note 57, at 258. 
196 See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 
(1950) (stating that notice reasonably calculated to inform parties of pendency of 
action is fundamental to due process); see also Weston, supra note 20, at 1730 
(proclaiming that mere publication is generally insufficient to meet the 
requirements of procedural due process). 
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although other nations permit notice by publication alone.197  
Under actions certified under U.S. Federal Rule 23(b)(3), parties 
must give the “best notice practicable, including individual notice 
to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort,” 
whereas under Rule 23(b)(1) or (2), notice is simply permissive or 
discretionary, in that the court need only “direct appropriate notice 
to the class.”198  Notice sent by first-class mail to each putative class 
member, explaining the right to opt out of the litigation, satisfies 
due process concerns.199  Notice may be required at different times, 
such as prior to class certification and prior to settlement.200 
Although notice is not, by itself, enough to satisfy 
constitutional concerns,201 it is central to both domestic and 
international notions of due process in both litigation and 
arbitration.  Under the AAA Supplementary Rules, the arbitrator 
shall “direct that class members be provided the best notice 
practicable under the circumstances.”202  The notice regarding class 
determination “shall be given to all members who can be identified 
through reasonable effort.”203  The notice must clearly state the 
nature of the action; the scope of the class; the class claims, issues, 
or defenses; and various procedural factors, such as appearance 
through counsel, exclusion, and the binding effect of the action; 
biographical information about class counsel and representatives; 
and how to communicate with the AAA regarding the 
arbitration.204 
 
197 Weston, supra note 20, at 1730; see also Gidi, supra note 20, at 341 (reporting 
that the notice requirement in Brazil is fulfilled “by a single publication in an 
official newspaper”). 
198 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A)–(B); Buckner 2, supra note 57, at 197.  Actions 
under Rule 23(b)(1) and (2) generally do not involve a claim of damages (as 
actions under Rule 23(b)(3) do) and typically result in compulsory or mandatory 
class membership.  MULHERON, supra note 20, at 31. 
199 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). 
200 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2),  23(e)(1). 
201 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 397 (1996) (noting 
that, due process demands adequate representation as well as proper notice); see 
also Buckner 2, supra note 57, at 197 (describing adequate representation as a 
“touchstone of due process”). 
202 AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 7, rule 6(a). 
203 Id. 
204 Id. rule 6(b).  The requirements for notice under the AAA Supplementary 
Rules are roughly similar to the type of content required under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure for Rule 23(b)(3) class members.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
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Notice not only affects whether a putative class member knows 
that a class arbitration is proceeding, but also affects that person’s 
ability to opt out (which affects future rights to initiate an 
individual claim) as well as that person’s ability to participate in 
the class proceedings themselves.  Thus, the notice requirement is 
closely linked to the opportunity to be heard.205  While issues 
regarding opting out and approval of class counsel and class 
representatives are not often discussed in the arbitral context, since 
they typically arise as a due process concern in judicial class 
actions, the international arbitral community has always been 
highly protective of a party’s ability to participate in arbitration 
proceedings.206  Furthermore, the notice provisions affect the 
individual’s ability to choose the arbitrator (though that choice in 
class arbitration would be limited to opting out), which is another 
right that has been closely guarded in international arbitration.207 
The AAA Supplementary Rules also require notice regarding 
settlement, voluntary dismissal or compromise.208  Again, the 
notice must “be provided in a reasonable manner to all class 
members who would be bound” by such a disposition.209  Notice at 
this stage also protects important due process rights, since, under 
AAA Supplementary Rules, the arbitrator must hold a fairness 
hearing and can only approve the disposition of a matter “on 
finding that the settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise is 
fair, reasonable, and adequate.”210  A class member may object to 
the proposed disposition and the arbitrator may refuse to approve 
the disposition of the matter unless it allows class members 
another opportunity to opt out.211 
Despite the breadth of these notice provisions, the AAA 
Supplementary Rules do not provide, as the U.S. Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure do, for the arbitrator to require additional notices 
“for the protection of the members of the class” at “any step in the 
 
205 Weston, supra note 20, at 1730 (explaining that notice and the opportunity 
to be heard are both crucial to the constitutional guarantee of procedural due 
process). 
206 LEW ET AL., supra note 16, paras. 26-86 to 26-87. 
207 Id. para. 10-45. 
208 AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 7, rule 8(a)(2). 
209 Id. 
210 Id. rule 8(a)(3). 
211 Id. rules 8(c)–(d). 
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action.”212  Furthermore, the AAA Supplementary Rules neither 
allow putative class members to indicate if they consider 
representation “fair and adequate,” nor do they allow arbitrators to 
divide a class into subclasses.213  Nevertheless, the AAA 
Supplementary Rules contain significant due process protections. 
 Notice requirements under the JAMS Class Arbitration Rules 
are very similar to those under the AAA Supplementary Rules.214  
Fairness hearings are required under JAMS Class Arbitration Rule 
6(a)(3).215 
Thus, to the extent that the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure protect due process, so too do the AAA Supplementary 
Rules and the JAMS Class Arbitration Rules, though the JAMS 
Class Arbitration Rules do so to a slightly lesser degree of certainty 
than the AAA Supplementary Rules, due to their failure to require 
reasoned partial awards during the clause construction and class 
certification phases.  However, neither set of class arbitral rules 
creates procedures that necessarily address civil law concerns 
about representative actions. 
3.2.2.3.   Confidentiality 
The third area of concern involves confidentiality, which is one 
of the long-enunciated benefits of arbitration.216  However, the 
AAA Supplementary Rules violate the presumption of privacy by 
explicitly stating that class arbitrations shall not be subject to the 
principle of privacy and confidentiality, although the arbitrator can 
provide otherwise if he or she deems it appropriate.217  This shift 
 
212 Buckner 2, supra note 57, at 252. 
213 See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 7, rule 4 (addressing class 
certification under AAA Supplementary Rules without any reference to 
subclasses). 
214 See JAMS CLASS ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 7, rule 4 (outlining the 
notice requirements under JAMS Class Arbitration Rules, which closely resemble 
those of the AAA Supplementary Rules). 
215 Compare id. rule 6(a)(3) (stating the arbitrator may only bind class 
members to a settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise after a fairness 
hearing) with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (allowing the court to approve a binding 
settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise only after a fairness hearing) and 
AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 7, rule 8(a)(3) (allowing the arbitrator to 
approve a settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise only after a fairness 
hearing). 
216 See supra note 76 (discussing various scholarly accounts on the role of 
confidentiality in arbitration). 
217 AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 7, rule 9(a). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss1/1
 
 
from accepted norms may be due to concerns about due process.  
For example, if proceedings were private, some questions might 
arise as to whether non-representative plaintiffs could attend the 
hearing.  The AAA Supplementary Rules avoid that problem by 
stating that “in no event shall class members, or their individual 
counsel, if any, be excluded from the arbitration hearings,” thus 
protecting the individual right to be heard in an arbitration.218  
Furthermore, allowing open proceedings permits arbitrators to 
invite government entities and other potential objectors to any 
fairness hearings, which complies with the “best practices” in class 
actions advocated by the Federal Judicial Center.219 
In addition to reversing the presumption of confidentiality, the 
AAA Supplementary Rules indicate that the AAA shall maintain a 
website—similar to the online dockets of many courts220 as well as 
the online list of pending and concluded cases maintained by the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(“ICSID”)221—containing certain information about the arbitration, 
including the demand for arbitration, the names of the parties and 
counsel, a list of the awards made to date, and details regarding 
any scheduled hearings.222  Notably, this is one area where JAMS 
and the AAA differ.  The JAMS Class Arbitration Rules contain no 
language regarding any deviations from the usual presumption 
 
218 Id. 
219 See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text. 
220 See, e.g., ENG. CIV. PRO. R. PRACTICE DIRECTIONS 5, 5.4C, 5.4D (2008) 
(outlining the process of obtaining court records for non-parties in England and 
Wales); Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, PACER Service Center, 
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov (last visited Sept. 13, 2008) (providing electronic 
access to U.S. federal court records); see also Ulf Öberg, Public Access to Documents 
after the Entry Into Force of the Amsterdam Treaty: Much Ado About Nothing? 2 EUR. 
INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS #8 (1998), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1998-008.htm 
(discussing the availability of public documents in Europe). 
221 International Centre for Settlement and Investment Disputes (“ICSID”),  
List of ICSID Cases, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet 
?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ListCases (last visited Sept. 13, 2008).  There 
is precedent for allowing notice of other mass or group arbitrations to be posted 
on a website.  Scott Armstrong Spence, Organizing an Arbitration Involving an 
International Organization and Multiple Private Parties: The Example of the Bank for 
International Settlements Arbitration, 21 J. INT’L ARB. 309, 317 (2004).  Also, the 
demand for transparency in arbitration is gaining ground.  Catherine A. Rogers, 
Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1301, 1319–
20 (2006) [hereinafter Rogers 1]. 
222 AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 7, rule 9(b). 
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about privacy and confidentiality in arbitration, and JAMS does 
not publish a docket of class arbitrations. 
Although the AAA Supplementary Rules appear to protect 
certain due process rights by reversing the common assumption 
about confidentiality in arbitration, proceedings under these rules 
could be subject to objections under article V(1)(d) of the New York 
Convention if open proceedings appear to contravene the parties’ 
agreement about the arbitral procedure.  However, any such 
debate would likely lead to an analysis of the extent to which 
parties can deviate from explicit arbitral rules, which is beyond the 
scope of this Article.223  Furthermore, the arbitrator has the 
discretion to set aside this aspect of the AAA Supplementary 
Rules. 
The JAMS Class Arbitration Rules appear to avoid this issue by 
remaining silent on the issue of confidentiality.  However, the 
reverse problem may arise, wherein objectors and non-named 
parties could object if they are barred from the hearings. 
3.3. Future Implications Regarding International Class Arbitration 
Procedures 
Although the form of class arbitrations will be heavily 
influenced by the form that representative proceedings take in the 
national courts where the arbitration is seated, U.S. class 
procedures will also have a significant impact on the future of 
international class arbitral procedures, for two reasons.224  First, the 
United States is the seat of the greatest number of known class 
arbitrations (domestic and international),225 which means that U.S. 
class action procedure will exert a palpable influencing force on the 
future shape of international class arbitrations.  Second, the only 
two published sets of class arbitration rules are based on U.S. class 
action procedure, suggesting that even those class arbitrations that 
are not seated in the United States might still be influenced by U.S. 
procedural norms. 
 
223 See, e.g., GARY A. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 5 (2001). 
224 American influence on all forms of international arbitration has been 
increasing over the last ten to fifteen years.  Drahozal 1, supra note 28, at 233, 243, 
246. 
225 See generally American Arbitration Association, Searchable Class 
Arbitration Docket, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25562 (last visited Sept. 18, 
2008) (database listing a large number of U.S. class arbitrations that are 
administered by the American Arbitration Association). 
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Although U.S. class actions are considered with some hostility 
in some parts of the world, they are not an anathema in every 
jurisdiction.  International class arbitrations that are influenced by 
U.S. class action procedure—either as a result of the influences of 
the seat of the arbitration or the use of the AAA Supplementary 
Rules or the JAMS Class Arbitration Rules—can thus expect a 
mixed reception when parties attempt to enforce their awards 
outside the United States.  However, the following section will 
show that even those states that disapprove of U.S. class actions 
(and would therefore be expected to also disapprove of U.S.-style 
class arbitrations) should still give international class awards the 
same presumption of enforcement that bilateral awards are entitled 
to receive under the New York Convention. 
4. CLASS ARBITRATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
As suggested above, objections to international enforcement of 
class awards are likely, at least initially, given how U.S. class 
actions are viewed abroad.  For example, there is evidence that 
“foreign courts routinely refuse to enforce U.S. judgments, 
particularly those arising from class litigation.”226  Indeed, 
practitioners from five European nations went on record with 
affidavits in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., stating that the courts of 
their countries would not enforce a judgment in a class action 
suit.227  Since most class arbitrations will mimic U.S. class actions, 
 
226 Buschkin, supra note 61, at 1566; see also Dreyfuss, supra note 32, 6–7 
(noting that foreign courts closely scrutinize American judgments arising from 
class actions). 
227 519 F.2d 974, 996–97 (2d Cir. 1975) (admitting affidavits from practitioners 
from the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, Italy, 
and France stating that courts in those jurisdictions would not enforce judgments 
resulting from American class actions); see also id. at 997 & n.48 (noting the 
affidavits stated that the foreign courts would deny enforcement of a judgment 
even if the foreign unnamed class members received adequate notice; however, 
“although the binding effect of a foreign class action judgment upon non-
appearing members of the class had not been decided by a court in any of these 
jurisdictions, [the affidavits stated that] had an ‘opt in’ form of notice one [sic] 
which required a class member to sign and return a writing agreeing to be bound 
by any judgment in the proceeding been adopted by the district court as urged by 
certain of the defendants, it was far more likely, although still not certain, that in 
several of these jurisdictions a prior judgment for defendant in the class action 
would serve as a bar to an action by any person who had joined the class.”); 
Buschkin, supra note 61, at 1581 & n.102 (claiming  that foreign courts’ failure to  
not enforce judgments from American class actions could lead to foreign 
plaintiffs’ bringing an action for the same injury against the same defendants in 
foreign courts); Dixon, supra note 14, at 134 (arguing that the structure of plaintiff 
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at least in the near future, international class awards are likely to 
be subject to these sorts of challenges early on in their 
development. 
However, the case for international class arbitration will be 
assisted not only by the increased availability of representative 
actions in domestic courts around the world but by the existence of 
domestic class arbitrations outside the United States.  This 
phenomenon does not seem to have been discussed in the 
literature on U.S. class arbitrations, but constitutes significant 
support in favor of the legitimacy of international class arbitration, 
since it shows that class arbitration is not a U.S.-only procedure. 
4.1. Class Arbitrations Outside the United States 
It is difficult to ascertain how prevalent class arbitrations are 
outside the United States due to (1) the often confidential nature of 
arbitration; (2) the decreased likelihood that details regarding 
arbitral procedure will make it into official reports; and (3) 
language issues.  However, there have been reports of class 
arbitrations outside the United States, though none of these 
matters appear to have been discussed in the jurisprudence on 
class arbitration. 
First, in Valencia v. Bancolombia, a tribunal based in Bogotá, 
Colombia heard a class suit initiated by shareholders following the 
merger of two financial entities.228  Although the claim was initially 
filed in court, both the civil circuit judge and the District Superior 
Court held that they had no jurisdiction over the matter, given the 
existence of an arbitration agreement in the by-laws of one of the 
financial entities.229  The plaintiffs argued that class actions in 
Colombia are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court, but 
the Supreme Court of Justice rejected that argument on the 
grounds that the arbitration agreement did not limit the types of 
claims that could be submitted to arbitration and thus did not 
exclude class arbitrations as a matter of law.230  Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court held that arbitrators have the same duties and 
 
classes may vary depending on whether foreign courts will enforce a judgments 
resulting from American class actions) 
228  Valencia v. Bancolombia (Colom. v. Colom.), digest by Zuleta DIGEST for 
Institute for Transnational Arbitration (ITA) (Arb. Trib. from the Bogotá Chamber 
of Comm. 2003), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
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powers as a court and thus have the competence to resolve class 
claims.231 
The Supreme Court did not go so far as to say that class 
arbitrations are permitted in Colombia in all circumstances, 
however.  Instead, it stated that: 
Arbitral Tribunals have no jurisdiction in principle to rule 
upon class actions, since the pertinent decision would 
involve or affect every individual that finds himself/herself 
under the same causal link which caused individual 
damages. . . . However, a different conclusion may arise 
regarding the shareholders of a Corporation, since these 
have accepted the inclusion of an arbitration agreement in 
the bylaws.232 
The matter was then sent to arbitration so that the tribunal 
could decide whether the plaintiffs met the threshold requirements 
(twenty or more people who have suffered damages out of the 
same cause of action) to proceed as a class.233  Given the ruling by 
the Supreme Court, the broad availability of class arbitrations in 
Colombia appears uncertain, though class proceedings apparently 
can arise in shareholder actions where arbitration of disputes is 
contemplated.234  Furthermore, the decision seems to confirm the 
civil law suspicion of representative actions that would affect the 
rights of absent class members except in special cases. 
Class arbitrations have also arisen in Canada.  Kanitz v. Rogers 
Cable Inc. involved the interplay between the Ontario Arbitration 
Act and the Ontario Class Proceedings Act, and arose after the 
plaintiffs filed a class action in court for breach of contract arising 
out of the provision of cable and high speed internet services.235  In 
this case, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice had to construe a 
clause providing for arbitration and forbidding class proceedings 
in light of a claim of unconscionability.236  The court considered the 
 
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Kanitz v. Rogers Cable Inc. (Can. v. Can.), [2002] 58 O.R. (3d) 299, 21 
B.L.R. (3d) 104, digest by Alvarez DIGEST for Institute for Transnational Arbitration 
(ITA), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com. 
236 Id. para. 39.  Unconscionability and class waivers are hot subjects in the 
United States right now, although they are outside the scope of this Article.  See 
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argument that, if such a clause were upheld, individual plaintiffs 
would be dissuaded from proceeding in arbitration due to the 
expense in relation to the prospective award, but found the 
argument unpersuasive given the lack of evidence showing that 
plaintiffs had, in fact, been dissuaded from proceeding 
individually in arbitration.237  The court was also unpersuaded by 
the argument that plaintiffs would be more likely to proceed as a 
class, since, by so doing, they would be protected from adverse 
costs in the case of loss.238  Furthermore, the plaintiffs claimed that 
giving effect to the arbitration/no class action clause would defeat 
the public policies inherent in the Class Proceedings Act.239  Again, 
the court found this position uncompelling.240 
Instead, the court focused on the mutuality of the arbitration 
agreement to hold that there was no unconscionability.241  
Furthermore, the court stated that although the Arbitration Act 
and the Class Proceedings Act could be said to have competing 
public policies, there was no reason to give precedence to one piece 
of legislation over the other.242  Instead, the court claimed that it 
was possible to interpret both enactments in a consistent manner 
by disallowing the class action in court and instead requiring 
individual arbitrations.243  However, a type of class arbitration 
could be permitted under the consolidation provisions contained 
in section 20(1) of the Arbitration Act.244  In particular, the court 
stated: 
Without deciding the point, it would appear that section 
20(1) would permit an arbitrator, at the very least, to 
 
Buckner 2, supra note 57, at 230 (discussing problems associated with dual court-
arbitrator competence to decide certain issues); Smit, supra note 13, at 201 
(discussing the legal status of waivers of class proceedings); Sternlight & Jensen, 
supra note 13, 75–76 (describing methods used by corporate defendants to avoid 
class proceedings); Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 81–86 (discussing how defendants 
seek to avoid class proceedings in court or in arbitration). 
237 Kanitz v. Rogers Cable Inc. (Can. v. Can.), [2002] 58 O.R. (3d) 299, 21 
B.L.R. (3d) 104, digest by Alvarez DIGEST for Institute for Transnational Arbitration 
(ITA) para. 42, available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com. 
238 Id. paras. 44–46. 
239 Id. para. 51. 
240 Id. paras. 51–53. 
241 Id. paras. 50, 56. 
242 Id. para. 51. 
243 Id. para. 53. 
244 Id. para. 54. 
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consolidate a number of arbitrations which raise the same 
issue.  Therefore, it appears at least arguable that if each of 
the five named representative plaintiffs here chose to seek 
arbitrations of their claims, an arbitrator might well decide 
that those arbitrations could be dealt with together thereby 
saving time and expense for all parties.  Such possibilities 
serve to militate against the central assertion of the 
plaintiffs that the arbitration clause operates so as to erect 
an economic wall barring customers of the defendant from 
effectively seeking relief.245 
Thus, class arbitrations have not yet reached full maturity in 
Ontario, but an intermediary step—mass consolidations—appears 
to have arisen. 
However, other provinces in Canada appear open to the 
concept of class arbitration.  For example, the Quebec Court of 
Appeal noted in Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs 
that, although arbitration was improper in this instance (since the 
arbitration clause had not been properly brought to the consumers’ 
attention), consumer protection claims could, under some 
circumstances, be arbitrated.246  Since that case involved a class 
action,247 it would appear that the court was leaving the door open 
for a class arbitration. 
Despite these suggestions of a pro-class arbitration stance 
outside the United States, other reports indicate that some states or 
arbitrators believe representative actions are improper in 
international arbitration.  For example, a number of claimants came 
to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in 2003 seeking to bring 
an action “on [their] own behalf and by proxy and representation 
on behalf of all Iranian citizens.”248  However, the rules of the 
Tribunal require claimants to “own” their claims, which means 
that any representative action must fail, since the party bringing it 
does not have the requisite degree of ownership.249  As the 
 
245 Id. para. 55. 
246 Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs (not indicated v. Can.), 
[2005] Q.C.C.A. 570, rev’d, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801, digest by Alvarez DIGEST for Institute 
for Transnational Arbitration (ITA), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration 
.com. 
247 Id. 
248 Sheibani v. United States, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 946, para. 2 (2003). 
249 Id. para. 13. 
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Tribunal stated, “[b]ecause ownership of a claim is a sine qua non of 
a party’s standing in a private claim, and because the Claimants 
have not pleaded such injury or ownership . . . they have no 
standing to bring this Claim.”250  Since group actions are not 
permitted under the Claims Settlement Declaration or tribunal 
precedent,251 class arbitrations would appear to be barred in any 
action in front of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.  This 
would also appear to be the case in other disputes brought 
pursuant to specialized arbitral rules or instruments, such as that 
concerning the Bank for International Settlements.252 
Although the two decisions against the use of representative 
proceedings in international arbitration are potentially 
problematic, the results are not surprising, given the terms of the 
relevant arbitration rules and the respect given to party autonomy 
regarding the agreed procedures.  Furthermore, the outcome is not 
as bad for international class arbitration as it could be, since in both 
instances the arbitrators indicated that class arbitration was 
inappropriate under the procedures required in the circumstances 
at hand; at no time did the arbitrators suggest that representative 
proceedings were universally inappropriate in arbitration.  Thus 
these two cases should be taken as cautionary but not as predictors 
of future outcomes.  Instead, the trend appears to be more in favor 
of allowing international class arbitration than it is against it. 
4.2. International Enforcement of Class Arbitral Awards 
Although the existence of domestic class arbitrations in various 
parts of the world supports the jurisprudential legitimacy of 
international class arbitration, the real concern will be pragmatic: 
will an award issued in a class arbitration be enforceable 
internationally?  In the early days of any arbitral innovation, 
disputes are bound to arise as the legal community identifies 
potential areas of concern and methods of resolving those 
concerns.  Class arbitration is no different, as parties will likely 
oppose enforcement of international class awards under the New 
York Convention on due process and public policy grounds. 
 
250 Id. para. 14. 
251 Id. para. 13. 
252 See, e.g., Spence, supra note 221, at 316 (noting instruments permitting 
arbitration involving the Bank for International Settlements “did not contemplate 
class action proceedings nor allow [arbitrators] to certify a class”). 
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4.2.1. Due Process Under the New York Convention 
When considering the enforceability of international class 
awards, one must consider not only the usual notions of 
international due process, but also the procedures that are required 
to assure due process in a representative proceeding.  Indeed, it 
may be that international class arbitrations, like domestic U.S. class 
arbitrations, require heightened scrutiny at enforcement in order to 
protect parties’ due process rights.253 
Due process in the context of representative proceedings has 
been said to be a “flexible concept,” though it: 
requires “fundamental fairness.”  Courts have construed 
this provision to require that an individual be given notice 
and an opportunity for a hearing prior to any deprivation 
of life, liberty, or property interest.  Notice is a fundamental 
component of due process.  In the judicial class action 
context, due process is the source for many requirements 
including the right of class members to opt out of the 
proceedings, the adequacy of representation, judicial 
oversight, and case disposition fairness approval.254 
Due process in the context of the New York Convention is also 
an inherently difficult concept to define, and “[w]hat constitutes 
due process is not uniform across all the Contracting States.”255  
The possibility of variations in the concepts of due process may 
have “significant consequences for arbitrations which are 
 
253 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31–32 & n.4 
(1991) (noting limited judicial review of arbitral awards is sufficient to ensure 
necessary standards are met); Buckner 2, supra note 57, at 225–26 (noting that due 
process is required in class action arbitration); Harding, supra note 169, at 382–83 
(discussing minimum standards of due process in arbitration). 
254 Weston, supra note 20, at 1768–69 (citations omitted); see also Slaney v. Int’l 
Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 592 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussing the 
requirements of fundamental fairness in arbitration hearings); Buckner 2, supra 
note 57, at 195 (same); Park & Yanos, supra note 2, at 269 (noting the elasticity of 
due process). 
255 O’Hare, supra note 139, at 184; see also Troy L. Harris, The “Public Policy” 
Exception to Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards Under the New York 
Convention: With Particular Reference to Construction Disputes, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 9, 11, 
16 (2007) (noting that public policy arguments can vary depending on the basic 
notions of morality and justice in forum states).  But see BORN, supra note 223, at 
436–47; Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization of Arbitral Procedure, 36 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1313, 1321–1322 (2003) (noting the harmonization of due process 
“across national arbitration regimes”). 
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conducted in forums where the notions of due process differ 
substantially” from those of other nations.256 
Nevertheless, when considering whether to recognize a foreign 
arbitral award under the New York Convention, the court must: 
determine whether the parties received the process for 
which they bargained.  For international cases, this 
implicates a number of special questions.  Was there an 
arbitration agreement?  Were the arbitrators honest?  Did 
the loser have the opportunity to present its case?  Does the 
award violate some fundamental public policy?257 
A court’s duty to recognize and enforce foreign awards under 
the New York Convention is subject to the possible objections set 
forth in article V.258  Article V constitutes the exclusive means of 
challenging the enforcement of an award on either procedural or 
substantive grounds259 and provides protection against abusive 
arbitral procedures by allowing courts to decline to lend their 
power to support proceedings that lack the necessary integrity or 
violate the public interest.260  The protections found in article V(1) 
“safeguard the parties against private injustice,” whereas those 
found in article V(2) “serve[] as an explicit catchall for the 
enforcement of a country’s own vital interests.”261  The procedural 
bases for objection found in article V(1) may be raised by the 
parties, while the substantive bases for objection in article V(2) may 
be raised by the parties or by the court ex officio.262  “All grounds 
for refusal of enforcement must be construed narrowly; they are 
exceptions to the general rule that foreign awards must be 
recognised and enforced.  The Convention sets maximum standards 
so that Contracting States cannot adopt legislation which adds 
grounds for resisting recognition and enforcement.”263 
 
256 O’Hare, supra note 139, at 184. 
257 Park & Yanos, supra note 2, at 273–74 (citations omitted). 
258 Id. at 257.  Of course, the duty to enforce a foreign award is also subject to 
the enforcing court’s discretion.  REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, para. 10-34. 
259 Harris, supra note 255, at 10. 
260 Park & Yanos, supra note 2, at 258. 
261 Id. at 259. 
262 Harris, supra note 255, at 10. 
263 LEW ET AL., supra note 16, para. 26-66; See also REDFERN & HUNTER, supra 
note 1, paras. 10-33 to 10-34 (noting that the grounds for objections to enforcement  
set out in article V of the New York Convention are “exhaustive”). 
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This, of course, bodes well for the future of international class 
arbitration.  Under the New York Convention, neither states nor 
parties can create new grounds for objection based on the 
representative nature of class arbitration.  Instead, any objections to 
enforcement must fall into an existing provision under article V.  
However, as discussed below, none of the existing objections to 
enforcement can be interpreted in such a way as to allow 
opponents to international class arbitration to overcome (as a 
blanket rule) the New York Convention’s presumption in favor of 
enforcement. 
Commentators in international arbitration agree that due 
process “is often understood as a ‘hard’ rule of law, a kind of a core 
or foundation of all other procedural rules, the violation or 
disregard of which will lead to unenforceability of the award or 
decision given.”264  At the very center of due process issues, “the 
rules cannot be contracted out and they may be applied ex officio.  
In many national laws this core is described as ordre public or 
public policy.”265  As Gabrielle Kaufman-Kohler states: 
The term “due process” here refers to a number of notions 
with varying names under different national laws, 
including natural justice, procedural fairness, the right or 
opportunity to be heard, the so-called principle de la 
contradiction and equal treatment.  More recently, 
procedural efficiency has been increasingly advocated by 
scholarly writers and taken into account in practice by 
arbitral tribunals and courts.  However, it has not achieved 
the same recognition as [due process and the principle of 
party autonomy in matters of procedure].266 
Even within the realm of due process concerns, there appears 
to be “a hierarchy and various degrees of legal strength and 
significance,” based, apparently, on “how fundamental the rule of 
due process is considered to be and how serious its violation or 
 
264 MATTI S. KURKELA & HANNES SNELLMAN, DUE PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (2005). 
265 Id. at 4; see also Stephen M. Schwebel & Susan G. Lahne, Public Policy and 
Arbitral Procedure, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY 205, 
209 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1986) (discussing the elements compromising “public 
policy”). 
266 Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 255, 1321–22 (citations omitted). 
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disregard is deemed to be.”267  Nevertheless, at a minimum, due 
process requires “that parties be provided with (1) reasonable 
notice and (2) an opportunity to be heard,” two concepts that are 
echoed explicitly in the New York Convention.268  Together, these 
principles form a “so-called due process defense [that] has been 
interpreted to ‘essentially sanction[] the application of the forum 
state’s standards of due process,’” where the “forum” in question 
is typically the seat of arbitration.269 
The fact that the propriety of due process is most likely 
evaluated in light of the due process standards of the state where 
the arbitration was seated gives even more weight to the 
presumption in favor of enforcement of international class awards, 
at least to the extent that most class arbitrations are currently 
seated in the United States.  Because U.S. courts will likely find the 
types of due process protections found in the AAA Supplementary 
Rules and, to a potentially lesser extent, the JAMS Class 
Arbitration Rules to comply with U.S. notions of due process, class 
arbitrations seated in the United States are likely to be 
internationally enforceable as a matter of general due process.  
However, each of the two core due process principles need to be 
discussed in more detail, in case the arbitration is not seated in the 
United States. 
4.2.1.1. Lack of Proper Notice 
Article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention indicates that 
“[r]ecognition and enforcement of the award may be refused” on 
 
267 KURKELA & SNELLMAN, supra note 264, at 5 (emphasis omitted). 
268 Weston, supra note 20, at 1770; see New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 
V(1)(b) (stating that courts may refuse enforcement of an award if the party  
 
against whom it is invoked did not receive notice or have an opportunity to be 
heard). 
269 Osamu Inoue, Note & Comment, The Due Process Defense to Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in United States Federal Courts: A Proposal for 
a Standard, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 247, 247 (2000) (citation omitted); see also 
O’Hare, supra note 139, at 184 (noting that due process is comprised of notice and 
the right to a full opportunity to address claims brought).  Some have asked 
whether arbitrators must consider the laws of every possible place of 
enforcement, but typically the answer is “no,” since the arbitrator may not be able 
to anticipate where enforcement will be sought.  Martin Platte, An Arbitrator’s 
Duty to Render Enforceable Awards, 20 J. INT’L ARB. 307, 312 (2003); see also LEW ET 
AL., supra note 16, para. 26-81 (stating that considering the law chosen by the 
parties  or the law at the place of arbitration is typically sufficient). 
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proof that “[t]he party against whom the award is invoked was not 
given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the 
arbitration proceedings.”270  The term “proper notice” in 
international arbitration means that: 
a party must be informed about the initiation of the 
proceedings in order to give him an opportunity to 
organize his defence and other action . . . . When the notice 
is “proper” must be assessed on the basis of the arbitration 
agreement and other applicable procedural rules including 
the law of the seat of arbitration.  If what constitutes proper 
notice is not well defined by the rules or law referred to in 
the arbitration agreement, the issue may become 
problematic as to the choice of applicable procedural rules.  
Proper notice is required in order to allow a party to 
“present his case.”  Thus the proper notice requirement is 
part of “presenting one’s case,” a condition precedent 
required absolutely to constitute due process and to make 
the rendering of an enforceable award possible.  In the 
absence of other more specific rules, proper notice must at 
the minimum contain information that legal proceedings 
are pending, the reference to the grounds for the 
jurisdiction and the identity of the parties.271 
The question, therefore, is whether JAMS’s and the AAA’s 
“best notice practicable” constitutes “proper notice.”  “Proper 
notice” in the context of international arbitration has been 
construed as “notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the 
action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections . . . and it must afford a reasonable time for those 
interested in make their appearance.”272  Furthermore, both the 
AAA and JAMS contemplate notice to putative class members who 
can be “identified through reasonable effort,”273 which would 
correlate with the totality-of-the-circumstances approach of the 
 
270 New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(b). 
271 KURKELA & SNELLMAN, supra note 264, at 17–18 (citations and emphasis 
omitted) 
272 Guang Dong Light Headgear Factory Co.  v. ACI Int’l, Inc. (P.R.C. v. U.S.), 
31 Y.B. COM. ARB. 1105, 1118 (2005) (citation omitted). 
273 AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 7, rule 6(a); JAMS CLASS 
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 7, rule 4. 
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New York Convention.  Thus, the two standards appear consistent, 
resulting in the presumptive enforceability of international class 
awards. 
Additionally, the magnitude and efficacy of the potential notice 
efforts will be taken into account in enforcement proceedings 
under the New York Convention, which should assist claimants in 
class arbitration.  For example, in Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Banco 
de Seguros del Estado, the Seventh Circuit noted in the context of an 
arbitration instituted against more than 100 underwriters at 
Lloyd’s that “[n]o reasonable person could be expected to serve 
more than 100 copies (that is, one copy for each retrocessionaire) of 
the same motion” on the registered agent for service of process and 
the Commissioner of Insurance.274 
Sufficiency of notice is typically to be determined by the law of 
the arbitral forum or the procedural law of the arbitration, 
supplemented by any relevant institutional rules.275  However, in 
some cases notice is evaluated under the standards of the enforcing 
state, albeit not with detailed reference to the rules and procedures 
applicable to court proceedings.276  This is problematic for 
international class arbitrations, since it shifts the focus from the 
due process standards of the arbitral seat to the due process 
standards the enforcing state, and it can be difficult for arbitrators 
to anticipate where enforcement might take place.  Furthermore, 
this analytical shift presupposes the application of a different 
(national) set of due process criteria, despite the fact that violations 
of due process should be considered under international (as 
opposed to domestic) standards. 
 
274 Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Banco de Seguros del Estado, 199 F.3d 937, 
945 (7th Cir. 1999) (proceeding under the Panama Convention, but applying New 
York Convention standards). 
275 LEW ET AL., supra note 16, at para. 26–81 (noting notice should be evaluated 
in light of the “standards set by the law chosen by the parties to govern the 
arbitration, or alternatively by the law at the place of arbitration”); see also Unión 
de Cooperatives Agrícolas Epis-Centre v. La Palentina SA (Fr. v. Spain) 27 Y.B. 
COM. ARB. 533, 538 (2002) (noting that sufficiency of notice must be considered in 
light of the arbitral rules the parties had agreed would apply). 
276 See, e.g., Jiangsu Changlong Chem. Co. v. Burlington Bio-Med. & Sci. 
Corp., 399 F. Supp. 2d 165, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that an argument against 
enforcement requires a showing that the arbitration was conducted in violation of 
the due process standards of the enforcing state); KURKELA & SNELLMAN, supra 
note 264, at 47 (noting that the procedural rules of state courts only apply if 
agreed upon by the parties). 
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Nevertheless, national courts have improperly shifted the focus 
of the due process analysis in the past.  For example, in Seller 
(Russian Federation) v. Buyer (Germany), the Court of Appeal of 
Bavaria relied on article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention when 
refusing to enforce a Russian arbitral award.277  Under Russian law, 
dispatch of notice constituted due process, even if the respondent 
did not actually receive that notice.278  However, because “the legal 
fiction of receipt is not sufficient for valid notice” under German 
law, the Bavarian Court of Appeal refused enforcement.279 
Although this case and others like it appear to be decided on 
the basis of article V(1)(b) alone, they seem to implicitly invoke the 
public policy exception under article V(2)(b) as well, which would 
explain the references to German standards regarding proper 
notice (as discussed below, objections based on article V(2)(b) of 
the New York Convention are analyzed under the law of the 
enforcing state).280  This conclusion is supported by other cases that 
indicate that the violation of the right to a fair arbitral procedure —
which would, by necessity, require proper notice—can constitute a 
violation of German public order.281  Other nations have also 
viewed notice issues through the lens of their own particular 
constitutional norms, again possibly because of the public policy 
implications.282  Indeed, commentators have explicitly recognized 
 
277 Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts Case 402: Bayerisches Oberstes 
Landesgericht, 27 Y.B. COM. ARB. 445 (2002) and 263 (2002) [hereinafter CLOUT 
Case 402]. 
278 Id. at 264. 
279 Id. 
280 See infra notes 304–22 and accompanying text. 
281 Buyer v. Seller (Den. v. F.R.G.), 4 Y.B. COM. ARB. 258 (1979) (dealing with 
failure to give notice of the names of the arbitrator and noting that, “As the right 
of the parties to challenge has a fundamental meaning for a fair arbitral 
procedure, the exclusion of this right constitutes a violation of the German public 
order”). 
282 See, e.g., Jiangsu Changlong Chem. Co. v. Burlington Bio-Med. & Sci. 
Corp., 399 F.Supp. 2d 165, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (relying on enforcing state’s notions 
of due process, not forum state’s); Guang Dong Light Headgear Factory Co.  v. 
ACI Int’l, Inc. (P.R.C. v. U.S.), 31 Y.B. COM. ARB. 1105, 1118 (2005) (citing U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent concerning due process requirements of notice in the 
context of an international enforcement proceeding); Unión de Cooperatives 
Agrícolas Epis-Centre v. La Palentina SA (Fr. v. Spain), 27 Y.B. COM. ARB. 533, 
538–39 (2002) (noting procedural safeguards must be examined “in accordance 
with the criteria established by the Constitutional Court, which is the highest 
interpreter of the fundamental provisions in whose principles, rights and liberties 
international public policy is embodied”); Italian Party v. Swiss Co., 29 Y.B. COM. 
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that there is some overlap between violation of due process 
guarantees of article V(1)(b) and the public policy provisions of 
article V(2)(b).283  However, rather than disguising a public policy 
objection as a due process concern, the better approach would be to 
indicate squarely that an objection is being made under article 
V(2)(b), since that will help the enforcing court identify the proper 
standard to be applied.284 
When courts consider motions to enforce class awards, they 
must recognize that “proper notice” in arbitration requires a 
factual determination involving an investigation into the 
circumstance of the case rather than a strict application of periods 
that may be specified in, for example, court rules.285  Furthermore, 
the form and content of the notice is as important as the giving of 
notice itself.286  However, the due process review only seems to 
apply to violations at the most fundamental level; parties can 
approve minor variations in procedure.287 
The propriety of notice in class arbitration will doubtless be 
affected by what is considered proper notice in judicial class or 
representative actions.  Different jurisdictions take different 
approaches to notice in representative actions.  For example, in 
Australia, individual personal notice is only used as a last resort 
and in circumstances where it is “reasonably practical” and not 
unduly expensive.288  It is more common in Australia to give notice 
by publication.289  In Ontario, courts consider a variety of matters 
(including the cost of notice and the class size) when determining 
how notice must be given.290  In practice, individual personal 
 
ARB. 819, 829 (2004) (“Denial of due process is in principle a violation of 
procedural public policy.”). 
283 Harris, supra note 255, at 10, 17. 
284 Objections under the New York Convention’s public policy provision are 
considered below.  See infra notes 304–55 and accompanying text. 
285 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, para. 10-40; O’Hare, supra note 139, at 
183. 
286 For example, notice must disclose the names of the arbitrators.  LEW ET AL., 
supra note 16, para. 26-85. 
287 Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Banco de Seguros del Estado, 199 F.3d 937, 
942 (7th Cir. 1999). 
288 MULHERON, supra note 20, at 344.  However, personal notice has been 
required for as many as 60,000 class members.  Id. at 345. 
289 Id. at 344–45 (quoting FCA (Aus). S 33Y(5)). 
290 Id. at 346. 
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notice is typically ordered in conjunction with other types of notice 
so as to give effect to opt-out provisions.291 
The U.S. regime lies at the other end of the spectrum.292  Notice 
is mandatory in a Rule 23(b)(3) damages suit, since individual 
members have the right to opt out.293  Thus, in the United States, if 
class members are identifiable, individual notice constitutes the 
“best notice practicable.”294  For any remaining class members, the 
“best notice practicable” can constitute notice by mail, by posting 
on dedicated internet sites or through publication in traditional 
media.295 
Thus, to create an internationally enforceable class award, the 
arbitrator should comply to the greatest degree possible with the 
notice provisions of the state in which the arbitration is seated or 
the procedural law that otherwise controls, particularly if the state 
has defined the necessary standards for notice in a large, 
representative proceeding.  While it can be useful to consider also 
the notice provisions of the enforcing state—in case lack of notice 
rises to the level of a public policy concern—it is not required.  
Class arbitrations that follow the AAA Supplementary Rules and 
JAMS Class Arbitration Rules will comply, on the whole, with U.S. 
notions of due process.  Thus, class arbitrations that follow one of 
these rule sets and are seated in the United States should avoid 
most objections based on lack of notice.  Furthermore, U.S. notions 
of notice in class proceedings compare favorably with notions of 
notice in other states’ representative proceedings (in that the U.S. 
standards are more stringent), suggesting that compliance with the 
AAA Supplementary Rules or JAMS Class Arbitration Rules will 
meet local standards for class arbitrations seated in other common 
law countries. 
Complying with these suggestions does not guaranteed an 
enforceable award in every jurisdiction.  Civil law concerns about 
representative actions may mean that actual notice —as opposed to 
 
291 Id. at 346, 352. 
292 Id. at 347. 
293 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
294 MULHERON, supra note 20, at 348; Sherman, supra note 27, at 410.  Actions 
under Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) typically result in mandatory class membership, 
so notice standards are more lenient.  MULHERON, supra note 20, at 31. 
295 See 4 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.311 (2004) (detailing 
certification notice procedures for class actions); MULHERON, supra note 20, at 349 
(stating that the “best notice practicable” can include television, radio, or journal 
publication). 
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“reasonably practicable notice”—is required to bind non-
representative class members in civil law states.296  This difference 
in approach is not based on the language of the New York 
Convention—since article V(1)(b) only requires “proper notice” —
but on civil law systems’ anticipated public policy concerns.  
Though cases and commentary concerning notice requirements 
under article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention indicate that 
compliance with the notice provisions of the applicable procedural 
rules (such as the AAA Supplementary Rules or the JAMS Class 
Arbitration Rules) would be enough to make an award 
enforceable, the fact that a notice/due process issue can result in a 
public policy violation under article V(b)(2) of the New York 
Convention suggests that parties and arbitrators would be well 
advised to consider also the notice requirements in any possible 
enforcing states. 
4.2.1.2.   Inability to Present One’s Case 
Notice is not the only due process concern implicated in 
international enforcement proceedings.  Article V(1)(b) of the New 
York Convention indicates that “[r]ecognition and enforcement of 
the award may be refused” on proof that “[t]he party against 
whom the award is invoked was . . . otherwise unable to present 
his case.”297  To some, “[t]he ability to present one’s case appears to 
be the most fundamental due process rule.”298  Some national laws 
require a “full opportunity” to present one’s case, whereas others 
only require a “reasonable opportunity” to do so.299 
Interestingly, “if a party has been denied his right to retain 
legal counsel of his choice to represent him, this may constitute 
‘unability’ under the Convention.”300  This is of course problematic 
in a situation where absent class arbitration members are given 
little opportunity to “shop around” for counsel.301  However, the 
 
296 Civil law nations may also require an opt-in rather than an opt-out 
system.  See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 997 & n.48 (2d Cir. 
1975) (describing affidavits from several civil law lawyers indicating that class 
action judgments might be enforceable in their home jurisdictions if the case 
involved opt-in, rather than opt-out, procedures). 
297 New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(b). 
298 KURKELA & SNELLMAN, supra note 264, at 18 (italics omitted). 
299 LEW ET AL., supra note 16, para. 26-87. 
300 KURKELA & SNELLMAN, supra note 264, at 17. 
301 However, absent class members who receive notice of the proposed class 
counsel and object to that person may always opt out of the proceedings. 
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AAA Supplementary Rules expressly contemplate the possibility 
of non-named parties having their own counsel.302 
The primary problem for class arbitration, of course, is that 
non-representative parties have very few real opportunities to 
influence the shape of the case.  However, the AAA 
Supplementary Rules do provide that all parties, including non-
representatives and their counsel, have the right to be present at 
the hearing, which is one way to alleviate this concern.303  
Furthermore, the arbitrator’s duty to undertake a fairness hearing 
upon disposition of the claim under both the AAA Supplementary 
Rules and the JAMS Class Arbitration Rules suggests that absent 
class members’ concerns are not disposed of without independent 
and objective analysis.304 
Since the AAA and JAMS both modeled their rules on the U.S. 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arbitrations seated in the United 
States should pass scrutiny so long as the enforcing state does not 
consider the nature of representative actions to be a fundamental 
violation of the right to be heard such that it rises to the level of a 
public policy concern, thus shifting the focus from the standards of 
the arbitral forum to the standards of the enforcing state.  
Arbitrations seated outside the United States will likely stand or 
fall depending on the extent to which the jurisdiction permits 
representative actions in the national courts.  Nevertheless, a class 
arbitration seated in an otherwise hostile jurisdiction should still be 
presumed enforceable on the grounds that (1) courts should give 
primacy to any selected arbitral rules (assumed, in this case, to be 
the AAA Supplementary Rules or JAMS Class Arbitration Rules) 
over non-mandatory provisions of national procedural law; and/or 
(2) the absence of a timely objection results in a waiver (assuming, 
in this case, that the motion to set aside is made after the 
conclusion of the hearing rather than after the issuance of one of 
the partial final orders concerning clause construction or class 
certification).305 
 
302 AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 7, rule 9(a). 
303 Id.  The JAMS Class Arbitration Rules are silent on this point. 
304 Id. rule 8(a)(3); JAMS CLASS ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 7, rule 6(3). 
305 Of course, there is always the question of whether a national court that 
takes a robust view of the negative principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz would even 
hear an interim motion.  Cf. N.C.P.C. art. 1458 (Fr.) (codifying the negative 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle in France); John J. Barceló III, Who Decides the 
Arbitrators’ Jurisdiction?  Separability and Competence-Competence in Transnational 
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4.2.2. Public Policy Under the New York Convention 
The second major area of concern regarding the international 
enforcement of class awards under the New York Convention 
involves the public policy exception in article V(2)(b).  
Representative or collective actions are not common outside the 
United States, and many nations have refused to adopt similar 
procedures into their national systems and/or enforce U.S. 
judgments arising out of a class proceeding, suggesting that there 
could be some hostility to the enforcement of international class 
awards.306 
However, even states that oppose representative actions in 
their courts should still enforce class awards because arbitration is 
a mechanism that welcomes flexibility, informality, and 
innovation.307  Furthermore, even those states that express concern 
about forcing absent members to relinquish control over valid 
causes of action should still enforce class arbitral awards, since it 
can be said that absent class members have affirmatively chosen to 
exercise their individual rights at this time and in this way.308  This 
choice is demonstrated either through the initial agreement to 
arbitrate (since that agreement can be construed to bind the 
signatories to whatever procedure the arbitrator deems proper in 
his or her discretion, subject only to the parties’ explicit 
instructions and the application of any relevant arbitral rules or 
mandatory provisions of law) or through absent class members’ 
failure to opt out of the proceedings. 
Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention indicates that 
“[r]ecognition and enforcement of the award may . . . be refused if 
the competent authority in the country where recognition and 
enforcement is sought finds that . . . [t]he recognition or 
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of 
that country.”309  Public policy concerns may be raised by the 
 
Perspective, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1115, 1124 (2003) (discussing difficulties in 
defining the proper scope and application of negative Kompetenz-Kompetenz). 
306 See supra notes 90–121 and accompanying text. 
307 Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 96. 
308 Baumgartner 1, supra note 26, at 320–21; Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 
46, at 264; Gidi, supra note 20, at 344–45. 
309 New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(2)(b). 
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parties or by the court ex officio.310  “Public policy” is not defined in 
the New York Convention,311 but the underlying rationale is “the 
right of the State and its courts to exercise ultimate control over the 
arbitral process.”312  Public policy is a fluid concept, changing to 
suit the needs of society.313  Although leading arbitrators believe 
that public policy “plays a much greater role in the theory of 
arbitration than in practice,”314 the argument does arise on 
occasion, albeit typically only when other objections fail.315 
Although critics have claimed that “there is no meaningful 
guidance at all concerning how [both industrialized and 
developing countries] would interpret the public policy 
exception,”316 some efforts have been made at harmonizing, or at 
least explaining, national laws.  In July 2000, the International Law 
Association issued a Report on Public Policy as a Bar to 
Enforcement of International Awards (“ILA Interim Report”), 
which is to be read together with the Final Report on Public Policy 
as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards (“ILA 
Final Report”) issued in 2002.317 
The two reports “attempt[] to define public policy by reference 
to ‘violations of basic notions of morality and justice,’” but, even 
 
310 See Harris, supra note 255, at 10 (detailing the applicability of the “public 
policy” exception to enforcement under article V(2)(b) of the New York 
Convention). 
311 See KURKELA & SNELLMAN, supra note 264, at 11 (noting that “[w]hat 
constitutes the public policy of a country” is not defined in the New York 
Convention). 
312 LEW ET AL., supra note 16, para. 26-114. 
313 See id. paras. 26-117, 26-144 (asserting that public policy is, by its nature, 
dynamic, and shifts readily to reflect evolving cultural norms); Karl-Heinz 
Böckstiegel, Public Policy and Arbitrability, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE 
AND PUBLIC POLICY IN ARBITRATION 177, 179 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1986) (discussing 
the concept of public policy). 
314 Böcksteigel, supra note 313, at 179. 
315 LEW ET AL., supra note 16, para. 26-114. 
316 Harris, supra note 255, at 11.  This is because dozens of nations have no 
reported decisions involving domestic interpretation of the New York 
Convention.  See id. at 21–22 (listing those countries). 
317 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, PUBLIC POLICY AS A BAR TO 
ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AWARDS (2000) [hereinafter ILA Interim Report], 
available at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/19 (follow 
link for “Conference Report London 2000”); INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, 
FINAL REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY AS A BAR TO ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRAL AWARDS (2002) [hereinafter ILA Final Report],   available at 
http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/19 (follow link for 
“Conference Report New Delhi 2002”).   
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more importantly, look at how public policy is used in 
international instruments and national legislation.318  National laws 
vary somewhat, but “[i]t appears that there is one universally 
accepted definition of public policy.  ‘It is clear that [it] reflects the 
fundamental economic, legal, moral, political, religious, and social 
standards of every state or extra-national community.’”319 
Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention indicates that the 
only relevant public policy is that of the state where enforcement is 
to take place.320  Foreign public policy is not typically considered in 
enforcement proceedings, “notwithstanding the fact that private 
international lawyers increasingly discuss the issue of application 
(or taken into account) of foreign public policy in a favourable 
manner” in other contexts.321  Objections based on public policy 
may be procedural (primarily involving due process issues) or 
substantive.322  Each will be discussed separately below.  Neither 
provides persuasive grounds for overcoming the presumption of 
enforceability that the New York Convention provides all arbitral 
awards, including those arising out of a class arbitration. 
4.2.2.1. Procedural Public Policy 
Procedural public policy sometimes overlaps with due process 
requirements found in article V(1)(b) of the New York 
Convention.323  Furthermore, “possible procedural public policy 
grounds include fraud in the composition of the tribunal; breach of 
natural justice; lack of impartiality; lack of reasons in the award; 
 
318 Loukas Mistelis, “Keeping the Unruly Horse in Control” or Public Policy as a 
Bar to Enforcement of (Foreign) Arbitral Awards, 2 INT’L L. F. DU DROIT 
INTERNATIONALE 248, 249 (2000) [hereinafter Mistelis 2]. 
319 KURKELA & SNELLMAN, supra note 264, at 11.  For example, in England “[i]t 
has to be shown that there is some element of illegality or that the enforcement of 
the award would be clearly injurious to the public good or, possibly, that 
enforcement would be wholly offensive to the ordinary reasonable and fully 
informed member of the public on whose behalf the powers of the State are 
exercised.”  Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft m.b.H. v. Ras Al 
Khaimah Nat’l Oil Co. [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 246, 254; see LEW ET AL., supra note 16, 
para. 26-115 (noting constituent elements of public policy); P.B. Carter, The Rôle of 
Public Policy in English Private International Law, 42 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 7 (1993) 
(arguing that principles informing public policy are those of general moral 
application). 
320 LEW ET AL., supra note 16, para. 26-82. 
321 Mistelis 2, supra note 318, at 253. 
322 Id. at 251. 
323 ILA Final Report, supra note 317, para. 29. 
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manifest disregard of the law; manifest disregard of the facts; 
annulment at place of arbitration.”324  Regardless of whether they 
are substantive or procedural, public policy objections under the 
New York Convention “must be construed narrowly.”325  
Critically, “only violation of the enforcement state’s public policy 
with respect to international relations (international public policy 
or ordre public international) is a valid defence.”326  Domestic public 
policy concerns are not enough to bar enforcement.327 
When deciding whether the New York Convention’s public 
policy exception to enforcement applies, courts look to their own 
law—i.e., the law of the enforcing state.328  The form and scope of 
any court review is limited.  Commentators and courts are 
“unanimous” on this point, stating: 
 
324 LEW ET AL., supra note 16, para. 26-117.  This is generally in accordance 
with other views, although “[i]t is widely accepted that procedural public policy 
should not include manifest disregard of the law or the facts.”  ILA Final Report, 
supra note 317, para. 29. 
325 LEW ET AL., supra note 16, para. 26-114. 
326 Id.; see also ILA Final Report, supra note 317, paras. 10–11 (comparing 
“international public policy” to “transnational public policy”); Yves Brulard & 
Yves Quintin, European Community Law and Arbitration: National Versus Community 
Public Policy, 18 J. INT’L ARB. 533, 546 (2001) (discussing application of European 
Community-wide public policy).  International public policy includes concerns 
about “biased arbitrators, lack of reasons in the award, serious irregularities in the 
arbitration procedure, allegations of illegality, corruption or fraud, the award of 
punitive damages and the breach of competition law.”  LEW ET AL., supra note 16, 
para. 26-118. 
327 LEW ET AL., supra note 16, para. 26-114; see ILA Final Report, supra note 317, 
paras. 10–11; Brulard & Quintin, supra note 326, at 546 (discussing interplay 
between domestic and European Community-wide public policy).  An 
interesting—and apparently open—question is “whether the existence of a large 
number of procedural defects constitutes a violation of due process or the 
principles of public policy.”  C v. Z, 31 Y. B. COM. ARB. 583, 585 (2006). 
328 New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(2)(b); see also Brulard & 
Quintin, supra note 326, at 546 (noting that in enforcement actions that “it is the 
public policy of the lex fori that is considered by the judge, which entails an 
examination of the award’s conformity with the public policy of his own 
jurisdiction”); Günther J. Horvath, The Duty of the Tribunal to Render an Enforceable 
Award, 18 J. INT’L ARB. 135, 143 (2001) (noting enforcement actions look to the 
public policy of the enforcing state).  Traditionally, the only time the public policy 
of the lex arbitri would be considered is when a party has brought a motion to 
vacate or set aside the arbitral award, since motions to set aside or vacate an 
arbitral award are typically made in the state where the arbitration was seated.  
See, e.g., Böcksteigel, supra note 313, at 189; Brulard & Quintin, supra note 326, at 
546. 
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[T]he national judge excludes review of the substance of the 
arbitration decision.  It must relate not to the evaluation 
made by the arbitrators of the rights of the parties, but 
rather to the solution given to the dispute, with the award 
being annulled only insofar as this solution runs counter to 
public policy.329 
Although class arbitration would appear to be reviewable as a 
“solution given to the dispute” rather than the “evaluation made 
by the arbitrators of the rights of the parties,”330 the method of the 
solution—i.e., class or representative treatment—is not itself 
counter to public policy, as discussed below.331  Therefore 
enforcing courts should take heed of the New York Convention’s 
presumption in favor of enforceability of awards. 
Only rarely have awards been successfully opposed at the 
enforcement stage as a result of a violation of international public 
policy.332  For example, England did not refuse enforcement of an 
arbitral award on the grounds of public policy until 1998.333  South 
Korea and Switzerland both use a narrow interpretation of public 
policy, but retain some focus on the interests and beliefs of the 
enforcing state.334  In the United States, the prevailing pro-
arbitration policy also results in few challenges succeeding on the 
basis of the public policy exception.335  Other jurisdictions that 
have reportedly taken a narrow view of the public policy exception 
include Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Switzerland, 
 
329 Brulard & Quintin, supra note 326, at 544 (quoting Judgment of the French 
Cour de Cassation, Applix, Paris, Oct. 14, 1993, REV. ARB. 1994) (emphasis added). 
330 Id. 
331 See infra notes 356-69 and accompanying text. 
332 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, para. 10-51; Schwebel & Lahne, supra 
note 265, at 206. 
333 See, e.g., Soleimany v. Soleimany [1999] Q.B. 785 (refusing enforcement of 
an award of public policy grounds); LEW ET AL., supra note 16, paras. 26-119 to 26-
122 (discussing Soleimany). 
334 See LEW ET AL., supra note 16, paras. 26-127 to 26-129 (discussing Korean 
and Swiss case law). 
335 See, e.g., Parsons Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Société Générale de 
l’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting “the [New 
York] Convention’s public policy defense should be construed narrowly. 
Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on this basis only where 
enforcement would violate the forum state’s most basic notions of morality and 
justice”); see generally REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, paras. 10-52 to 10-53 
(describing public policy challenges to arbitral award enforcement) 
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Russia, Italy and India.336  However, some jurisdictions—including 
Turkey, Japan, Vietnam and China—have been criticized for their 
broad use of the public policy exception.337 
The question exists whether there can be any procedural errors 
that rise to the level of a public policy violation under article V(2) 
of the New York Convention that are not covered by the grounds 
for objection under article V(1).  Certainly “if the form and the 
underlying process by which an arbitral award was created do not 
meet all potentially applicable domestic procedural requirements, 
there will be confusion over where and to what extent the award 
will be enforceable, particularly if it involves transnational 
commerce,” but that does not answer the deeper question of what 
procedural public policy concerns might exist other than those 
enumerated in article V(1) of the New York Convention.338  As it 
currently stands, commentators have typically take the procedural 
objections outlined in article V(1) as conclusively defining the 
corpus of international procedural public policy, or—even more 
generally—have defined international procedural public policy as 
simply constituting equal treatment, fair notice and the right to 
present one’s case.339  This, of course, is good for international class 
arbitration, since blanket due process objections to class 
proceedings cannot stand under the New York Convention. 
Objections to class awards based on procedural public policy 
will likely mirror those made under article V(1)(b) of the New York 
Convention, although, to be considered legitimate grounds for 
non-enforcement by the international arbitral community, they 
must rise to the level of a gross violation of due process, judged by 
international, rather than domestic, standards.  Although there 
should be few such rulings in theory, courts have been willing to 
invoke their own due process standards to remedy even mid-level 
violations of due process.340  Notably, this sort of interventionist 
approach is discouraged and presumptively improper under the 
New York Convention. 
 
336 Harris, supra note 255, at 14–15. 
337 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, para. 10-54.  But see Harris, supra note 
255, at 15 (claiming that Japan takes a restrictive view of the public policy 
exception). 
338 Schwebel & Lahne, supra note 265, at 206. 
339 Id. at 216. 
340 See supra notes 277-84 and accompanying text. 
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4.2.2.2. Substantive Public Policy 
Objections to enforcement of a foreign arbitral award may also 
be based on substantive public policy concerns such as “(1) 
mandatory rules/lois de police; (2) fundamental principles of law; 
(3) actions contrary to good morals, and (4) national 
interests/foreign relations.”341  Substantive grounds for objection 
also include violations of the principle of good faith and pacta sunt 
servanda, prohibition of abuse of rights and prohibition of activities 
that are contra bonos mores,342 as well as awards involving punitive 
damages and breaches of competition law.343  Some commentators 
distinguish mandatory provisions of law from public policy, even 
though that may be difficult to do as a practical matter.344 
Interpretation of substantive public policy is methodologically 
the same as it is for procedural public policy, in that objections 
under the New York Convention must be construed narrowly, 
applying international rather than domestic standards.345  Though 
objections based on substantive public policy are, like objections 
based on procedural public policy, viewed from the perspective of 
the enforcing state, some question has arisen as to whether the 
public policy of other potentially interested states can or should be 
taken into account.346  The issue arises most often in the context of 
antitrust or competition law, or similar laws with a particular 
economic purpose.347  The question in the context of class 
arbitrations will likely be whether class arbitration impedes or 
advances laws intended to protect parties that are presumed to be 
 
341 ILA Interim Report, supra note 317, at 15 (emphasis omitted). 
342 Id. at 28. 
343 LEW ET AL., supra note 16, para. 26-118. 
344 See KURKELA & SNELLMAN, supra note 264, at 11 (noting that distinguishing 
between mandatory substantive law and public policy can be problematic); 
Böcksteigel, supra note 313, at 183 (noting the distinction between mandatory rules 
and public policy). 
345 LEW ET AL., supra note 16, para. 26-114. 
346 See ILA Final Report, supra note 317, para. 20 (stating the prevailing view 
that “only the public policy of the State where enforcement is sought should be 
applied”). 
347 Id. para. 50.  Some commentators note “national courts’ growing leniency 
towards the arbitrability of areas strongly marked by social and economic 
policies.”  Homayoon Arfazadeh, Arbitrability under the New York Convention: the 
Lex Fori Revisited, 17 ARB. INT’L 73, 76 (2001).  It could be argued that deterrence of 
certain economic abuses is a global issue, thus requiring class actions and/or 
arbitrations on a global scale.  Buschkin, supra note 61, at 1588–93. 
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in inferior bargaining positions, such as wage-earners, commercial 
agents, consumers and/or shareholders.348  Interestingly, this has 
been one of the areas where civil law systems seem inclined to 
permit representative actions, albeit usually as a result of 
legislative authority.349  Although some states might wish to keep 
these sorts of economic concerns in the public realm because the 
manner of their resolution affects the public interest, it could be 
said that recognizing a form of representative right in these areas 
of law opens the door to class arbitration.  Certainly precedent 
suggests that matters involving substantive public policy may 
properly be resolved in the arbitral realm.  For example, in 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the U.S. 
Supreme Court indicated that arbitrators had the right and the 
ability to consider matters that had a significant impact on 
American public policy—in this case, U.S. antitrust laws.350 
There is some question about the extent to which individual 
states’ public policies should influence the arbitration when the 
law of that state has not been chosen to govern the dispute.351  
However, in the case of international class arbitrations, the 
international character of the dispute should lead arbitrators to 
apply nothing other than international—rather than individual 
domestic—public policy.352  Only if the enforcement of the award 
 
348 ILM Interim Report, supra note 317, at 17; Arfazadeh, supra note 347, at 77–
78. 
349 See, e.g., Council Directive 98/27, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51 (EC) (concerning 
consumer protection); see also Drahozal & Friel, supra note 97, at 362 & n. 23 
(describing the diversity of consumer protection enactments at the European 
level). 
350 473 U.S. 614, 633, 638 (1985). 
351 Case C-126-97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l NV, [1999] 
ECR I-3055; Brulard & Quintin, supra note 326, at 533 (discussing Eco Swiss). 
352 This approach would also apply when considering “whether a principle 
forming part of [an enforcing state’s] legal system must be considered sufficiently 
fundamental to justify a refusal to recognize or enforce an award.”  ILA Final 
Report, supra note 317, rec. 2(b).  Thus, for example, “a court should take into 
account, on the one hand, the international nature of the case and its connection 
with the legal system of the forum, and, on the other hand, the existence or 
otherwise of a consensus within the international community as regards the 
principle under consideration.”  Id.  Furthermore, “[w]hen considering whether a 
principle is sufficiently fundamental to justify refusing enforcement, the 
enforcement court is entitled to have regard to the connections the parties and the 
subject matter have with the jurisdiction where enforcement is sought.  Where 
there are few connections, the court would be entitled to take a more liberal 
approach.”  Id. para. 40.  These recommendations support the conclusion that the 
propriety of international class arbitration should be evaluated under 
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would “manifestly disrupt the essential political, social or 
economic interests” protected by the rule of public policy, should 
the policy be given effect.353 
Because class arbitration is an entirely new mechanism in the 
international arbitral realm, it does not fit easily into the standard 
analytical model regarding substantive public policy.  It is most 
likely that objectors will focus their arguments on how class 
arbitration violates fundamental principles of law concerning the 
exercise of individual procedural rights in the enforcing state.  
Objections could also be based on any punitive damages elements 
(though those could be severable354) or on the claim that matters 
involving substantive public policy, especially economic policy, 
exist outside the realm of arbitration (though that argument has 
become questionable in many jurisdictions).355  Interestingly, states 
that would otherwise be hostile to class arbitration may find 
consumer arbitrations less objectionable, since that is an area 
where an increasing number of national or regional legislatures 
have created a form of representative action. 
4.2.2.3. Public Policy Objections to Class Action Judgments 
Although there are no cases yet describing enforcement of 
international class awards, it is useful to see how non-U.S. states 
deal with requests to enforce judgments arising out of U.S. class 
actions against non-U.S. corporate defendants.356  In actions to 
enforce judgments, courts typically look to see whether the 
judgment violates the enforcing state’s notions of substantive or 
procedural public policy, which is similar to the procedure used 
for objections under article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention.357 
While commentators outside the U.S. have indicated that it 
might be inappropriate to undertake a wholesale transplantation of 
U.S.-style class actions into non-U.S. legal systems, they have 
acknowledged that the U.S. system has some merits, such as acting 
 
international standards and that awards resulting from class arbitrations should 
be found enforceable to the same extent as bilateral awards. 
353 Id. rec. 3(b). 
354  New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(c). 
355 See supra note 350 and accompanying text. 
356 See Dreyfuss, supra note 32, at 6–7 (discussing approaches taken by foreign 
courts). 
357 Id. at 6. 
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as a deterrent and increasing access to justice for consumers.358  
However, these commentators still express deep-seated concerns 
about the nature of individual procedural rights in representative 
litigation,359 particularly those that are based on essential rights of 
defense protected by domestic constitutions.360  For example, 
Italian courts have determined in the context of actions to enforce 
foreign judgments that the “right of defense”—such as the right to 
oppose an action for the protection of one’s interests—is an 
expression of Italian procedural policy and one of the “supreme 
principles of the constitutional system.”361  The same view exists as 
a matter of Spanish constitutional law.362  In Italy, the adversary 
process principle (principio del contraddittorio) requires that the 
parties have a real opportunity to advocate their positions at every 
stage of the proceedings.363  Defendants, in particular, must have 
the right to challenge the legal and factual claims asserted against 
them.364  When considering whether to enforce foreign judgments, 
Italian courts will not look to see if the procedures of the foreign 
court are the same as those used in Italy; instead, the Italian courts 
will look at “the concepts that inspire the [Italian] legal system and, 
more precisely, . . . the fundamental principles recognized by the 
legislature to be necessary conditions for the very existence of 
society.”365  To be upheld, the foreign judgment must have been 
issued by a proceeding that “substantially guaranteed the parties 
an adequate opportunity to be heard” and “honored the essential 
rights of defense of all the parties . . . throughout the duration of 
the proceeding.”366 
This reading of Italian courts’ predilections regarding 
enforcement of foreign judgments could signal trouble for anyone 
attempting to enforce a class arbitration award in Italy or in any 
jurisdiction that adopts a similar approach to the rights of defense.  
For example, a class arbitration—like a class action—“might impair 
 
358 Id. at 8; see also Taruffo, supra note 32, at 412–13 (detailing various issues 
European countries may have wiith the U.S. class action system). 
359 Dreyfuss, supra note 32, at 9–10; Taruffo, supra note 32, at 415. 
360 Dreyfuss, supra note 32, at 17. 
361 Id. 
362 Cairns, supra note 15, at 593. 
363 Dreyfuss, supra note 32, at 19, 25. 
364 Id. at 19. 
365 Id. at 26 (internal citations omitted). 
366 Id. at 26. 
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the defendant’s ability to ascertain necessary information and 
might deprive the defendant of the opportunity to develop 
essential elements of defense with which to confront the 
claimants,” particularly if the class arbitration procedure “treats 
discrete claims as fungible claims,” which might offend the 
principle both of defense and of the opportunity present 
evidence.367  Because a class action and a class arbitration “might 
hold an Italian defendant liable for damages to unknown or 
unidentified plaintiffs despite the defendant’s inability to challenge 
their individual claims,” an Italian court might refuse to enforce a 
judgment or arbitral award.368  Interestingly, the same problem 
might not exist in actions to enforce a class award providing 
injunctive or declarative relief only, since the injury to one party is 
the same as the injury to any other named or unnamed party. 
The Italian view is not universal.  As discussed above, other 
state courts have found U.S. class proceedings inoffensive to the 
enforcing state’s public policies.  In particular, England—which 
does not have a particularly robust view of representative actions 
and resembles civil law systems to some extent—has found that 
U.S. class actions do not violate principles of natural justice and 
will thus enforce class judgments.369  The issue will therefore likely 
come down to how each state views the legitimacy of 
representative proceedings and the type of relief requested.  
However, the argument here is that all states should give full effect 
to the provisions of the New York Convention and adopt a pro-
enforcement stance even for class awards. 
5. INTERNATIONAL CLASS AWARDS MERIT EQUAL TREATMENT 
WITH OTHER ARBITRAL AWARDS 
The preceding discussion has demonstrated the manner in 
which objections to the enforcement of international class awards 
will likely arise.  Some parties may claim that international class 
arbitration violates proper arbitral procedure, primarily focusing 
on due process concerns to advance their position.370  Other parties 
 
367 Id. at 27. 
368 Id. 
369 See supra notes 112–15 and accompanying text. 
370 See supra notes 253-305 and accompanying text.  This Article has focused 
on procedural arguments related to due process and public policy, since those 
arguments are rooted in fundamental state concerns.  Other procedural 
arguments, which focus more on party autonomy, are akin to those used to 
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may focus on public policy, claiming that enforcement of a foreign 
class award will result in a radical—and unacceptable—
reconceptualization of individual procedural rights.371  Because the 
New York Convention permits objections to enforcement based on 
both due process and public policy, such claims are—on their face 
—legitimate grounds for non-enforcement of a foreign award.372  
Furthermore, due process and public policy—particularly 
concerning the shape and scope of individual procedural rights—
are very much within the purview of national constitutional law, 
and may, as such, be given heightened respect and weight during 
enforcement proceedings as mandatory provisions of law.373  
Nevertheless, parties should not be able to enter blanket objections 
to class awards based on the special nature of class or 
representative proceedings.  Instead, foreign class awards should 
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, using the same standards as 
are used with non-class awards, for two reasons. 
First, the pro-arbitration policy of the New York Convention 
indicates that courts are to adopt a presumption in favor of 
enforcement.374  Only in extreme cases are courts permitted to 
interfere with the arbitral process by refusing enforcement after its 
conclusion on the merits.375  Many states—including several civil 
law nations that might otherwise be expected to object to 
representative actions as violative of national conceptions of 
individual procedural rights—have adopted robust pro-arbitration 
policies and should, therefore, be expected to live up to those 
enunciated positions by upholding class awards.376  Furthermore, 
 
oppose consolidation of arbitrations and are outside the scope of this Article.  See 
generally Strong, supra note 13. 
371 See supra notes 306–69 and accompanying text. 
372 New York Convention, supra note 1, arts. V(1)(b), V(2)(b). 
373 See supra notes 277–84, 360–69 and accompanying text; see also LEW ET AL., 
supra note 16, paras. 5-68 to 5-72 (describing the principle underpinning the 
“magna carta of arbitration”). 
374 Park & Yanos, supra note 2, at 254, 259. 
375 LEW ET AL., supra note 16, paras. 26-65 to 26-70.  Of course, judicial 
interference during the arbitral process is even more unwelcome, with the 
exception of measures necessary to uphold the arbitrator’s authority. Id. paras. 5-
35, 15-5 to 15-55 (explaining how courts may become involved with arbitration 
awards). 
376 Of course, this Article is not suggesting that a general policy in favor of 
arbitration should result in universal enforcement of all arbitral awards.  There 
are legitimate violations of due process and public policy that would and should 
forestall enforcement of a class award, just as there are areas of law that a state 
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the policy reasons supporting international arbitration are 
consistent with policy reasons in favor of class treatment of certain 
claims.  Thus, as a matter of policy, international class awards 
should be accorded the same presumptions of enforcement that are 
given to other international awards. 
Second, the detailed analysis of the due process and public 
policy objections under article V of the New York Convention 
undertaken above demonstrates that objections based only on the 
special nature of class arbitrations are inappropriate.  While a full-
fledged comparative analysis of the national law of each of the 140-
plus signatories to the New York Convention is beyond the scope 
of this Article,377 international commercial arbitration is an area 
that is both (1) particularly needful of harmonization and (2) 
particularly amenable to the persuasive power of expert 
commentary.378  Therefore, the generally accepted international 
standards that have developed as a result of commentary, case law 
and legislative enactments concerning objections under articles 
V(1)(b) and V(2)(b) of the New York Convention should be applied 
to class awards to the same extent that they do to bilateral awards.  
As discussed further below, these standards indicate that blanket 
objections to international class arbitrations that are based only on 
the unique nature of representative proceedings should not be 
permitted. 
 
may deem non-arbitrable.  Arbitrability is typically considered under article II of 
the New York Convention.  New York Convention, supra note 1, art. II; see also 
LEW ET AL., supra note 16, paras. 9-1 to 9-5 (discussing the concept of arbitrability).  
Concerns regarding arbitrability can overlap with public policy arguments under 
article V(b)(2) of the New York Convention.  See, e.g., id. para. 9-4 (describing both 
“objective arbitrability” and “subjective arbitrability”); Böckstiegel, supra note 313, 
at 179 (describing notions of abitrability in Latin America and Western European 
countries).  However, objections based on article II of the New York Convention, 
including those relating to arbitrability, are outside the scope of this Article. 
377 Such an analysis might not, in any case, yield much useful information, 
since many state parties to the New York Convention do not have any reported 
decisions concerning the construction of the New York Convention.  Harris, supra 
note 255, at 21–22. 
378 Tom Ginsburg, The Culture of Arbitration, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1335, 
1338 (2003).  The persuasive power of scholarly commentary is a hallmark of the 
civil law tradition.  Id. at 1340–41.  International commercial arbitration has 
embraced this perspective, giving scholarly writings more weight in legal 
arguments than is perhaps the case in common law courts.  Id.; see also S.I. STRONG, 
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: SOURCES 
AND STRATEGIES (forthcoming 2009); Gidi, supra note 20, at 325, n.24 (stating that 
scholars, not judges, are the preeminent figures of the civil legal tradition and 
listing various sources supporting the same). 
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5.1.  International Class Awards Should Be Upheld as a Matter of   
General Policy 
This section considers two separate policies:  those supporting 
international arbitration and those supporting class or 
representative treatment of certain types of claims.  Legitimate 
concerns about the propriety of international class arbitrations 
could arise if the two policies were inconsistent.  However, 
analysis shows that both policies attempt to achieve similar ends, 
indicating that international class awards should be treated in the 
same manner as non-class awards. 
5.1.1. Policies Supporting International Arbitration 
The New York Convention is “one of the most successful 
commercial treaties in history,” with over 140 states having 
become parties through ratification, accession or succession.379  
Commercial entities submit a vast range of disputes to arbitration, 
allowing private individuals, rather than courts, to resolve 
disputes worth billions of dollars.380  Furthermore, a “significant 
majority of corporations” prefers to have its cross-border disputes 
resolved through arbitration rather than through litigation.381 
There is no indication that international arbitration is more 
popular in common law countries over civil law countries or vice 
versa, suggesting that support for arbitration is based on 
something other than the expectation that the procedures will 
either (a) benefit parties from one legal tradition over another or 
(b) mimic one’s home system.382  Indeed, the common expectation 
 
379 Park & Yanos, supra note 2, at 257. 
380 Joseph T. McLaughlin, et al., Recent Developments in Domestic and 
International Arbitration Involving Issues of Arbitrability, Consolidation of Claims and 
Discovery of Non-Parties, in SM090 ALI-ABA 757, 759 (2007); see also Sternlight & 
Jensen, supra note 13, at 75 (noting that an increasing number of  companies use 
arbitration clauses to prevent class action suits being brought against them by 
consumers); Weston, supra note 20, at 1714–15 (claiming that companies are 
increasingly submitting their disputes to arbitration). 
381 McLaughlin et al., supra note 380, at 759.  For further discussion of the 
extent to which international contracts include arbitration clauses, see Theodore 
Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight From Arbitration: An Empirical Study of 
Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 335, 347, 351–52 (2007) (describing statistics concerning incidence of 
arbitration clauses in a variety of contracts, including international contracts). 
382 Over the years, international commercial arbitration has come to adopt 
procedures that incorporate both civil law and common law traditions, which is 
one of the reasons why it has become so popular.  LEW  ET AL., supra note 16, paras. 
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and, in many cases, hope is that arbitration will not be identical to 
judicial resolution of the dispute.383  Innovation and flexibility are 
not only permitted in international arbitration, they are 
affirmatively encouraged.384  Many esteemed arbitrators and 
advocates have recognized that it is good arbitral practice for each 
proceeding to be individually tailored to the needs of the parties.385  
Thus, the mere fact that class arbitration is an unusual procedure 
from some parties’ or nations’ perspective is not problematic in 
itself.  An arbitration can be unusual and still be entirely proper 
under both the arbitration agreement and the relevant procedural 
law. 
When signing on to the New York Convention, states are on 
notice that a pro-arbitration—including a pro-enforcement—stance 
is the norm.386  Much of the operative language is in mandatory 
terms:  article II states “[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize an 
agreement in writing” to arbitrate, while article III states “[e]ach 
Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and 
enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 
territory where the award is relied upon.”387  Language permitting 
deviations from the general pro-enforcement stance is couched in 
 
21-32 to 21-39 (describing elements of common and civil law procedures in 
international arbitration).  Despite the absence of any visible preference for 
international arbitration based on a civil law-common law divide, Gary Born has 
noted that: 
[i]n some developing and other countries, there has been a perception 
that international commercial arbitration was developed by, and was 
biased in favor of, Western commercial interests.  As a consequence, 
national law in many countries was historically hostile towards 
international arbitration.  In some states, this remains the case today. . . . 
In general, this hostility has waned somewhat . . . , with many states 
acceding to the New York Convention and enacting “pro-arbitration” 
legislation. 
BORN, supra note 223, at 8 (citation omitted). 
383 LEW ET AL., supra note 16, paras. 1-9, 1-13 to 1-18 (describing procedural 
differences between litigation  and arbitration). 
384 Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 96. 
385 See, e.g., LEW ET AL., supra note 16, para. 1-15 (describing how variations in 
form, structure, and procedure may arise in different arbitrations); Weidemaier, 
supra note 8, at 95–98 (arguing that class arbitration would benefit from the 
implementation of “innovative procedures that courts have been hesitant to 
accept”). 
386 See BORN, supra note 223, at 21 (explaining the purpose of the New York 
Convention and the general requirements it imposes on its signatories). 
387 New York Convention, supra note 1, arts. II–III (emphasis added). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss1/1
 
 
permissive, rather than mandatory, terms.  Therefore, although 
“[r]ecognition and enforcement of the award may be refused” on 
the request of a party, such refusal is permitted only on five specific 
grounds, even assuming that the court is so inclined.388  
“Recognition and enforcement of the award may also be refused” 
by a competent authority on two other grounds, including public 
policy.389  However, even these limited grounds for objection to 
enforcement may be further restricted, since, under article VII of 
the New York Convention, a party wishing to enforce an award 
may rely on other international agreements or on national law that 
would make it easier to obtain enforcement (a principle known as 
the “most favorable provision” doctrine, in that a party seeking 
enforcement can proceed under the principle of law most favorable 
to it).390 
Although this is not the place to discuss the depth of dedication 
with which individual states promote the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards, it is sufficient to note that different states support 
international arbitration to different degrees.391  It can also be said 
that a strongly pro-arbitration stance can be found in a number of 
states that are active in international commerce, including the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, The Netherlands, 
France, Italy and Switzerland.392  Furthermore, research suggests 
that the more a country wants to become active in international 
commerce, the more likely it is that the courts and/or legislature of 
that country will adopt a pro-arbitration stance, since the inability 
to obtain reliable enforcement of an arbitral award typically leads 
international commercial actors to avoid business dealings with 
 
388 Id. art. V(1) (emphasis added). 
389 Id. art. V(2) (emphasis added). 
390 Id. art. VII; see also LEW ET AL., supra note 16, para. 6-44 (explaining the 
most favorable provision doctrine).  For example, the French interpretation of 
article VII of the New York Convention means that parties wishing to enforce a 
foreign arbitral award in France will not be faced with an objection based on 
article V(1)(e), since the French statute authorizing enforcement does not permit 
objections on those grounds in either domestic or international enforcement 
actions.  See Pabalk Ticaret v. Norsolor, 24 I.L.M. 360 (1985) (construing article VII 
of the New York Convention in conjunction with article 12 of France’s New Code 
of Civil Procedure); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, paras. 10-71 to 10-72. 
391 See BORN, supra note 223, at 29–30 (describing how vestiges of historical 
suspicion and hostility towards arbitration can remain in certain countries’ legal 
traditions). 
392 Id. at 30. 
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entities based in that state.393  As a result, “[l]eading international 
arbitration conventions and national law [both] provide for the 
presumptive enforceability of arbitration agreements.”394 
It is true that some states have demonstrated a “historic 
distrust” regarding international arbitration, and although that 
distrust has waned, courts in those countries may still refuse to 
enforce international awards based either on a philosophic 
opposition to international arbitration or as a result of requests by 
individuals, companies or state entities that would be injured as a 
result of a pro-enforcement stance.395  Nevertheless, “[a]n 
important aim of the Convention’s drafters was uniformity: they 
sought to establish a single, stable set of international legal rules 
for the enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards,” thus 
suggesting that narrow, nationalistic approaches to international 
arbitration are inappropriate under the New York Convention.396 
Most of the rationales supporting a pro-arbitration policy are 
commercial, at least in the international realm.397  For example, 
international arbitration facilitates international commerce because 
the existence of enforcement treaties such as the New York 
Convention398 gives parties some assurance that they can recover 
damages from entities located in other countries.399  Prior to the 
widespread enactment of international arbitration treaties, 
commercial actors had to subject their disputes to the vagaries and 
 
393 Id. at 29–30; see Christopher R. Drahozal, Regulatory Competition and the 
Location of International Arbitration Proceedings, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 371, 372–74 
(2004) [hereinafter Drahozal 2] (arguing that the number of arbitrations in a given 
country increase upon the enactment of a new or revised arbitration law). 
394 BORN, supra note 223, at 5. 
395 Id. at 29–30. 
396 Id. at 23. 
397 William W. Park, The International Currency of Arbitral Awards, 756 PLI/Lit 
309, 360 (2007); see also Drahozal 2, supra note 393, at 374, 382–83 (noting those 
who promote new or revised arbitration statutes claim economic benefits will 
result; finding some empirical support for that position, albeit not to the extent 
commonly believed). 
398 Again, the New York Convention is only the best known of many 
multilateral and bilateral enforcement agreements.  See generally New York 
Convention, supra note 1. 
399 BORN, supra note 223, at 7–10, 19. Interestingly, the reverse may also be 
true—that the New York Convention’s success is based on the fact that it came 
into being “in the 1960s and 1970s, as world trade and investment began 
significantly to expand.  With this expansion came substantially greater numbers 
of international commercial disputes—and arbitrations—which gave practical 
utility to the Convention.”  Id. at 22. 
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possible biases of national courts.400  Although parties could 
attempt to sidestep rogue courts through choice of forum clauses, 
those clauses were not always upheld.401  Furthermore, an 
international actor still had to deal with those courts when it came 
time to enforce a judgment.402  Even the most reputable courts were 
still under no duty to enforce a judgment arising out of a foreign 
court, since no widespread multilateral treaties existed for the 
enforcement of judgments and requests to enforce a foreign 
judgment typically turned on the principles of comity.403 
Thus, international arbitration—with its easy enforcement 
mechanisms—became the preferred route for dispute resolution in 
the international commercial field.404  With arbitration came a 
number of collateral benefits for international actors.  For example, 
parties to an arbitration not only avoid the biases of national 
courts, they also avoid procedural quirks that might give one party 
a home court advantage.405  The procedure and location of an 
arbitration is often chosen to provide as neutral a playing field as 
possible.406  Furthermore, the flexibility of arbitration allows parties 
to enjoy a procedure that is “tailor made” for their dispute and 
may result in a savings of cost and time.407  This sort of innovation 
and lack of formalism is particularly appropriate and appreciated 
in international matters, where the legal and business cultures of 
the parties and/or arbitrators can sometimes vary widely and 
where a pragmatic, rather than legalistic, approach is highly 
valued.408 
If the underlying rationale behind international commercial 
arbitration in non-class situations is the creation of a flexible, 
pragmatic international dispute resolution mechanism that will 
encourage international commerce and investment, then the 
question is whether international class arbitration supports or 
conflicts with that position.  If international class arbitration is 
consistent with the aims and goals of international bilateral 
 
400 Park, supra note 397, at 360. 
401 Id. 
402 Id. 
403 Id. 
404 BORN, supra note 223, at 10. 
405 Id. at 2, 8. 
406 Id. at 9. 
407 Id. at 7–9. 
408 Id. at 2. 
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arbitration, then states should support the enforcement of 
international class awards.  To do otherwise would (a) create a 
hierarchy of “acceptable” types of international arbitrations, 
creating a precedent for other types of exceptions to enforcement 
based on grounds other than those contained within the New York 
Convention; and (b) create confusion and conflict in the 
international realm and diminish the aim of uniformity across 
jurisdictions, since enforcement of class awards will be 
presumptively permitted in some states (such as the U.S., Canada, 
Australia and England) and not in others (such as most civil law 
states, with the possible exception of Brazil).409  Indeed, if 
international class arbitration were shown to conflict with the aims 
and goals of other forms of international arbitration, then 
enforcement of class awards should not be presumed.  As it turns 
out, international class arbitration is in fact consistent with the 
policies and aims of international bilateral arbitration. 
5.1.2. Policies Supporting International Class Arbitration 
It is true that class arbitration is not universally embraced by 
either the legal or business community, even within the United 
States, where it is most common.410  Indeed, a split in support even 
can be seen with respect to judicial class actions, which are the 
predecessors for class arbitrations.411  On the one hand, class 
actions—and class arbitrations—result in a number of advantages, 
some of which are based on efficiency (often a pro-business 
rationale) and others of which are based on justice.  For example, 
class proceedings in both courts and arbitration include the 
following benefits: 
 The reduction of discovery and pre-hearing procedures, 
leading to savings of cost, effort and time. 
 The presentation of all legal and factual disputes to one 
decision maker, which (a) increases the likelihood of 
reaching the “right” result; (b) decreases the likelihood 
of additional dispute resolution proceedings, thus 
allowing defendants to get on with their business 
affairs; and (c) creates the possibility of a single global 
 
409 See supra text accompanying notes 102–21. 
410 See supra text accompanying note 24. 
411 See supra text accompanying notes 51–52. 
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settlement which may be more realistic and which may 
avoid bankrupting the defendant. 
 Consistency of results for both claimants and 
defendants. 
 To the extent that (a) contingent or conditional fees are 
allowed or (b) fee shifting is limited or restricted, the 
possibility that claimants will bring an action that 
would not have been otherwise brought. 
 Perhaps most importantly, at least from a social justice 
standing, the ability to permit recovery for small 
individual claims suffered by persons who might not 
have known they were injured and almost certainly 
would not have sought recovery even if they had 
known of their injury.  In theory, requiring defendants 
to pay the entire social cost of their wrongdoing should 
avoid much of the reason for high punitive damages, 
which are suspect in many jurisdictions.412 
Many of these benefits inure to both defendants and claimants, 
though it is certainly true that many corporate defendants oppose 
any mechanism—including class actions and class arbitrations —
that make it easier for claimants to bring claims against them, since 
fewer awards paid to claimants increases the company’s profits.413  
Furthermore, it is true that many of the benefits rely on efficiency 
arguments which, in the realm of multiparty arbitration, have not 
been universally adopted as a means of overcoming the traditional 
view of arbitration as a bilateral, contractual construct.  
Nevertheless, there are those in the international arbitral 
community who have supported efficiency as a proper 
consideration in multiparty actions, albeit not a controlling one.414  
In fact, commercial efficiency is—in many ways—a core goal of 
international commercial arbitration.  For example, arbitration has 
long been touted as a more efficient means of resolving both 
domestic and international commercial disputes than is 
 
412 LEW ET AL., supra note 16, para. 16–92; see Sternlight, supra note 3, at 28 
(describing the nature and benefits of a class action); Weinstein, supra note 60, at 
172–75 (same); Weston, supra note 20, at 1727 (same). 
413 See Sternlight, supra note 3, at 5 (arguing that corporate defendants are 
averse to class proceedings). 
414 See LEW ET AL., supra note 16, paras. 16-92 to 16-93 (noting circumstances in 
which multiparty arbitration may be warranted); Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 
255, at 1321 (claiming efficiency is becoming one of the primary goals of 
arbitration). 
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litigation.415  Additionally, the passage of the New York 
Convention was based on efforts to increase international 
commerce by making both the dispute resolution process and the 
enforcement of any resulting awards more efficient.416  Thus, the 
efficiency rationale of international class arbitration is particularly 
consistent with the international arbitration regime, even aside 
from the social justice claims. 
Of the various efficiency arguments, one requires particular 
attention.  The business community’s need and desire for 
transnational consistency is particularly important in areas of law 
(such as consumer or employment law, two common areas for 
class arbitration) that are heavily regulated at the national or 
regional level.  As the recent decision by the European Court of 
First Instance in the Microsoft competition case has shown, it is 
possible for a multinational corporation to be subject to 
diametrically opposing legal requirements that could prove costly 
(to both the business and the end consumer) or even fatal to that 
corporation’s ability to do business in a particular state or region.417 
International class arbitration also addresses a concern that has 
received a great deal of attention in U.S. arbitration circles, namely 
the “repeat player” syndrome.418  The premise of the repeat player 
syndrome is that corporate defendants—particularly in the 
consumer and employment fields, two areas that generate a large 
number of small, individualized claims—experience an allegedly 
higher number of favorable judgments in individual (bilateral) 
 
415 BORN, supra note 223, at 9–11. 
416 Id. at 8. 
417 U.S. Department of Justice, European Microsoft Decision Could Discourage 
Competition, Sept. 17, 2007, http://useu.usmission.gov/Dossiers/Antitrust/ 
Sep1707_Barnett_Microsoft.asp (noting discrepancies between European and 
American rulings on Microsoft’s allegedly anticompetitive conduct). 
418 Compare Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 13, at 75–76, 92 (discussing 
problems associated with class arbitration in consumer context) with Ware, supra 
note 130, at 274–76 (discussing contracts of adhesion in class arbitration context), 
and Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 71–81 (addressing the benefits to repeat players 
in arbitration).  See also Lisa B. Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute Resolution 
Design and Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 873, 889 (2002) (noting a 
“pattern of results [that] tended to contradict assertions of systemic bias in favor 
of employers in employment arbitration”); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, 
Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment 
Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 231, 233 (1998) (discussing Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission’s contention “that mandatory arbitration 
has a built-in bias for the employer who is a repeat player” in light of empirical 
data revealing no systematic pro-employer bias). 
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arbitrations because (1) arbitrators tend to side with the parties 
who are more likely to provide the arbitrators with future business, 
i.e., the corporations who often retain the right to name the 
arbitrators and who are faced with a large volume of nearly 
identical claims, and (2) repeat players gain a large amount of 
intellectual capital concerning the best way to present their case 
over time, as opposed to one-off parties who may or may not have 
legal representation.419  The problem is particularly troubling in 
many commentators’ minds because many of the arbitrations in 
which the repeat player syndrome occurs involve mandatory 
arbitration clauses that are imposed by large corporations on 
smaller, weaker individuals.420  
However, the repeat player syndrome might in many ways be 
resolved by permitting class arbitration, including international 
class arbitration.  For example, by combining the majority of claims 
into a single action, the corporate defendant will not experience 
any of the “repeat player” benefits, such as: 
 a facility with the procedure gained through repeat 
procedures, since the class procedure will likely be sui 
generis and will not, in any event, be repeated regularly; 
 utilizing experienced counsel with superior knowledge 
of the facts and/or law at issue, since the claimants in a 
class proceeding will be represented by more 
sophisticated counsel than is often true in 
individualized employment or consumer arbitration, 
where the claimant may not be able to afford to hire any 
legal representation, let alone sophisticated counsel; 
 the ability to chose an arbitrator that is predisposed to 
the defendant’s case, at least in cases involving the 
AAA Supplementary Rules, since that rule set requires 
at least one arbitrator to be named from the AAA 
 
419 Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 71–81.  The repeat player problem is less of 
an issue outside the U.S. because some jurisdictions do not permit pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses in consumer cases.  Drahozal & Friel, supra note 97, at 372–73.  
Although some states may consider employment and consumer disputes to be 
“non-commercial” and thus potentially outside the New York Convention, 
objections based on due process and public policy may arise through other means.  
See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
420 Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 69.  It is precisely these kinds of mandatory 
arbitration clauses that courts outside the United States will likely find most 
problematic (and hence presumptively unenforceable).  Catherine A. Rogers, The 
Arrival of the “Have-Nots” in International Arbitration, 8 NEVADA L. REV. 341, 360 
(2007) [hereinafter Rogers 2]. 
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national roster of class arbitration arbitrators, thus 
inserting an increased level of impartiality by virtue of 
the limited number of potential arbitrators;421 and 
 a presumption that the arbitrator will side with the 
repeat player, since (a) there is only one proceeding and 
thus little likelihood of repeat business and (b) there 
may be increased national or international scrutiny of 
the award and proceedings; in particular, international 
standards regarding the impartiality and independence 
of arbitrators422 suggest that arbitrators in international 
actions will be dutiful in protecting their impartiality 
and independence.423 
Furthermore, if the presumed benefit to the repeat player had 
actually ensued, the corporate defendant would not be subject to 
an enforcement action, since the corporate defendant would have 
prevailed. 
However, class proceedings–both judicial and arbitral–have 
their downsides.  For example: 
 Class proceedings are more complex than bilateral 
proceedings, both in terms of procedural issues and 
legal issues. 
 
421 AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 7, rule 2(a).  The JAMS Class 
Arbitration Rules contain no similar provision.  Furthermore, corporate 
defendants faced with a class arbitration are more likely to want an arbitrator 
with strong experience in class proceedings, rather than someone who is simply 
their arbitrator “on call,” since procedural errors could result in an invalid award. 
422 See LEW ET AL., supra note 16, paras. 11-1 to 11-52 (discussing the 
impartiality and independence of arbitrators).  A detailed analysis of international 
standards of impartiality is outside the scope of this Article, but documents such 
as the International Bar Association’s Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in 
International Arbitration have been very useful in flushing out the types of 
relationships and situations that can provoke challenges for lack of independence 
or impartiality in international arbitrations.  IBA Guidelines of Conflicts of 
Interest in International Arbitration, http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads 
/guidelines%20text.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2008) [hereinafter IBA Guidelines]; 
see also Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional 
Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 53, 55 (2005) 
(suggesting regulatory framework  to improve the standards of conduct among 
arbitrators) [hereinafter Rogers 3].  The IBA Guidelines help demystify the issue of 
arbitrator bias by creating a hierarchy of potentially problematic relationships that 
might give rise to claims of personal, professional or financial self-interest. See 
generally Rogers 2, supra note 420, at 377 (noting differences between domestic and 
international perspectives on ethical issues). 
423 See Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 69–81 (describing the “individuation 
critique”). 
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 Representative actions raise unusual ethical pressures 
due to the different nature of the client-attorney 
relationship. 
 Mass actions may force settlement, even when the 
claims are baseless, because of the threat of huge 
awards.424 
 Class and representative proceedings create concerns 
about the adequate protection of the rights of absent 
class members, even in those jurisdictions that embrace 
representative actions.425 
Some of these concerns—particularly the first—cut against any 
efficiency arguments that can be made in favor of international 
class arbitration, while others challenge the claim that class 
proceedings promote social justice in a way that is difficult or 
impossible in bilateral proceedings.  However, the most 
compelling argument against class or representative proceedings—
i.e., that such actions do not adequately protect the rights of absent 
class members in either the arbitral or judicial context—is one that 
is squarely addressed by the New York Convention, primarily 
through the public policy exception under article V(2)(b).  That 
issue will be discussed below. 
The other policy-based argument that could be used to oppose 
class arbitrations concerns the contractual nature of arbitration.  
Parties can—and have—argued that efficiency and social justice 
arguments in favor of class arbitration cannot overcome the 
contractual basis of arbitration.426  However, international 
commercial arbitration recognizes that arguments based on 
contract do not always prevail.  For example, mandatory rules of 
law will prevail over party autonomy; non-signatories may 
occasionally be bound to an arbitration agreement, often based on 
concerns sounding in equity and despite the lack of strict 
contractual privity; and consolidation may be ordered in some 
 
424 In fact, settlement of both class arbitrations and class actions are quite 
likely, though perhaps more so in U.S.-style class actions, since American-style 
discovery is expensive and time consuming.  Because unwarranted settlements 
raise the cost of doing business (which is eventually passed on to the consumer), 
there is a social cost associated with baseless class proceedings. 
425 Smit, supra note 13, at 210; Sternlight, supra note 3, at 34–37; Weinstein, 
supra note 60, at 172–74. 
426 Strong, supra note 13, passim. 
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cases even over the parties’ objections.427  While these examples are 
the exception rather than the rule, opponents to class arbitration 
cannot claim that the strict terms of the contract will or should 
prevail in all circumstances.  Furthermore, courts and arbitrators 
have been able to construe arbitration agreements to permit class 
proceedings without having to do violence to established notions 
of party autonomy.428 
Thus, as a general matter, policies in favor of international 
commercial arbitration also favor international class arbitration.  
The policies—including both efficiency and social justice 
concerns—do not line up one hundred percent in class arbitration’s 
favor, but they do provide significant support.  Furthermore, if 
certain types of arbitral proceedings were excluded from the New 
York Convention’s presumption of enforceability based, not on the 
grounds contained within the New York Convention, but rather on 
other, more general arguments, it would undercut the certainty 
and predictability that are both the aims of and foundation for 
international commercial arbitration.  Thus, the overwhelming 
trend towards pro-arbitration policies—and the need for a uniform 
approach to enforcement of international awards—indicates that 
international class awards should be treated in the same manner as 
awards arising out of bilateral arbitrations. 
5.2. International Class Arbitrations Should Be Upheld Under the New 
York Convention 
The general policy arguments discussed in the preceding 
section indicate that international class awards should be given the 
same presumption of enforceability as other international awards.  
A similar conclusion is reached under the specific provisions of the 
New York Convention. 
5.2.1. Due Process Objections Cannot Provide a Blanket 
Prohibition on Class Arbitration 
Different states have different views about the proper 
parameters of due process, which could lead to confusion in 
 
427 See LEW ET AL., supra note 16, paras. 7-33 to 7-58, 16-50, 16-70 to 16-78, 17-8 
to 17-10, 17-22 to 17-26 (discussing limits on party autonomy ). 
428 See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 451 (2003) (plurality 
opinion) (noting, for example, that named and unnamed class members consented 
to the named arbitrator by virtue of their continuing in the class). 
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enforcement actions.  However, courts considering objections to 
enforcement under article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention are 
supposed to use the standards of the state whose procedural law 
controlled the arbitration (typically the law of the seat of the 
arbitration).429  This is helpful to courts faced with motions to 
enforce international class awards for two reasons.  First, most 
class arbitrations in the next few years will likely be seated in 
jurisdictions that already permit some form of representative 
action in their national courts and perhaps also in arbitration.  
Because those states have already resolved many of the due 
process issues raised by representative proceedings, parties to 
international class arbitrations would find it difficult to advance 
any sort of blanket due process objections to class arbitration under 
the law of those jurisdictions. 
Second, the two major areas of concern regarding due 
process—notice and the ability to present one’s argument—are 
actually not as problematic in practice as they are in the abstract.  
For example, both of these due process concerns are met—at least 
as a matter of U.S. law, which will apply in many of the early 
international class arbitrations—through the use of the AAA 
Supplementary Rules or, to a lesser extent, the JAMS Class 
Arbitration Rules.430 
Furthermore, both of these due process concerns are more 
likely to be problematic from the claimants’ perspective than the 
defendant’s perspective, meaning that it is perhaps less likely that 
they will be raised in an international enforcement action.  For 
instance, commentators have questioned the ability to provide 
effective notice to absent claimants who may not receive or 
understand a notice provision and the ability of those claimants to 
participate in the conduct of the proceedings.431  However, actions 
to enforce an international arbitral award will primarily be to 
enforce an award of damages or an injunction against a corporate 
defendant, and notice to a corporate defendant is typically readily 
achieved and readily proven.  Furthermore, a corporate defendant 
is likely to have sophisticated counsel that will represent the 
corporation’s needs more than adequately.  Although it is possible 
that a corporate defendant could argue that it did not have the 
 
429 Inoue, supra note 269, at 247; see also O’Hare, supra note 139, at 184 (noting 
that forum state’s due process standard should be applied). 
430 See supra notes 166–222 and accompanying text. 
431 ROTHSTEIN & WILLGING, supra note 69, at 19. 
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ability to present an individualized defense to each claim due to 
the sheer number of unspecified individual claimants in a class 
arbitration, this objection would most likely arise in the context of a 
public policy argument and will be discussed below.  It is also 
conceivable that a corporate defendant could claim that inadequate 
notice left the corporation open to future claims from non-named 
parties, but that sort of objection appears too speculative, 
particularly if it is not brought up during the proceedings.432  This 
sort of objection also reverses the parties’ roles to some extent, 
allowing the defendant to advance what is really the claimant’s 
argument (i.e., that inadequate notice injured the claimant in some 
way). 
There is one way that due process can become a problem even 
in international class arbitrations that are governed by the law of a 
class-friendly state.  As mentioned above, some states take the 
view that violations of due process rise to the level of a public 
policy concern, thus permitting the application of the enforcing 
state’s laws.433  While this sort of interpretation is improper, it has 
happened on occasion.434 
5.2.2. Public Policy Objections Cannot Provide a Blanket 
Prohibition on Class Arbitration 
Objections based on public policy are more problematic than 
objections based on due process.  First, some due process concerns, 
such as the right to defend against a claim, can be considered so 
fundamental to a state’s constitutional regime that they are 
transformed into public policy concerns, allowing the standards of 
the enforcing state to apply rather than the standards of the state 
whose procedural law governed the arbitration.  This type of shift 
could, for example, allow state constitutional concerns about the 
defendant’s right to confront each and every absent claimant to 
justify non-enforcement of a class award that would otherwise be 
valid under the procedural law governing the arbitration. 
Second, legitimate differences of opinion about the nature of 
individual procedural rights and the ability to assert a 
representative claim can rise to the level of a public policy concern.  
Different states have, for reasons of legal tradition and public 
 
432 See supra note 368 and accompanying text. 
433 See supra notes 277-83 and accompanying text. 
434 See supra notes 277-83 and accompanying text. 
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policy, taken different stances regarding the legitimacy of 
representative proceedings in court.  However, the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards is not analogous to the enforcement of 
foreign judgments or to the adoption of a foreign dispute 
resolution mechanism into a state’s domestic legal system.  First, 
arbitration permits a number of procedures that would not be 
permitted in court,435 so it cannot be expected that all policies 
applicable to judicial actions would or should apply equally to 
arbitration.  Both the parties—who are understood to have agreed 
to a procedure that does not slavishly imitate judicial norms—and 
the states—who have, through national legislation and adherence 
to multinational treaties such as the New York Convention, 
permitted the parties to choose those procedures—are operating on 
the premise that arbitration is not and need not be identical to 
litigation.  Imposing judicial norms on the arbitral procedure is 
both inappropriate and unnecessary. 
Furthermore, enforcement of an arbitral award is inherently 
different than the adjudication of a dispute; the emphasis during 
an enforcement action is on whether the process was proper and in 
accordance with the arbitration agreement, not whether the result 
and procedure would have been the same under the law and 
procedure of the enforcing state.436  Furthermore, enforcement of 
an arbitral award does not require a court to introduce a foreign 
and/or disapproved-of form of legal action—i.e., a representative 
action—into the domestic legal system.  The action to enforce an 
arbitral award is much simpler and was intended to avoid any sort 
of deeper inquiries into the legitimacy of the legal system that 
heard the case on the merits.  It was that kind of deeper inquiry 
that made the enforcement of foreign court judgments so difficult 
and led to the creation of multilateral treaties for the enforcement 
of arbitral awards. 
Presumptions obviously have their limits.  Too broad an 
application of a pro-enforcement presumption would eviscerate 
the public policy exception altogether, with parties claiming that 
 
435 See Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 95–96 (stating that international class 
arbitration permits arbitrators to implement innovative procedures that courts are 
hesitant to accept). 
436 See, e.g., Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation S.A. v. Hilmarton Ltd., 
[1992] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 146 (noting the court was not being asked to enforce the 
contract, but to enforce an award); Westacre Inv. Inc. v. Jugoimport-SPDR 
Holding Co., [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 65 (Eng. Civ. App.) (same). 
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any award issued by an arbitrator should be upheld.  As pro-
enforcement as the New York Convention is, it certainly 
contemplates situations where enforcement can and should be 
denied.  However, the New York Convention offers only limited 
grounds for non-enforcement, and those grounds are to be 
construed narrowly.437  Furthermore, objections based on public 
policy under article V(2)(b) must be based on international rather 
than domestic public policy.  These limitations suggest that the 
only policies that should be allowed to interfere with the 
enforcement of international class awards are those that shock the 
conscience of the international arbitral community.438  International 
class arbitration does not rise to that level, even if there are a 
number of jurisdictions that do not permit representative actions in 
their national courts.  Too many states permit representative 
actions to support the argument that an international consensus 
against representative actions exists. 
Instead, international public policy bodes in favor of the 
enforcement of international class awards, since certain economic 
abuses practiced globally by multinational corporations are likely 
to continue absent some sort of equally widespread remedy.439  Of 
course, this again touches on a sensitive area, since many civil law 
nations are opposed to allowing individuals to act as “private 
attorney generals” and prefer to address corporate abuses through 
domestic or regional legislation.440  If, however, the injuries are 
taking place outside the jurisdictional reach of the legislative body, 
then class arbitration may be the most effective and appropriate 
remedy.  Furthermore, the need to avoid regulatory inconsistency 
also suggests that class arbitrations, with their single, tailor-made 
remedies, would be a wise solution to certain transnational ills. 
Thus, awards resulting from international class arbitration 
should be treated as presumptively enforceable, even in countries 
that do not themselves allow representative actions.  Furthermore, 
the rights of defense are adequately protected in class arbitrations 
that follow the AAA Supplementary Rules or the JAMS Arbitration 
 
437 New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V; LEW ET AL, supra note 16, para. 
26–66. 
438 See supra notes 323–55 and accompanying text. 
439 See Buschkin, supra note 61, at 1588–93 (discussing how international class 
actions can deter economic abuses by global multinational corporations). 
440 Sherman, supra note 27, at 418 (describing the European preference for 
legislative action). 
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Rules, at least to the extent that a blanket objection to the 
procedure cannot be upheld. 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1. Current Status of International Class Arbitration 
Four factors indicate that an increasing number of international 
class arbitrations will be seen in the coming years.  First, the United 
States Supreme Court’s recognition of class arbitration as a viable 
dispute resolution device in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle441 
and the publication of the AAA Supplementary Rules and the 
JAMS Class Arbitration Rules mean that class arbitration cannot be 
seen as an anomalous procedural mechanism limited to a few U.S. 
states.  Indeed, the AAA has been asked to administer over 120 
class arbitrations,442 and many other class arbitrations may be 
proceeding on an ad hoc basis or under the administration of JAMS, 
which does not publish its class arbitration docket.443  Second, class 
arbitration has been considered a potentially acceptable process 
outside of the U.S., demonstrating that class arbitration is not 
limited to one country.444  Third, international commerce and 
investment continue to rise, meaning that the legal community will 
face an increasing number of transnational disputes of both a 
bilateral and multilateral nature.  Fourth, international class 
arbitrations already exist in three different forms: (1) situations 
where a defendant resides outside the country where the 
arbitration is seated; (2) situations where a defendant resides in the 
country where the arbitration is seated, but has significant assets in 
other countries; and (3) situations where the claimant class 
includes individuals resident outside the country where the 
arbitration is seated.445 
This Article has focused primarily on issues raised by the first 
two types of international class arbitration, looking at enforcement 
concerns that do not arise in traditional (bilateral) forms of 
 
441 539 U.S. 444, 455 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
442 Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 70. 
443 See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (concerning a potential ad hoc class arbitration), appeal docketed (2d 
Cir. June 2, 2008); Pedcor Mgmt. Co. v. Nations Pers. of Tex., Inc., 343 F.3d 355 
(5th Cir. 2003) (same). 
444 See supra notes 228–52 and accompanying text. 
445 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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international arbitration.446  When objecting to enforcement on due 
process grounds under article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention, 
the matter is considered from the perspective of the seat of the 
arbitration or the state whose laws govern the arbitral procedure.447  
The two primary objections will be based on notice and the ability 
to present one’s case.448  However, gross violations of due process 
can rise to a procedural public policy concern, which might result 
in the application of the enforcing state’s due process standards.449 
Unlike challenges based on due process, challenges based on 
either procedural or substantive public policy are considered from 
the perspective of the state of enforcement in an action under 
article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention.450  Procedural public 
policy concerns include due process issues as well as other matters, 
such as biased arbitrators or irregularities in the arbitration 
procedure, that are not unique to class arbitration.451  Several 
possible objections to class awards based on substantive public 
policy concerns exist.  For example, challenges might be based on 
conflicts with fundamental principles of law, including those 
regarding prohibitions on the abuse of rights, or on awards 
involving punitive damages and economic policy.452  The most 
likely objection to enforcement of international class awards will be 
based on civil law conceptions of individual procedural rights, 
which constitute a fundamental principle of constitutional law in 
some jurisdictions. 
 
446 Because the United States is the jurisdiction with (1) the most practical 
experience in class arbitration and (2) the most pro-class arbitration perspective 
(in terms of legal and social philosophy), it is likely that most international class 
arbitrations will be seated in the United States, at least in the near future.  
However, class arbitrations can be seated elsewhere.  See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen SA, 435 
F.Supp. 2d at 384 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (concerning a demand for class arbitration 
where one arbitration clause provided for arbitration in either New York or 
London).  Furthermore, an action to enforce a class award may also arise 
anywhere in the world. 
447 See supra note 269 and accompanying text. 
448 See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
449 See supra notes 277–84 and accompanying text. 
450 See supra note 309 and accompanying text. 
451 See supra note 324 and accompanying text. 
452 See supra notes 341-43 and accompanying text. 
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6.2.       International Class Arbitration Going Forward 
Although there do not appear to be any reported cases 
concerning the enforcement of an international class award under 
the New York Convention, courts faced with a motion to enforce 
are not deciding an entirely open question of law.  Instead, judges 
can and should be guided by policy and analogous precedent, both 
of which point to the presumptive enforceability of international 
class awards.  However, because class arbitrations—like any 
arbitration—can vary significantly in terms of governing law and 
procedure, courts should be prepared to consider how different 
variables could affect any arguments made concerning 
enforceability. 
First, some class arbitrations will adopt specialized rule sets 
specifically formulated for representative proceedings, whereas 
others will follow more general arbitral rules or proceed entirely ad 
hoc.  Though there is no requirement that a class arbitration use 
any particular set of rules or procedures, enforcing courts should 
look particularly favorably on proceedings that have adopted a 
specialized rule set such as the AAA Supplementary Rules or the 
JAMS Class Arbitration Rules.  Whether the rules are used on a 
binding basis or merely as procedural guidelines, they help 
structure the arbitration in a way that increases the likelihood that 
due process concerns are met.  Between the two, the AAA 
Supplementary Rules seem slightly preferable to the JAMS Class 
Arbitration Rules, except perhaps in cases where the parties have a 
high need for confidentiality.453  Although the use of these two rule 
sets will be most compatible with a class arbitration seated in the 
U.S. (since the two rule sets are based on the U.S. Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure), they can also be used in class arbitrations seated 
elsewhere.  In many ways, the two rule sets are ideal for use in 
other jurisdictions, since they either meet or exceed the procedural 
due process requirements of other states that permit representative 
actions in their national courts.  However, neither of the two rule 
sets appears to take into account the special concerns of civil law 
jurisdictions that oppose representative actions as a matter of 
principle, and therefore may not—by themselves—be enough to 
“save” a class award that is issued out of a jurisdiction that has 
traditionally demonstrated judicial and/or legislative hostility to 
representative proceedings.  If, however, the arbitrator creates an 
 
453 See supra notes 166–223 and accompanying text. 
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opt-in (rather than an opt-out) mechanism for claimants who live 
in nations where representative relief has not been broadly 
adopted, that might be sufficient to overcome some civil law 
objections regarding the nature of representative proceedings. 
Second, the seat of the arbitration will likely play a role in the 
presumptive enforceability of a class award, and enforcing courts 
should look carefully at the sites of the arbitration.  Because due 
process is considered from the perspective of the seat of arbitration 
or the state whose laws govern arbitral procedure,454 awards that 
arise out of a jurisdiction that is amenable to judicial class or 
representative proceedings stand a good chance of being found 
enforceable on due process grounds, particularly if the arbitration 
follows (1) one of the published rule sets or (2) the general 
procedural dictates of the judicially recognized representative 
action in that jurisdiction (since those dictates will be considered to 
comply with domestic, and likely international, notions of due 
process).  Class arbitrations that are seated in the United States are 
perhaps the most likely to be found to comply with local 
requirements concerning due process, since both class actions and 
class arbitrations have been used by domestic disputants for 
decades and there is no philosophical opposition to representative 
proceedings in the U.S. 
Although the United States is undoubtedly the “safest” 
jurisdiction in which to seat an international class arbitration, other 
states may also prove able to produce enforceable class awards.  At 
this point, awards issued out of common law jurisdictions (such as 
Canada or Australia) that permit broad, U.S.-style representative 
actions should also meet with few due process objections, 
particularly if the arbitrators utilize the AAA Supplementary Rules 
or the JAMS Class Arbitration Rules, which would likely meet or 
exceed local requirements regarding due process.455  Enforcing 
courts may have more trouble with awards arising out of civil law 
nations and those common law nations that permit only narrow 
formulations of representative rights,456 though the most forceful 
 
454 Although parties may choose to have their proceedings governed 
primarily by the procedural law of a state other than the seat of the arbitration, the 
procedural law of the seat always retains a residual role.  See Union of India v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 48, 50–51 (distinguishing between 
“internal” and “external” issues of procedural law). 
455 See supra notes 102–15 and accompanying text. 
456 However, some civil law systems—such as Brazil and possibly Colombia 
and Switzerland—can be considered amenable to representative actions.  See supra 
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objections from those jurisdictions will likely arise as a matter of 
public policy rather than due process. 
Third, enforcing courts may find that the type of dispute 
and/or the type of remedy sought has some bearing on arguments 
regarding enforceability.  For example, if the arbitral cause of 
action falls into an area that civil law legislatures have considered 
particularly amenable to collective action—such as consumer 
protection in the European Union and its Member States457—an 
enforcing court might still be able to find that due process was met, 
even in a civil law jurisdiction, since limited representative relief 
for that type of legal harm is already available in the national 
courts.  Similarly, an enforcing court might have fewer problems 
providing class relief where injunctive or declaratory relief alone 
were sought (as opposed to individual damages), since injunctive 
and declaratory relief does not trigger the civil law concern about 
protecting the defendant’s right to face all individual claimants. 
Fourth, public policy will doubtless play a role in many 
enforcement actions, but not necessarily a leading role.  Though 
parties have some flexibility in choosing where to seat their 
arbitrations, they have less of an ability to “forum shop” when it 
comes time to enforce their awards.  It may be impossible for 
claimants to avoid countries whose domestic public policies 
prohibit or limit representative relief, since enforcement decisions 
are typically based on pragmatic considerations involving the 
location of assets.458  When courts in jurisdictions that oppose 
representative judicial actions as a matter of principle are asked to 
deny enforcement of a class award, the enforcing court may be 
tempted to apply domestic notions of public policy, based on the 
New York Convention’s statement that enforcement may be 
refused if doing so “would be contrary to the public policy of that 
country.”459  Nevertheless, enforcing courts should remember to 
review any domestic public policy that is to be applied through an 
international lens.  Furthermore, enforcing courts should consider 
 
notes 116–21 and accompanying text.  England has also demonstrated its 
willingness to enforce judgments arising out of foreign representative actions, 
despite the fact that England does not itself provide broad representative relief as 
a matter of national law.  See supra notes 105–15 and accompanying text. 
457 Council Directive 98/27, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51 (EC). 
458 See LEW ET AL., supra note 16, para. 26–56 (stating that prevailing parties 
typically seek enforcement in jurisdictions where assets are located and the law on 
enforcement is most favorable). 
459 New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(2)(b) (emphasis added). 
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that sufficient policy grounds exist to hold that international class 
arbitrations are presumptively enforceable under the New York 
Convention. 
For example, when considering public policy arguments, 
enforcing courts should recognize the strong pro-arbitration 
policies inherent in many national statutes on arbitration, as well 
as in international enforcement mechanisms such as the New York 
Convention.  The fact that a national court would have decided the 
matter differently than the arbitrator did is no barrier to 
enforcement.  Indeed, as the Queen’s Bench Commercial Court 
stated when ruling to enforce an award based on a contract that 
would be unenforceable in English courts under English law, “the 
reason for the different result is that Swiss law is different from 
English law, and the parties chose Swiss law and Swiss arbitration.  
If anything, this consideration dictates (as a matter of policy of the 
upholding of international arbitral awards) that the award should 
be enforced.” 460  The court went on to state that “[i]t is legitimate to 
conclude that there is nothing which offends English public policy 
if an arbitral tribunal enforces a contract which does not offend the 
domestic public policy under either the proper law of the contract 
or its curial law, even if English domestic public policy might have 
taken a different view.”461  While this language is taken from one 
national court, the view that courts ought not go behind an arbitral 
award in an action under the New York Convention except in the 
most extreme situations is shared by many other nations.462 
Furthermore, enforcing courts should recognize that, as a 
general policy matter, the advantages of class arbitrations 
outweigh the disadvantages, particularly when claimants would be 
unlikely to arbitrate to recover very small sums.  In particular, the 
policies and goals supporting international bilateral arbitrations 
also support international class arbitrations. 
However, courts do not need to rely solely on efficiency 
arguments when considering how to treat international class 
awards going forward.  They can also rely on the fact that 
 
460  Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation S.A. v. Hilmarton Ltd., [1999] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 222, 224. 
461 Id. at 224–225. 
462 See LEW ET AL., supra note 16, para. 26–145 (stating that many national 
courts apply a concept of international public policy which is usually more 
restrictive than their domestic public policy); see also Park & Yanos, supra note 2, at 
273 (discussing federal courts’ limited role in reviewing arbitral awards under 
New York Convention). 
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arbitration is a dispute resolution procedure that is known for its 
innovation and informality.463  Thus, procedures that might not be 
adopted for court use can form the basis of a binding arbitration.464  
Furthermore, international arbitration is known for its 
amalgamation of civil law and common law procedures.465  
Although class arbitration currently reflects its common law 
origins, civil law lawyers can and should help shape its future 
development.  If civil law jurisdictions reject the procedure on a 
wholesale basis, they will not be able to play a role in its evolution. 
While civil law jurisdictions have weighed up the policy 
considerations for and against representative actions differently 
than common law jurisdictions have,466 at least in the context of 
litigation, it cannot be disputed that there are legitimate arguments 
in favor of allowing representative actions.  In fact, there are fewer 
disadvantages to representative actions in arbitration than there 
are in litigation.467  Furthermore, the public policy concerns might 
be lessened when one considers that parties can be said to have 
agreed to representative proceedings (either through the initial 
agreement to arbitrate or through the failure to opt out).  Since 
parties to arbitration are deemed to have bargained for a dispute 
resolution procedure with fewer due process protections and/or 
different procedures than litigation, civil law jurisdictions should 
not intervene in the parties’ agreed dispute resolution process 
based on domestic formulations of rights.  This is particularly true 
when the award results from an arbitration that is governed by 
procedural and substantive laws other than those of the enforcing 
state and is consistent with the public policy of that other state or 
states. 
International class arbitration has the potential to address civil 
wrongs that would otherwise be without remedy and provide 
relief to individuals who would otherwise be unwilling or unable 
to enforce their rights.  Though courts and commentators will have 
to monitor the development of this procedure, the international 
arbitral community should encourage enforcement of class awards 
on the same terms as other arbitral awards and give international 
 
463 Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 96. 
464 Id. 
465 BORN, supra note 223, at 44–47. 
466 See supra notes 90–121 and accompanying text. 
467 See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
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class awards the same presumption of enforceability as is granted 
to other awards under the New York Convention. 
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